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Introduction
1.1 Game Theory
The monograph lying before you deals with several subjects in the field of Game Theory.Broadly speaking, Game Theory is a mathematical theory to model and analyze so-called
conflict situations. In a conflict situation a group of goal-seeking individuals, each endowed
with his own knowledge, capacities, behavior, likes and dislikes, interact and thereby jointly
generate an outcome. Game Theory is a rather young field of study, its foundation was made
in an article by John von Neumann in 1928, but the theory received widespread attention
only after the publication of the seminal book by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944.
Since then, Game Theory is increasingly being applied in a wide variety of disciplines, like
economics, auction theory, political sciences, management, behavioral psychology and other
social sciences and in evolution theory. From these examples it is clear that the notion of
‘game’ should not be taken too restrictive, since Game Theory goes further than parlor games
like chess or poker. Nevertheless, a model of a conflict situation is usually called a game and
the individuals or decision-makers involved are called the players of the game.
The game (model of the conflict) itself consists of a number of data such as the number of
players and each player’s characteristics, together with the rules of the game. Numerous
other features of the real-life situation may be included in the data of a game. Furthermore,
there are some basic assumptions concerning the characteristics of the players. First of all,
it is quite often assumed that the data of the game is common knowledge. This means that
all players know the data of the game, each of the players knows that all players know the
data of the game and so on. Second, it is assumed that players understand the game, are
capable to express preferences for possible outcomes and that each player tries to obtain
among the outcomes the most profitable outcome. This assumption is known as a mild form
of rationality.
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Game Theory aims to prescribe what each player in a game can do, in order to promote his
interest optimally assuming that everyone else behaves rationally as well. To be more pre-
cise, Game Theory tries to find solution rules for certain classes of games. Solution rules
provide recommendations to the players involved, telling each of the players how to attain
an optimal outcome. Before one can try to come up with a certain concept for a solution
rule, it first should be clear which approach the players choose to achieve a certain out-
come. Roughly speaking, there are two different approaches to attain a particular outcome,
namely, players either ‘cooperate’ or ‘compete’ with each other. Traditionally, this division
is also reflected in Game Theory. The competitive nature of interaction is the topic of Non-
cooperative Game Theory. Here, the players cannot make binding agreements (as well as
other commitments) and are considered as individual (expected) utility-maximizers playing
against each other. The main focus in Non-cooperative Game Theory is on formalizing the
notions of rational behavior and the concept of equilibrium. We should emphasize that the
term ‘non-cooperative’ does not mean that this branch of Game Theory is incapable of ex-
plaining cooperation within groups of individuals. Rather it focuses on how cooperation may
emerge as rational behavior in the absence of the possibility to make binding agreements. In
case the players can attain particular outcomes for themselves through binding agreements,
we are dealing with Cooperative Game Theory. In this branch of Game Theory it is not only
interesting to know how players cooperate in an optimal way, but also the problem of how to
allocate the proceeds of the cooperation plays an important role.
1.1.1 Non-cooperative Game Theory
In a non-cooperative game the strategic aspects are all important. Each player involved rec-
ognizes his partial influence on the situation, since the outcome does not only depend on his
own actions but also on the actions of other players involved in the game. Those strategies
of a player that are, according to his preferences, the most profitable to him may depend on
strategies that his opponents have already taken, on those he expects them to be taking at the
same time and even on future strategies that they may take, or decide not to take, as a result
of his current strategy. The main interest within this branch of Game Theory is on finding
a set of recommendations that tell each player, in every situation that may arise, how to be-
have in such a way that benefits him most. By rationality this means that none of the players
should be able to improve by deviating unilaterally from such a recommendation. Hence, a
recommendation must be self-enforcing, meaning that for each player it should not be in his
interest to deviate as long as his opponents follow their recommendations. In game theoretic
terminology this means that such a recommendation is a Nash-equilibrium (Nash (1950)),
i.e., a strategy profile consisting of one strategy for each player with the property that it is
this player’s best response to the strategies actually played by his opponents.
The basic model of a non-cooperative game is the so-called normal-form game which in
case of two players is also referred to as a bi-matrix game. Informally, in a normal-form
game there are a finite number of players and each of them has a finite number of strategies
at his disposal by which he can influence the outcome of the game. Each player chooses,
simultaneously and without any possibility or wish to communicate with the other players, a
strategy that generates immediately a certain payoff to each one of the players. This ends the
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game. Let us have a look at an example of a bi-matrix game and of a Nash-equilibrium in
this game.
Example. Imagine that two very good friends have won a bet with a bookmaker and earned
50 euro with it. However, the bookmaker is sly and wants to earn his money back. To do so,
he challenges the two friends to divide the money as follows. Each of the two friends can
choose, at the same time and without telling the other, either ‘to share’ or ‘not to share’ the
50 euro. In case both friends choose ‘to share’, both of them receive 50 euro. So, in this case
the bookmaker pays each friend 50 euro. In case one of them chooses ‘to share’ and the other
one chooses ‘not to share’, the latter receives the 50 euro from the bookmaker and receives
an other 50 euro from the first player (who chooses ‘to share’). However, in case both of
them choose ‘not to share’, they will receive nothing and thus the bookmaker will win back
his 50 euro. Since, these two friends are convinced of their friendship and loyalty to one and
other, they decide to play the game as proposed by the bookmaker.
This game can be modeled as a bi-matrix game in which both players have two strategies ‘to
share’ denoted by S and ‘not to share’ denoted by NS. The evaluation of both players for all
the possible outcomes can be reflected in the following bi-matrix (which explains the name
of the game):
Pl
ay
er
1
Player 2
S NS
S
NS
50
50
− 50
100
100
− 50
0
0
Here, Player 1 is the row player and Player 2 is the column player. If, for instance, Player 1
chooses NS and Player 2 chooses S, then the outcome is the entry determined by these
choices, meaning that Player 1 receives 100 euro and Player 2 pays 50 euro.
Suppose one gives the recommendation (S , S) as a solution of the game, meaning that
Player 1 as well as Player 2 should choose S. Then in this situation it is in the interest
of Player 1 to deviate from this recommendation, i.e., choose NS instead of S, as long
as Player 2 follows his recommendation, i.e., still chooses S. The reason for Player 1 to
choose NS instead of S is because he will get 100 euro instead of 50 euro. Also Player 2
is inclined to deviate from (S , S). If one gives the recommendation (NS , S) as a solution,
it is in interest of Player 2 to deviate, i.e., to choose NS, since he will get 0 euro instead
of −50 euro. Similarly, Player 1 is inclined to deviate from (S , NS). However, if one gives
the recommendation (NS , NS) it is in no player’s interest to deviate unilaterally from it
and therefore the strategy profile (NS , NS) is a Nash-equilibrium. The following figure
illustrates this reasoning.
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Pl
ay
er
1
Player 2
S NS
S
NS
Figure 1. Unilateral improvements for Player 1 and Player 2.
Hence, according to the Nash-equilibrium both friends do not share the money and thus the
bookmaker will win his 50 euro back. ◦
Remark. The bi-matrix game discussed in the example is a version of the so-called pris-
oner’s dilemma. The title prisoner’s dilemma and the rather entertaining version with prison
sentences as payoffs are due to Albert W. Tucker (for an explanation see e.g., page 94–
95 in Luce and Raiffa (1957)). This bi-matrix game has become the classic example of a
non-cooperative game in economics, political and social sciences, and of course in Game
Theory. ◦
1.1.2 Cooperative Game Theory
In a cooperative environment the players may or must agree (e.g., enforced by a legal con-
tract) to a joint action that generates a certain outcome. By doing so, they may attain, ac-
cording to their preferences, a (relatively) high outcome in the given situation. In this branch
of Game Theory the strategic aspects become less important while the negotiations are all
important. The central question in Cooperative Game Theory is how one can divide the pro-
ceeds of cooperation among the players, in such a way that, according to their preferences,
is considered to be as fair as possible while taking into account all the contributions of the
players to this outcome.
The problem of fair division is as old as the hills. Already in the Hebrew Bible, the issue
of fairness is raised in some of the best-known narratives. Fairness triumphed, when King
Solomon proposed to cut a baby, claimed by two mothers, in two. When the true mother
protested and offered the baby to the other ‘mother’, the truth about the baby’s maternity
became apparent. Solomon’s proposed solution is maybe the first explicit mention of fair
division, known in recorded history. Although, it is not a real solution (Solomon had no
intention of cutting the baby in two), it distinguished the mother from the impostor. This
story, among several other stories from the Hebrew Bible, is studied from a game theoretical
point of view in Brams (1980).
The first problem of fair division is which normative concept one should use, since it may
not be clear which concept suits a division problem best. As a result, many concepts for so-
lution rules can be found in Cooperative Game Theory. Besides, Cooperative Game Theory
comprises several different models. The Transferable Utility (TU) game is studied the most.
This model of a cooperative game was already introduced in Von Neumann and Morgenstern
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(1944). Since then it forms the main pillar of Cooperative Game Theory. The second main
model in Cooperative Game Theory is the Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) game and is intro-
duced by Aumann and Peleg (1960). Let us have a look at a cooperative setting from which
these two models may arise.
Example. Imagine that the two friends in the example of Subsection 1.1.1 decide, after
being aware of the ‘catastrophic’ outcome according to the Nash-equilibrium, to make bind-
ing agreements before playing the game proposed by the bookmaker. Then the nature of
the game changes completely. Let us consider what each coalition, i.e., a non-empty sub-
set of the set of players, can achieve in this example. Player 1 can guarantee himself at
least a payoff of zero by choosing NS. Indeed, if he chooses this strategy, he receives ei-
ther 100 euro (Player 2 plays S) or 0 euro (Player 2 plays NS), while if he chooses S he
might have to pay 50 euro. Also Player 2 can guarantee himself a payoff of zero, by choos-
ing NS. Both players together, i.e., coalition {1, 2}, can achieve all outcomes within the set
{(50, 50), (100,−50), (−50, 100), (0, 0)}. This situation is depicted in the following figure.
r
(0, 0)
r(100,−50)
r(50, 50)
r(−50, 100)
Pl
ay
er
1
Player 2
Figure 2. All possible attainable outcomes.
The outcome generated by the two players, will be determined by negotiations. Player 1 will
not agree with an outcome below the horizontal line through the point (0, 0), while Player 2
will not agree with an outcome left of the vertical line through the point (0, 0), since both
players can guarantee themselves a payoff of zero. Hence, only outcomes in the gray area of
Figure 2 are taken in consideration and thus the options are (0, 0) or (50, 50). Since (50, 50)
is for both players better than (0, 0) they will, according to rationality, agree to share the
100 euro. Recall that in the non-cooperative setting both players decide, according to the
Nash-equilibrium, not to share and end up with nothing i.e., in the point (0, 0).
The cooperative game described above is called a Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) game. In
such games, it is assumed that payoffs cannot be transferred between the players. Therefore,
in such a game the only important issue for a coalition of players is its set of attainable
outcomes. However, since the possible outcomes are expressed in money, both players could
also make agreements in which side payments or monetary compensations are used, i.e., the
players can agree to choose a certain outcome under an additional condition in which both
players pay each other a certain amount of money. For instance, both players can agree to
play (S , NS) under the condition that Player 2 pays 60 euro to Player 1, yielding an outcome
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of (− 50 + 60 , 100 − 60) = (10 , 40). If in addition we assume that both players have an
equal evaluation for money, this second approach leads to a Transferable Utility (TU) game.
Following the same reasoning as before, both players can guarantee themselves at least the
payoff of zero. However, the players together can agree to achieve many more outcomes than
in the previous situation, as the following figure illustrates.
(0, 0)
(100, 0)
(0, 100)
(50, 50)
Pl
ay
er
1
Player 2
Figure 3. All possible outcomes in case of side payments.
All outcomes within the gray part of Figure 3 can be realized by negotiations between the two
players. Observe that the payoff vector of an outcome is not relevant, but only the sum of its
coordinates is all important. Hence, by rationality, the only important issue for each coalition
is the value of the most valuable outcome which can be realized. In case of coalition {1, 2}
this value is 100 euro. So, the outcome that will be realized in case both players come to an
agreement, is on the dark line in Figure 3, known as the Pareto boundary. This boundary,
introduced in Pareto (1909), is used in economic theory in case of decisions with multiple
conflicting objectives to obtain rational solutions (see e.g., Keeney and Raiffa (1976)). It is
not clear which outcome on this Pareto boundary both players agree to realize. However, the
outcome (50, 50) is still one of the possibilities and for this two-person TU-game it is also
the standard solution (see e.g., Aumann and Maschler (1985)). ◦
1.2 Outline of the thesis
In this monograph we are dealing with both, Non-cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory.
Herewith, we give an overview of the subjects studied in this thesis and we briefly discuss the
results we have obtained.
Chapter 2 deals with Cooperative Game Theory. The first part is introductory. It recalls some
results and well-known solution concepts in the theory of Transferable Utility (TU) games,
one of them being the core (Gillies (1959)). Although the core seems to be a very natural
solution concept, its existence cannot always be guaranteed. The bargaining set, introduced
by Aumann and Maschler (1964), is an extension of the core. This set contains allocations
which do not allow for objections to be justified. Since, a core allocation does not allow
any objection, the bargaining set contains the core. However, since the bargaining set also
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contains the kernel (Davis and Maschler (1965)) its non-emptiness can be guaranteed as long
as the TU-game has a non-empty imputation set. More recently, Granot (1994) presented a
new type of bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set. Also the reactive bargaining set is a
non-empty set-valued solution concept containing the kernel and the core. It is closely related
to the bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler, but it is a (proper) subset of the bargaining
set. The semireactive bargaining set (Sudho¨lter and Potters (2001)) takes a middle position
between these two concepts. It contains the reactive bargaining set and it is a (proper) subset
of the bargaining set.
In the main part of the chapter these three type of bargaining sets are studied on the class of
symmetric TU-games. It turns out that for a symmetric TU-game the reactive bargaining set
is the union of the kernel and the core. If one additionally assumes superadditivity, the same
statement holds for the semireactive bargaining set. For the bargaining set and the core of a
symmetric TU-game to coincide, one needs total balancedness. By means of examples, it is
shown that these assumptions cannot be omitted. Furthermore, the chapter provides a proof
for the core and bargaining set of an arbitrary TU-game to coincide whenever the value for
the grand coalition is large enough. In other words, if the proceeds of cooperation of all the
players is large enough, each of the three bargaining sets coincides with the core. However,
we end this chapter by providing an example of a symmetric TU-game which illustrates a
rather surprisingly phenomenon of the bargaining set. In the example the bargaining set and
the core coincide for all possible values for the grand coalition, except for exactly one value.
There, the bargaining set is the union of the core with a finite number of imputations outside
the core. This illustrates that the property ‘the bargaining set and the core coincide’ is not a
prosperity property (Gellekom, Potters, Reijnierse (1999)).
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study fair (re)allocations in economies with indivisible goods and
money.
The contents of Chapter 3 is twofold. The first part is closely related to Chapter 2. Here,
the reactive, semireactive and bargaining set are studied for exchange economies with in-
divisible goods and money. In these Debreu-type of economies (Debreu (1959), see also
Debreu (1983)) players, in this context usually referred to as agents, can exchange indivisible
goods with each other. Payments are made by a perfectly divisible good (money). Agents
have preferences for bundles consisting of a number of indivisible goods and an amount of
money. These preferences are assumed to be complete and transitive binary relations on the
set of consumption bundles. Since, the definitions of the three bargaining sets, studied in the
previous chapter for (symmetric) TU-games, are given in ordinal terms (i.e., without explicit
reference to utility functions), they can be extended to these types of economies. This is done
in the first part of Chapter 3.
We prove that the reactive bargaining set is non-empty, if the preferences of the agents can
be represented by quasi-linear utility functions and if the initial endowments satisfy the To-
tal Abundance (TA) condition. The latter is a condition on the amounts of money agents
initially have. By examples it is shown that for guaranteeing non-emptiness of the reactive
bargaining set neither the TA-condition nor the quasi-linearity of the utilities can simply be
omitted. Furthermore, it turns out that reallocations in the (semi)reactive bargaining set are
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individual rational (i.e., agents receive bundles which they appreciate weakly better than their
initial endowments). This result does not hold for the bargaining set. An exchange economy
with quasi-linear utilities generates a non-negative and superadditive TU-game. We show
that the core and the (semi)reactive bargaining set of an exchange economy, satisfying the
TA-condition, coincide if and only if the core and the (semi)reactive bargaining set of the
corresponding TU-game coincide.
The observation that every non-negative and superadditive TU-game generates an exchange
economy is the starting point for the second part of the chapter. Here, we prove that if in
addition this TU-game is balanced, then it generates an exchange economy with a price
equilibrium. However, different economies may yield the same TU-game. So, it is possible
that the set of price equilibria of two exchange economies, yielding the same TU-game, may
be different. This illustrates that the concept of price equilibrium is not a game theoretical
solution concept, i.e., it is a solution rule for economies, not for the corresponding games.
Chapter 4 is closely related to the previous chapter. Here, we also study economies with
indivisible goods. However, in this chapter the agents do not have initial endowments, i.e.,
there is no a priori allocation of the indivisible goods. The problem that arises is how to
allocate the indivisible goods among the agents in a fair way. Since these goods cannot be
divided, monetary compensations are used to obtain fair allocations. Like in Chapter 3, agents
are assumed to have preferences defined on the set of bundles consisting of indivisible goods
and money. In this chapter, however, more general preferences than quasi-linear ones are
considered.
The first concept, studied in this chapter, for a fair allocation is envy-freeness (Foley (1967)).
In an envy-free allocation each agent receives, according to his preference, the best bundle
among all the bundles in the allocation. So, each agent thinks that he receives the best part of
the allocation. Given that the preferences satisfy strict monotonicity and continuity in money
and the archimedean property (i.e., money can change preferences), we prove the existence of
envy-free allocations. An example illustrates that continuity in money and the archimedean
property cannot be omitted.
From a given envy-free allocation it is still possible for the agents to improve, by reallocating
the indivisible goods and the amounts of money. This observation brings us to an other
concept for allocating the indivisible goods, namely, envy-freeness and Pareto eff iciency. A
Pareto efficient allocation is optimal for all agents, in the sense that no agent can improve
his position without making at least one other individual worse off. We provide an example
which illustrates the incompatibility of envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. Intuitively, this
means one has to choose either an allocation which is envy-free, but agents still can improve
or an allocation from which nobody can improve without hurting the others, but which causes
envy. The final section of the chapter is devoted to provide some additional conditions for
the compatibility of envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 deal with fair allocations in certain resource sharing problems. A
natural approach to solve such problems is to model them as cooperative games and use a
solution concept to allocate the costs and/or profits of the shared resource.
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Chapter 5 studies the fair allocation of the total profit within a tree with revenues. Here, a
tree network is given with non-negative costs on the edges and a number of players in each
node. Each player may earn some non-negative revenue, if he is connected to the root of the
network (e.g., a central supplier). A cooperating coalition of players is assumed to connect
those members to the root who together yield the highest net profit (i.e., the maximum of
their total revenues minus the construction costs). The problem that arises is how to allocate
the proceeds of this cooperation among the players in a fair way. To study this problem we
construct a TU-game and propose the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) as a fair allocation of the
total profit. The nucleolus is a single-valued solution concept which for the TU-games studied
in this chapter is contained in the core. Calculating the nucleolus in general requires an
exponential number of computations, since the solution must adhere to coalitional rationality
conditions. The main focus of Chapter 5 is to bypass all the computational complexity and
devise a simple algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a tree with revenues. Furthermore,
we present some monotonicity properties satisfied by the nucleolus and a characterization of
the nucleolus as a solution rule for trees with revenues.
In Chapter 6 the problem of fairly allocating the minimal joint costs of a processing problem
is studied. In a processing problem there is a finite number of jobs that need to be com-
pleted. Each job requires a specific amount of effort (e.g., money, labor or demand). The
main restriction is the available capacity constraint to process jobs. During the time a job is
uncompleted a fixed cost (the cost-coeff icient of the job) has to be paid. The objective is to
minimize the total costs. To do so, the jobs can be processed in any way one likes, there are
no restrictions whatsoever on the processing schedule. However, as it turns out the total costs
can be minimized by performing the jobs one by one. With this observation one can find
easily an efficient algorithm to solve a processing problem. By applying Smith’s rule (Smith
(1956)) the optimal order can be derived.
Consider now the situation in which each job is owned by a different player. Each player
has an individual capacity to process jobs. It is an upper bound for the amount of effort
per time unit he can generate for handling jobs. A coalition of cooperating players faces a
processing problem with the coalitional capacity being the sum of the individual capacities
of the members. Next to the problem of minimizing the total costs, there is the problem of
allocating these costs among the players in a fair way. To analyze this problem we introduce
processing games which are TU-games considering costs instead of rewards. The main result
of the chapter is the total balancedness of this class of games. To be more precise, we provide
an explicit core allocation of the costs. It has the appealing property that the contribution a
player has in the total costs is independent on the optimal order that is chosen to process the
jobs.
The final chapter of this thesis is a topic in Non-cooperative Game Theory. The main solution
concept for non-cooperative games is the Nash-equilibrium (Nash (1950)). However, this
concept has several drawbacks. The first one is its multiplicity and the inconsistency of many
Nash-equilibria with the intuitive notion about what an equilibrium should be. Moreover, the
question remains on how players come to play a Nash-equilibrium. An approach to study
these problems was inspired by the theory of evolution of populations of animals. The paper
by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) was the starting point of the idea of introducing evolution
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of species for a way to justify the concept of Nash-equilibrium.
In Chapter 7 we formalize this idea for normal-form games, by introducing a dynamic se-
lection process defined by differential equations. These differential equations are defined by
so-called regret-functions which measure the ‘regret’ of a player, expressed in his payoff, of
not having played a certain pure strategy to his disposal. This dynamic selection process has
the appealing property that its rest-points and the set of Nash-equilibria coincide. The main
question studied is whether the limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria. Intuitively,
this means that the dynamics has a tendency only towards Nash-equilibria. Due to an exam-
ple of Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) this question has a negative answer. However, the main
results of the chapter state that on the class of zero-sum games (Von Neumann (1928)) (or
strategic equivalent games) as well as on the class of potential games (Monderer and Shapley
(1996)) every limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria. We provide for each class
of normal-form games a Lyapunov function and we prove that both classes of normal-form
games require different functions to be Lyapunov functions. Also the concept of asymptotic
stability is studied. In a zero-sum game the (unique) Nash-component is asymptotically stable
and in a potential game a smoothly connected component of Nash-equilibria is asymptotically
stable if and only if it is a local maximizer of the potential.
2
Bargaining Sets in Cooperative Games
2.1 Introduction
For a greater part of the current chapter the bargaining set, the semireactive bargaining set
and the reactive bargaining set are studied within the class of symmetric TU-games. Most of
the results derived in this part can also be found in Meertens, Potters and Reijnierse (2006b).
The first part of the chapter is an introduction to the theory of Transferable Utility games.
In 1964, Aumann and Maschler introduced the idea to base a solution concept for coopera-tive games on certain bargaining possibilities of the players. They introduced several types
of bargaining sets. The variant Mi1, simply referred to as the bargaining set and studied in
Davis and Maschler (1967), attracted the most attention. The bargaining set is a set-valued
solution concept. Set-valued solution concepts usually recommend which outcomes should
be rejected. They do not claim that every element in the set is convincing. In fact, it may
be possible to devise games in which certain outcomes, according to the solution, make in-
tuitively no sense. In an attempt to solve this problem, one may define a smaller set-valued
solution concept that will reject more undesirable outcomes. This approach has been taken in
the case of the bargaining setM (= Mi1) of Aumann and Maschler. In 1994, Granot (see also
Granot and Maschler (1997)) introduced a new type of bargaining set, the reactive bargaining
set. This new type is closely related to the original concept, however, it is a (proper) subset of
the bargaining set. More recently, Sudho¨lter and Potters (2001) introduced the semireactive
bargaining set which takes a middle position between the other two bargaining sets.
The underlying idea of each of these bargaining sets is that imputations which allow justified
objections are rejected. As soon as an imputation is not a core allocation, certain coalitions
have reasons to depart from the grand coalition and can raise an objection. If the objection
is from player k against player `, and the latter player is not able to counter, the objection is
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justified. So, an objection can be interpreted as a complaint of player k against player `. It
consists of a coalition of players, say coalition P , containing player k and not player `, and
an alternative solution for the players in this coalition which is strictly better than the initial
solution. An interpretation is that player k tries to form a coalition in which he promises all
the players an improvement to get them on his side to object. Player ` is able to counter this
objection if he can find a coalition Q containing player ` and not player k and an alternative
proposal for the players in Q. This proposal is weakly better than the initial solution for
the players outside coalition P (but members of coalition Q) and also weakly better than the
alternative solution of player k for the players in P and Q (if there are any). An interpretation
is that player ` tries to find a coalition Q in which he can keep the players outside coalition P ,
but in coalition Q, content with respect to the initial solution and give the players in both
coalitions P and Q at least the alternative solution offered by player k.
So, these three bargaining sets have in common that they do not admit justified objections.
They diverge with respect to the order in which the objections and counter-objections are
announced. If in the bargaining set M player k plans to object against player `, he has
to announce the objection before player ` has to state his counter-objection. So, player `
knows completely the objection of player k, before specifying his counter-objection. But
in the reactive bargaining set Mr, player ` must choose a coalition for defending himself
against every possible objection of player k. So, before player k states his objection, player `
should already specify the coalition he uses to counter. As this concept allows for more
justified objections (player ` has more difficulties to defend himself), the reactive bargaining
set is a subset of the bargaining set. The semireactive bargaining set Msr takes a middle
position between these two concepts. In the semireactive bargaining set player k has only
to announce in advance the coalition which he plans to object with. Player k may wait to
specify the objection via this coalition, until player ` has specified the coalition he uses to
counter. So, player ` only knows the coalition player k uses to object with, before he should
give the coalition to counter. In view of how much player k is able to react to the coalition
announced by player ` and thus to have better possibilities for a justified objection, we have
for a Transferable Utility (TU) game 〈N, v〉 the following inclusions
Mr(v) ⊆ Msr(v) ⊆ M(v).
Sudho¨lter and Potters (2001) give examples of TU-games for which each of these inclusions
are strict. Granot (1994) proves thatMr(v) is non-empty for all TU-games 〈N, v〉with a non-
empty imputation set. The proof of this statement boils down to the fact that the kernel (Davis
and Maschler (1965)) is contained in the reactive bargaining set which, in turn, is proven to
be non-empty by the same authors. Moreover, the reactive bargaining set contains the core
whenever the latter is non-empty. An easy and straightforward argument is that imputations
in the core do not allow any objections and therefore there is nothing to counter at all. By the
inclusions mentioned above, both statements also hold for the semireactive bargaining set and
the bargaining set. In general each of these bargaining sets may properly contain the core.
However, in the literature several classes of TU-games can be found for which one of these
three bargaining sets and the core coincide. Let us summarize these classes of TU-games.
The bargaining set and the core coincide for:
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• Convex games (Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972)),
• Strongly balanced partitioning games, including e.g., assignment games and Γ-com-
ponent additive games (Potters and Reijnierse (1995)),
• Non-negative superadditive games with a veto player (Potters, Muto and Tijs (1989)),
• Clan games (Potters, Poos, Tijs and Muto (1989)),
• Supperadditive simple flow games (Reijnierse, Maschler, Potters and Tijs (1996)),
• Three-person and four-person balanced games (Solymosi (2002)).
Of course, by the inclusions mentioned earlier, for these classes of TU-games the semireac-
tive and reactive bargaining set also coincide with the core. Furthermore, the semireactive
bargaining set (and thus also the reactive bargaining set) coincides with the core for:
• Superadditive simple games, including e.g., apex games and superadditive weighted
majority games (Sudho¨lter and Potters (2001)).
Finally, the reactive bargaining set and the core coincide for:
• Simple network games (Granot (1994) and Granot, Granot and Zhu (1997)),
In this chapter we give, for each bargaining set, a new class of TU-games for which the par-
ticular bargaining set and the core coincide. We restrict our analysis to the class of symmetric
TU-games. Of course, neither of the three bargaining sets can be seen as a real solution con-
cept for symmetric TU-games, since it is obvious how the value of the grand coalition should
be divided among the players. Nevertheless, already on this rather simple class of TU-games,
these bargaining sets demonstrate a different behavior. That is, for each of the three bargain-
ing sets different assumptions on the structure of the symmetric TU-game are needed in order
for the particular bargaining set and the core to coincide. It turns out that for every symmetric
TU-game the reactive bargaining set is the union of the core and the kernel. If the TU-game is
superadditive, the same statement holds for the semireactive bargaining set. For the bargain-
ing set and the core to coincide for a symmetric TU-game, total balancedness is sufficient.
By examples we illustrate that each of these additional assumptions cannot be omitted. It is
a straightforward observation that for a symmetric TU-game, the kernel is a singleton (i.e.,
the value of the grand coalition is equally divided among the players). So, for an arbitrary
symmetric TU-game, the reactive bargaining set is the only concept among the three bargain-
ing sets providing us with those solutions which one, intuitively speaking, would hope for. If
the symmetric TU-game is not balanced, it gives ‘equal split’ as a solution and in case it is
balanced, core allocations are provided as a solution (i.e., if there is an objection, then it is
justified).
The chapter contains also a proof that for an arbitrary TU-game the bargaining set and the
core coincide whenever the value of the grand coalition is ‘large enough’. This means that
for a given incomplete TU-game (i.e., the value of the grand coalition is not yet specified)
one can calculate a worth such that the bargaining set and the core coincide whenever the
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value of the grand coalition exceeds this worth. A quite intriguing example of a symmetric
TU-game, however, illustrates that the property ‘the bargaining set coincides with the core’ is
not a prosperity property (Gellekom, Potters and Reijnierse (1999)). This means that for an
incomplete TU-game there does in general not exist a worth such that the bargaining set and
the core are the same sets if and only if the value of the grand coalition exceeds this worth.
2.2 Transferable utility games
In cooperative game theory it is assumed that the players’ first concern is to form a coalition
in which they can profitably cooperate. Once the coalition has been formed, the players
choose a joint action that generates an outcome. Each player has his own utility evaluation
on the outcome, so the choice of a joint action and the generated outcome will therefore be
the subject of negotiations. A well-known and extensively used model in cooperative game
theory is the so-called finite n-person game with transferable utility (TU-game). This section
is devoted to give a brief overview of the theory of TU-games. We recall some basic solution
concepts along with some properties of these solution concepts. Also some properties on
the structure of TU-games are given. For a more complete overview the reader is referred to
Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003). Let us start by giving the formal definition of a TU-game.
Definition. A TU-game is described by a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a finite set of players and
where v : 2N −→ R is a characteristic function which assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N a
real number v(S), the value of coalition S, with the convention that v(∅) = 0. The set N is
called the grand coalition. ◦
The value v(S) ∈ R denotes the maximum profit that coalition S ⊆ N can generate by
joint actions when it forms. Often it is assumed that the grand coalition N is formed, in
other words all players of the TU-game cooperate. The term ‘transferable utility’ refers to
the assumption that utility can be transferred from one player to another player and that the
utilities of the players are comparable. The easiest situation which satisfies this assumption
is when all values v(S) are expressed in terms of money, all players have enough money and
they have the same linear utility for money. In Chapter 3 exchange economies with indivisible
goods, money and quasi-linear utilities are studied from which such cooperative games arise
in a natural way. Also the resource sharing problems studied in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6
generate TU-games in an obvious way.
Once the model for a TU-game is given, the next step is to solve it. In this case, given that the
grand coalition forms, this means to recommend fair allocations of the value v(N) among the
players in N . In the theory of cooperative TU-games many solution concepts can be found.
A solution concept ϕ assigns to every TU-game 〈N, v〉 (within some class of TU-games) a
subset ϕ(N, v) of RN . We usually write ϕ(v) instead of ϕ(N, v) as long as there is no doubt
about the set of players N . Before we recall the definitions of some basic and well-known
solution concepts, we first give some desirable properties for a solution concept to satisfy.
Definition. A solution concept ϕ is:
• Efficient whenever x(N) = v(N) for all x ∈ ϕ(v) and every 〈N, v〉,
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• Individually rational whenever xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N , all x ∈ ϕ(v) and every 〈N, v〉,
• Coalition rational whenever x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , all x ∈ ϕ(v) and every 〈N, v〉.
For all S ⊆ N we use the standard shorthand notation x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi. ◦
Efficiency states that the value v(N) is completely allocated among the players. Individual
rationality states that each player receives at least the profit that he can achieve by himself,
whereas coalition rationality states that each coalition receives at least the maximum profit
that they can obtain by themselves.
Definition. The imputation set I(v) of a TU-game 〈N, v〉 contains all allocations which are
efficient and individually rational, i.e.,
I(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}. ◦
Clearly, the imputation set is non-empty if and only if
∑
i∈N v({i}) ≤ v(N). Throughout
the chapter, we assume that I(v) 6= ∅. For a TU-game with a non-empty imputation set,
this set is often very large and therefore this set is hardly seen as a solution concept, but as
a desirable set in which every solution concept should be contained. An example of such a
solution concept is the core.
Definition (Gillies (1959)). The core, denoted by C(v), of a TU-game 〈N, v〉 contains all
allocations which are efficient and coalition rational, i.e.,
C(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}. ◦
So, the core contains all imputations for which each coalition receives at least the maximal
profit its members can generate by joint actions. This set of solutions is stable in the sense
that it gives no coalition an incentive to split off. However, the core may be empty.
Example. Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the values v(S) for S ⊆ N
given by:
v(N) = 12,
v({1, 2}) = 10, v({1, 3}) = 8, v({2, 3}) = 7,
v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 3 and v({3}) = 1.
Observe that I(v) 6= ∅, since v({1})+v({2})+v({3}) = 1+3+1 < 12 = v(N). Suppose
C(v) 6= ∅ and let x ∈ C(v). Then x ∈ R3 satisfies the following inequalities:
x1 + x2 + x3 = 12,
x1 + x2 ≥ 10,
x1 + x3 ≥ 8,
x2 + x3 ≥ 7,
x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 1.
Hence,
24 = 2·(x1 + x2 + x3) = (x1 + x2) + (x1 + x3) + (x2 + x3) ≥ 10 + 8 + 7 = 25.
This contradiction shows that the core C(v) is empty. ◦
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Next, we recall a well-known theorem, proven independently by Bondareva (1963) and Shap-
ley (1967), which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the core to be non-empty.
For that purpose, we first need the definition of balancedness. Given a coalition S ⊆ N its
characteristic vector eS ∈ RN is defined by (eS)i = 1 if i ∈ S and (eS)i = 0 else.
Definition. A TU-game 〈N, v〉 is balanced if for every non-negative solution {ΛS}S⊆N of
the equation
∑
S⊆N ΛS ·eS = eN the inequality
∑
S⊆N ΛS ·v(S) ≤ v(N) holds. ◦
Theorem 2.1 (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. Then the
core C(v) is non-empty if and only if 〈N, v〉 is balanced. 2
So, if a TU-game is balanced, then the core is non-empty and therefore it is a convenient
solution concept on the class of balanced TU-games. But what if the core is empty? Assume
we have an imputation x ∈ I(v) and the TU-game 〈N, v〉 is not balanced. Then there exists
a coalition S ⊆ N which can depart from the grand coalition N and improve with respect
to the imputation x ∈ I(v). However, this coalition S still faces a problem, namely, how to
divide the value v(S) among the players in S. Although all the players in S can improve,
with respect to this imputation x ∈ I(v), there may be reallocations of the value v(S) which
trigger alternative proposals of players outside S in such a way that maybe some players in S
do not want to split off. Aumann and Maschler (1964) proposed a solution concept which
takes this issue into account. Their idea is that for a coalition to split off, it must be justified
by the absence of another coalition which can give an argument for the coalition not to split
off. In the next section we give, next to the approach by Aumann and Maschler, two more
recent approaches to formalize this idea.
This section we end by recalling some well-known properties on the structure of a TU-game
and we recall the definition of a prosperity property. Let us start by giving the definition of
superadditivity.
Definition. A TU-game 〈N, v〉 is superadditive if v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T ) whenever S, T ⊆
N and S ∩ T = ∅. ◦
In most of the applications of TU-games superadditivity is satisfied. Indeed, it may be argued
that if coalition S ∪ T forms, its members can decide to act as if S and T would have formed
separately and by doing so they generate v(S) + v(T ). Nevertheless, superadditivity may be
violated. The members of the coalitions S and T may hamper each other or they find it more
difficult to reach an agreement in a larger coalition. An even more demanding property for
a TU-game is total balancedness. For all S ⊆ N we write vS : 2S −→ R as the restriction
of v to coalition S.
Definition. A TU-game 〈N, v〉 is totally balanced if for every coalition S ⊆ N the subgame
〈S, vS〉 is balanced. ◦
Total balancedness states that every subgame has a non-empty core. Hence, a totally bal-
anced TU-game is in particular balanced. It is also straightforward that total balancedness
implies superadditivity, however, there are superadditive TU-games which are not balanced
and therefore not totally balanced. See for instance the example of the three-person TU-
game, given earlier in this section, which is superadditive but not (totally) balanced. Next,
we mention the concept of convexity.
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Definition (Shapley (1971)). A TU-game 〈N, v〉 is convex if
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T ) + v(S ∩T ) for all S, T ⊆ N. ◦
Convexity implies total balancedness (Shapley (1971)) and thus a convex TU-game is in
particular balanced.
Next, we give four additional properties on a TU-game. Let us start by giving the definition
of extendability which states that any core element of any subgame can be extended to a core
element of 〈N, v〉.
Definition (Kikuta and Shapley (1986)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. The core C(v) is ex-
tendable if for every coalition S ⊆ N and every core element y of the subgame 〈S, vS〉 there
exists an allocation x ∈ C(v) such that xi = yi for all i ∈ S. ◦
Two other properties on a TU-game that can be found in the literature are largeness and
exactness.
Definition (Sharkey (1982)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. The core C(v) is large if for every
vector y ∈ RN with y(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N there exists a core allocation x ∈ C(v) such
that xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ N . ◦
Definition (Schmeidler (1972)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. The core C(v) is exact if for
every coalition S ⊆ N there exists an allocation x ∈ C(v) such that x(S) = v(S). ◦
Finally, we mention the concept of stability of the core. The core is stable whenever every
imputation outside the core is dominated by an element of the core.
Definition. Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. The core C(v) is stable if for every imputation y ∈
I(v)\C(v) there exists an allocation x ∈ C(v) and a coalition S ⊆ N which dominates y via
S, i.e., x(S) = v(S) and xi > yi for all i ∈ S. If the core is stable then it is the unique Von
Neumann-Morgenstern solution (1944). ◦
The following relations between extendability, largeness and stability of the core can be found
in Kikuta and Shapley (1986) and are stated here without a proof.
Theorem 2.2 (Kikuta and Shapley (1986)). If 〈N, v〉 is a TU-game with a large core C(v),
then C(v) is extendable. If 〈N, v〉 is a TU-game with an extendable core C(v), then C(v) is
stable. 2
In fact, extendability is the weakest sufficient condition known at the moment in order for
a TU-game to have a stable core. Gellekom et al. (1999) give an example which shows
that extendability and stability of the core are no equivalent properties. Furthermore, they
prove that the properties largeness, extendability and non-emptiness of the core are so-called
prosperity properties. This means that if we start with an arbitrary TU-game and increase
only the value v(N) of the grand coalition, these properties will arise at a given moment and
will be kept if we go on with increasing this value. Let us give the formal definition of this
concept. The restriction of v to 2N\{N} is denoted by v0 and 〈N, v0〉 is called an incomplete
TU-game. Using this notation, a TU-game 〈N, v〉 in which v(N) = γ for a certain γ ∈ R
can also be denoted by 〈N, v0, v(N) = γ〉.
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Definition (Gellekom et al. (1999)). A property P on TU-games is a prosperity property if
for every incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉 there exists a number αP(v0) ∈ R such that
The TU-game 〈N, v0, v(N)〉 has property P if and only if v(N) ≥ αP(v0).
A property P on TU-games is a weak prosperity property if for every incomplete TU-game
〈N, v0〉 there exists a number αP(v0) ∈ R such that
• The TU-game 〈N, v0, v(N)〉 has property P if v(N) > αP(v0),
• For every β < αP(v0) there exists a number γ ∈ (β, αP(v0)) such that the TU-game
〈N, v0, v(N) = γ〉 does not have property P . ◦
So, the difference between a prosperity property and a weak prosperity property on a TU-
game 〈N, v0, v(N)〉 is that in the latter definition the property P may either hold or not
hold whenever v(N) ≤ αP(v0). Gellekom et al. (1999) also introduced the concept of a
monotone and closed property on TU-games which closes the gap between a weak prosperity
property and a prosperity property.
Definition. A propertyP on TU-games is monotone if for every incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉
and every γ ≥ β we have,
〈N, v0, v(N) = β〉 has property P ⇒ 〈N, v0, v(N) = γ〉 has property P .
A property P on TU-games is closed if for every incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉 and every
sequence βm ↓ β we have,
〈N, v0, v(N) = βm〉 has property P ⇒ 〈N, v0, v(N) = β〉 has property P. ◦
Remark. The following two statements follow immediately from the definitions.
(i) If P is a weak prosperity property and in addition monotone and closed, then P is a
prosperity property,
(ii) If a (weak) prosperity property P implies property P ′, then P ′ is a weak prosperity
property. ◦
An obvious example of a prosperity property is non-emptiness of the imputation set. In-
deed, given an incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉, the TU-game 〈N, v0, v(N)〉 has a non-empty
imputation set if and only if v(N) ≥ αI(v0), where αI(v0) :=
∑
i∈N v
0({i}). An other
example of a prosperity property is balancedness, since the condition for a TU-game 〈N, v〉
to be balanced can, according to Theorem 2.1, be written as,
v(N) ≥ max{
∑
S⊆N
λS ·v
0(S) | λS ≥ 0 such that
∑
S⊆N
λS ·eS = eN}.
In fact, given an incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉, the value αBal(v0) can be computed by
solving a linear program. Observe that αBal(v0) ≥ αI(v0) for every incomplete TU-
game 〈N, v0〉. Total balancedness and superadditivity are no (weak) prosperity properties,
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since violated inequalities not concerning the grand coalition N will remain violated, even
if one increases the value v(N). Gellekom et al. (1999) prove that largeness of the core
and extendability are prosperity properties. Note that according to Theorem 2.2 it follows
that αLC(v0) ≥ αExt(v0) for every incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉. Exactness is not a (weak)
prosperity property, since exactness implies total balancedness. Stability of the core is a weak
prosperity property, since extendability implies stability. It is still an open problem whether
stability of the core is a closed and/or monotone property.
In Section 2.4 we prove that the property ‘the bargaining set and the core coincide’ is a weak
prosperity property. However, later on in this chapter, in Section 2.6, we give an example
which illustrates that this property is neither monotone nor closed and therefore it is not a
prosperity property. In this example the bargaining set and core coincide for all possible
values of v(N), larger or equal than αBal(v0), except for exactly one value for v(N). For
this value the bargaining set is equal to the union of the core with a finite set of imputations
outside the core.
2.3 Bargaining sets in TU-games
In this part of the chapter three solution concepts for TU-games are considered which can be
seen as a substitute of the core in the case the latter is empty. Each of these solution concepts
are based on the idea that the players have certain bargaining possibilities. Before we can
recall the formal definitions of these three concepts, we first need the notion of an objection.
For all players k, ` ∈ N with k 6= ` we write Γk` := {S ⊆ N | k ∈ S ⊆ N \{`}} for the set
of coalitions containing player k but not player `.
Definition. An objection of player k against player ` with respect to an imputation x ∈ I(v)
is a pair (P, y) with P ∈ Γk` and y ∈ RP such that
yi > xi for all i ∈ P and y(P ) ≤ v(P ). ◦
So, an objection (P, y) is an incentive for the players in coalition P to withdraw from the
grand coalition N . That is, each of the players in P has a reason to complain (against
player `), since coalition P can divide the value v(P ) among themselves in such a way that
all members improve with respect to the imputation x ∈ I(v). But perhaps player ` is able
to give a counter-objection to each complaint which makes it not justified. The existence
of such a counter-objection is the key-concept in the idea of the bargaining sets. Without
any further delay we now give the definitions of the bargaining set, the semireactive and the
reactive bargaining set of a TU-game.
Definition (Aumann and Maschler (1964)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. An imputation
x ∈ I(v) is an element of the bargaining set M(v) if for all players k and ` in N and for
every objection (P, y) of k against ` with respect to x there exists a coalition Q ∈ Γ`k such
that y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) ≤ v(Q). ◦
Definition (Sudho¨lter and Potters (2001)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. An imputation x ∈
I(v) is an element of the semireactive bargaining set Msr(v) if for all players k and ` in N
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and for every coalition P ∈ Γk` there exists a coalition Q ∈ Γ`k such that for every objection
(P, y) of k against ` with respect to x, it holds that y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) ≤ v(Q). ◦
Definition (Granot (1994)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. An imputation x ∈ I(v) is an
element of the reactive bargaining set Mr(v) if for all players k and ` in N there exists a
coalition Q ∈ Γ`k such that for every objection (P, y) of k against ` with respect to x, it holds
that y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) ≤ v(Q). ◦
Remark. Let (P, y) be an objection of player k against player ` with respect to x ∈ I(v)
such that y(P ∩ Q) + x(Q\P ) > v(Q) for every ∈ Γ`k. Then for every Q ∈ Γ`k there
does not exists a vector z ∈ RQ with z(Q) = v(Q) such that
zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ P ∩Q and zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ Q\P.
This means that player ` does not have a counter-objection (Q, z) against the objection of
player k. In this case the objection (P, y) is said to be justified. ◦
In each of the mentioned bargaining sets player ` should be able to counter every possible
objection of player k. The difference between these three bargaining sets is the amount of
information player ` has about the objection of player k before he has to specify the coalition
Q ∈ Γ`k he uses to counter. In the bargaining set player ` completely knows how the objection
(P, y) of player k looks like. In the semireactive bargaining set player ` at least knows the
coalition P ∈ Γk` player k uses in his objection, but in the reactive bargaining set player `
does not know anything about the possible objection from player k. In view of how much
information player ` has about the objection of player k before he specifies the coalition
Q ∈ Γ`k he uses to counter, we have the following inclusions,
Mr(v) ⊆ Msr(v) ⊆ M(v).
The core C(v) of a TU-game 〈N, v〉 is contained in the reactive bargaining set because of
the obvious reason that if x ∈ C(v) no player can raise an objection with respect to this
allocation x. So, on the class of balanced TU-games these three bargaining sets are non-
empty. In search for the non-emptiness of the bargaining set of an arbitrary TU-game another
solution concept came up in the literature, namely, the kernel.
Definition (Davis and Maschler (1965)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game. The kernel is defined
by
K(v) := {x ∈ I(v) | sk`(x) ≤ s`k(x) or x` = v({`}) for all k 6= ` ∈ N},
where sk`(x) := max{v(S) − x(S) | S ∈ Γk`} for all k, ` ∈ N with k 6= ` denotes the
maximum surplus of player k against player `. ◦
Davis and Maschler (1965) prove that the kernel is a subset of the bargaining set and that it
is non-empty (given that the imputation set is non-empty). As a result, non-emptiness of the
bargaining set is guaranteed. This result can be generalized to the reactive bargaining set.
This is demonstrated in Granot (1994). For the sake of completeness we give also a proof.
Theorem 2.3 (Granot (1994)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game, then K(v) ⊆Mr(v).
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Proof. Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game and take x ∈ K(v). Let k ∈ N be a player who is able to
raise an objection against player ` with respect to x. Observe that this in particular implies
that sk`(x) > 0. In case x` = v({`}), player ` is able to counter every objection of player k
via the one-coalition {`}. On the other hand, if x` > v({`}), then player ` needs an other
coalition to counter. Because x ∈ K(v) we obtain in this case that 0 < sk`(x) ≤ s`k(x).
Take Q ∈ Γ`k such that v(Q)− x(Q) = s`k(x). Suppose there exists an objection (P, y) of
player k against player ` which cannot be countered by coalition Q, i.e.,
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) > v(Q).
Then
v(P ) − x(P ) ≥ y(P )− x(P ) = y(P ∩Q) − x(P ∩Q) + y(P \Q) − x(P \Q)
> y(P ∩Q) − x(P ∩Q) = y(P ∩Q) + x(Q \P ) − x(Q)
> v(Q) − x(Q).
Therefore, sk`(x) ≥ v(P ) − x(P ) > v(Q) − x(Q) = s`k(x). However, x` > v({`})
and x ∈ K(v). Contradiction. Hence, player ` is able to counter the objection (P, y) via
coalition Q. 2
The definition of the reactive bargaining set leaves the possibility open for one more refine-
ment of the bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler, in terms of the amount of information
the players have about possible objections. Assume player ` can expect an objection of
player k. To counter this objection, player ` should not only specify in advance the coalition
Q ∈ Γ`k he uses to counter, but he also should give the alternative solution z ∈ RQ for the
players in Q. After player ` has given this pair (Q, z) player k may choose his objection
(P, y) against player `. Clearly, this approach leads to a refinement of the reactive bargaining
set, since this new concept allows for more justified objections (player ` has more difficulties
to defend himself). However, for this refinement non-emptiness cannot be guaranteed.
Example. Let 〈N, v〉 be a simple, superadditive and non-balanced TU-game with N =
{1, . . . , 4} and the values v(S) for S ⊆ N given by:
v(N) = 1
v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = 1
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = 1
v(S) = 0 else.
Some straightforward calculations yields that the kernelK(v) of this TU-game is a singleton,
namely,K(v) = {( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0)}. Granot et al. (1997) show that the reactive bargaining set of
a simple, superadditive and non-balanced TU-game coincides with the kernel. Therefore, the
refinement of the reactive bargaining set in which the objector k may choose his objection
after player ` has given his counter-objection should contain x := ( 13 , 13 , 13 , 0). Otherwise,
this refinement is empty.
However, player 1 can make an objection against player 2 with respect x. The only possible
coalition player 2 can use to counter is Q := {2, 3, 4}. Player 1 can make the objection
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({1, 3, 4} , ( 512 ,
5
12 ,
2
12 )) or the objection ({1, 3} , ( 512 , 712 )). If player 2 would be able to
counter both objections by one counter-objection (Q, z) for a certain z ∈ RQ, then z2 ≥ 13 ,
z3 ≥ max{
5
12 ,
7
12} =
7
12 and z4 ≥
2
12 . But then the total payoff according to this vector
z ∈ RQ exceeds the value of Q, since
z({2, 3, 4}) ≥ 1 112 > 1 = v({2, 3, 4}).
Hence, for every counter-objection (Q, z) of player 2 there exists an objection of player 1
which cannot be countered by (Q, z). ◦
The example illustrates that in search for refinements of the bargaining set of Aumann and
Maschler, the reactive bargaining set is the furthest one can go, still guaranteeing non-empti-
ness. Differently, to maintain non-emptiness, which is game theoretically speaking important,
one cannot ask from a player under attack to give more information in advance than the
coalition he uses to counter.
2.4 Bargaining sets and the core
According to Theorem 2.3 each of the three bargaining sets, studied in this chapter, are
non-empty (given of course that the imputation set is non-empty). Hence, when the core
is non-empty each bargaining set contains the core, but in contrast with the core, however,
non-emptiness can be guaranteed for each bargaining set. Therefore, one can see the three
mentioned bargaining sets as substitutes of the core whenever it is empty. This gives rise to
the question: ‘When is one of these bargaining sets a real extension of the core?’ To put it
differently: ‘For which balanced TU-games does the core coincide with one of the bargaining
sets?’
In Section 2.5 this question is studied for symmetric TU-games. In the present section, we
prove that the property ‘the bargaining set coincides with the core’ is a weak prosperity
property. Intuitively, this means that the bargaining set and the core coincide whenever the
value of the grand coalition is large enough. Observe that this also yields the equivalence of
the semireactive and reactive bargaining set with the core whenever the value of the grand
coalition is large enough. To prove this statement, we first need some preparations.
Given an incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉 (see Section 2.2 for the definition), we define for all
i ∈ N ,
A∗i (v
0) := {x ∈ RN | x(S) > v0(S) for all S 6= N with i ∈ S}.
And given a TU-game 〈N, v〉, we denote
Ai(v) := I(v) ∩ A
∗
i (v
0) for all i ∈ N.
Given these notational conventions, we now can present a sufficient condition for the bar-
gaining set and the core, of an arbitrary balanced TU-game, to coincide.
Lemma 2.4. Let 〈N, v〉 be a balanced TU-game such that I(v) =
⋃
i∈N Ai(v), then
M(v) = C(v).
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Proof. Let 〈N, v〉 be a balanced TU-game such that I(v) =
⋃
i∈N Ai(v) and let x ∈ I(v) be
an imputation outside the core C(v). Then there exists ` ∈ N such that x ∈ A`(v). Because
x /∈ C(v), there exists a coalition P ⊆ N such that v(P ) > x(P ). Observe that ` /∈ P .
Take k ∈ P . We define the objection (P, y) of player k against player ` with respect to x by
yi := xi +
1
|P | ·[v(P )− x(P )] for all i ∈ P.
Take Q ∈ Γ`k, then it follows that
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) ≥ x(Q) > v(Q).
The last inequality follows from the fact that x ∈ A`(v). Hence, the objection (P, y) is
justified. 2
Next, we prove that the property ‘I(v) =
⋃
i∈N Ai(v)’ is a monotone and weak prosperity
property.
Proposition 2.5. Let 〈N, v0〉 be an incomplete TU-game. There exists a value αA(v0) ≥
αI(v
0) such that
I(v0, v(N) = β) =
⋃
i∈N
Ai(v
0, v(N) = β) if and only if β > αA(v0).
Proof. Let 〈N, v0〉 be an incomplete TU-game. Without loss of generality, we assume that
v0({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Define,
B(v0) := {β ≥ aI(v
0) | I(v0, v(N) = β) =
⋃
i∈N
Ai(v
0, v(N) = β) }.
Claim 1. B(v0) 6= ∅.
Proof. Define αi := maxS:i∈S v0(S) for all i ∈ N . Take β >
∑
i∈N αi and let x ∈
I(v0, v(N) = β). Then, due to efficiency, there exists a player i ∈ N such that xi > αi.
Hence, since xj ≥ v0({j}) = 0 for all j ∈ N , we have for every S 6= N with i ∈ S that
x(S) ≥ xi > αi ≥ v
0(S).
So, we can conclude that x ∈ Ai(v0, v(N) = β). Hence, B(v0) 6= ∅.
Claim 2. If β ∈ B(v0) and γ ≥ β, then γ ∈ B(v0).
Proof. Let γ ≥ β for a certain β ∈ B(v0). Take y ∈ I(v0, v(N) = γ). Then it can be
verified that there exists x ∈ I(v0, v(N) = β) such that xj ≤ yj for all j ∈ N . Because
β ∈ B(v0), we know that there exists a player i ∈ N such that x(S) > v0(S) for all S 6= N
with i ∈ S. Hence, y ∈ Ai(v0, v(N) = γ) and thus γ ∈ B(v0).
Given these two statements on B(v0), we now define,
αA(v
0) := inf
β∈B(v0)
β.
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By definition of B(v0) and due to Claim 1, αA(v0) is well-defined. Claim 2 tells us that
(αA(v
0) , ∞) ⊆ B(v0) ⊆ [αA(v
0) , ∞).
So, it is left to prove that αA(v0) /∈ B(v0).
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that αA(v0) ∈ B(v0). For simplicity, we denote αA :=
αA(v
0) and use the abbreviation I(αA) for the imputation set I(v0, v(N) = αA(v0)). Then
for every x ∈ I(αA) there exists a player i ∈ N such that
x ∈ Ai(v
0, v(N) = αA) = I(αA) ∩ A
∗
i (v
0).
Because A∗i (v0) is an open set in RN , there exists for every x ∈ I(αA) a number ε(x) > 0
such that
x ∈ B 1
2 ·ε(x)
(x) ⊆ Bε(x)(x) ⊆ A
∗
i (v
0).
Here, Bε(x) := {y ∈ RN | maxi∈N |yi − xi| < ε} for all x ∈ I(αA) and every ε > 0.
The collection {B 1
2 ·ε(x)
(x)}x∈I(αA) covers I(αA). Hence, due to compactness of the impu-
tation set I(αA) we can conclude that
I(αA) ⊆
K⋃
k=1
B 1
2 ·ε(x
k)(x
k) ⊆
K⋃
k=1
Bε(xk)(x
k)
for certain x1, . . . , xK ∈ I(αA). Define, ε := min{ε(xk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ K} and select β ≥ 0
such that αA − ε < β < αA. We show that β is also in B(v0), which yields the desired
contradiction.
Take y ∈ I(v0, v(N) = β). Note that y + αA−β|N | ·eN ∈ I(αA). Select 1 ≤ k ≤ K such that
y + αA−β|N | ·eN ∈ B 12 ·ε(xk)(x
k).
Then y ∈ Bε(xk)(xk). Indeed, for all j ∈ N we have that
|yj − x
k
j | <
1
2 ·ε(x
k) + αA−β|N | <
1
2 ·ε(x
k) + 12 ·ε ≤ ε(x
k).
Hence, y ∈ A∗i (v0) and thus y ∈ Ai(v0, v(N) = β). From this we can conclude that β ∈
B(v0). This contradicts the definition of αA, since β < αA. Hence, B(v0) = (αA(v0),∞).
This completes the proof. 2
If we define αMC(v0) := max{αBal(v0), αA(v0)} for every incomplete TU-game 〈N, v0〉,
we obtain according to Lemma 2.4 and Proposition 2.5 the following result.
Corollary 2.6. Let 〈N, v0〉 be an incomplete TU-game, then
M(v0, v(N) = β) = C(v0, v(N) = β) whenever β > αMC(v0). 2
So, according to Corollary 2.6, the property ‘the bargaining set and the core coincide’ is
a weak prosperity property. However, in Section 2.6 we give an example which illustrates
that this property on a TU-game is neither closed nor monotone and thus it is not a prosperity
property. In Section 2.6, we also compare for certain incomplete TU-games 〈N, v0〉 the value
αMC(v
0) with the values αExt(v0) and αLC(v0) of largeness and extendability, respectively.
2.5 Symmetric TU-games 25
2.5 Symmetric TU-games
This section studies the three bargaining sets, defined in Section 2.3, on the class of symmetric
TU-games. Let us start by recalling the definition of a symmetric TU-game.
A TU-game 〈N, v〉 is symmetric if there exists a map f : {0, 1, . . . , n} −→ R with f(0) = 0
and v(S) = f(s) whenever s = |S| for all S ⊆ N . So, in a symmetric TU-game the value of
a coalition only depends on its size and not on its members. Since the characteristic function
v : 2N −→ R can be represented by the map f : {0, 1, . . . , n} −→ R, we write 〈N, f〉
instead of 〈N, v〉.
A symmetric TU-game 〈N, f〉 is balanced if and only if f(s)/s ≤ f(n)/n for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
It is totally balanced if and only if the map s 7−→ f(s)/s is weakly monotonic and it is
superadditive if and only if f(s) + f(t) ≤ f(s + t) for all 1 ≤ s, t ≤ n. Recall from
Section 2.2 that every totally balanced (symmetric) TU-game is in particular superadditive.
If 〈N, f〉 is a symmetric game and x ∈ I(f) an imputation, we assume, without loss of
generality, throughout the remaining sections of the chapter that N := {1, . . . , n} such that
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn.
2.5.1 The reactive and the semireactive bargaining set
This subsection studies the reactive and semireactive bargaining set for symmetric TU-games.
Let us start by proving that on this class of TU-games the reactive bargaining set is the union
of the core and the kernel. To do so, we first need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Let 〈N, f〉 be a symmetric TU-game, then K(f) = { 1
n
·f(n)·eN}.
Proof. Clearly, 1
n
·f(n) ·eN ∈ K(f). Conversely, take x ∈ K(f), and suppose xn > x1,
then s1n(x) > sn1(x) and thus xn = f(1). But this means that x1 < f(1). This yields
a contradiction and thus x1 = xn. Because in particular x ∈ I(f) it follows that x =
1
n
·f(n)·eN . 2
Using Lemma 2.7 we can now prove that the reactive bargaining set of a symmetric TU-game
coincides with the union of the core and the kernel.
Theorem 2.8. Let 〈N, f〉 be a symmetric TU-game, then
Mr(f) =
{
C(f) if C(f) 6= ∅,
K(f) if C(f) = ∅.
Proof. Let 〈N, f〉 be a symmetric TU-game. Take x ∈ Mr(f). Suppose x /∈ C(f) ∪ K(f).
So, according to Lemma 2.7, this yields that xn > x1.
Player 1 can raise an objection against player n. Let Q be a coalition in Γn1 such that for any
objection (P, y) of 1 against n,
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) ≤ f(|Q|). (1)
26 2 Bargaining Sets in Cooperative Games
We denote q := |Q|. Observe that due to inequality (1) we have that x(Q) ≤ f(q). Since,
xn > x1 ≥ f(1) and n ∈ Q this in particular yields that q > 1. Furthermore, this yields that
f(q) − x
(
{1} ∪ Q\{n}
)
> f(q) − x(Q) ≥ 0.
Take 0 < δ < xn − x1 such that f(q) > x({1} ∪ Q\{n}) + δ and define
y1 := x1 + δ,
yi := xi +
1
q−1 ·[f(q)− δ − x
(
{1} ∪ Q\{n}
)
] for all i ∈ Q\{n}.
Then (P, y) with P := {1} ∪ Q\{n} is an objection from 1 against n. However,
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) = y(Q\{n}) + xn
= f(q) + xn − x1 − δ > f(q).
This contradicts inequality (1). 2
Theorem 2.8 in fact shows that on the class of symmetric TU-games the positive kernel and
the reactive bargaining set coincide. The positive kernel is a solution concept, introduced by
Sudho¨lter and Peleg (2000), which contains the kernel and the core but is, in turn, contained
in the reactive bargaining set.
Next, we prove that on the class of superadditive and symmetric TU-games the semireactive
bargaining set and the positive kernel also coincide. The same result also holds for superad-
ditive simple TU-games, but for arbitrary superadditive TU-games this statement is no longer
true. We refer to Sudho¨lter and Potters (2001) for the details.
Theorem 2.9. Let 〈N, f〉 be a superadditive and symmetric TU-game, then
Msr(f) =
{
C(f) if C(f) 6= ∅,
K(f) if C(f) = ∅.
Proof. Let 〈N, f〉 be a superadditive and symmetric TU-game. Take x ∈ Msr(f). Suppose
x /∈ C(f) ∪ K(f). Then according to Lemma 2.7 we have in particular xn > x1.
Player 1 can raise an objection against player n. Take P := {1, . . . , p} ∈ Γ1n such that
f(p)− x(P ) = max{f(|P ′|)− x(P ′) | P ′ ∈ Γ1n} and 2 ≤ p ≤ n− 1 is maximal.
Let Q be any coalition in Γn1 and denote q := |Q|. We may assume that x(Q) ≤ f(q),
otherwise any objection of player 1 is justified.
Claim 1. f(q)− x(Q) < f(p)− x(P ).
Proof. Suppose f(q)− x(Q) ≥ f(p)− x(P ). Define P ′ := {1} ∪ Q\{n}. Since xn > x1,
this yields
f(|P ′|)− (x1 + . . . + x|P ′|) = f(q)− (x1 + . . . + xq)
> f(q)− x(Q) ≥ f(p)− x(P ).
Contradiction with the definition of P .
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Claim 2. P ∩Q 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose that P ∩Q = ∅. Then
f(p + q)− (x1 + . . . + xp+q) ≥ f(p + q)− x(P ∪Q)
≥ f(p)− x(P ) + f(q)− x(Q) ≥ f(p)− x(P ).
The second inequality follows from the superadditivity of 〈N, f〉. Hence, by the definition
of P , this yields f(p + q) − (x1 + . . . + xp+q) = f(p) − x(P ). But this contradicts the
maximality of p.
Using Claim 1 and Claim 2 we can now construct a justified objection via coalition P . Take
δ > 0 such that 0 ≤ f(q)− x(Q) < f(p)− x(P )− δ and define
yi := xi +
δ
|P\Q| for all i ∈ P \Q,
yi := xi +
1
|P∩Q| ·[f(p)− x(P )− δ] for all i ∈ P ∩Q.
Then (P, y) is an objection from 1 against n. Furthermore,
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) = x(P ∩Q) + f(p) − x(P ) − δ + x(Q\P )
= x(Q) − x(P ) + f(P ) − δ > f(q).
This means that the objection (P, y) is justified and the desired contradiction is obtained. 2
2.5.2 The bargaining set
In this subsection the bargaining set is studied on the class of symmetric TU-games. Let us
start by proving the following useful lemma which states that if there is a justified objection,
then there is a justified objection from player 1 against player n.
Lemma 2.10. Let 〈N, f〉 be a symmetric TU-game and let x ∈ I(f) be an imputation with
x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn. There is a justif ied objection with respect to x if and only if there is a justif ied
objection (P, y) of player 1 against player n with P := {1, . . . , p} and y1 ≤ . . . ≤ yp.
Proof. Let x ∈ I(f) with x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn. Assume that player k has a justified objection
against player ` with respect to x.
Claim 1. k < `.
Proof. Let (P, y) be a justified objection of player k against player `. Let Q := {`} ∪ P\{k}.
Then
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) = y(P )− yk + x` < f(|P |) − xk + x`.
But on the other hand, since (P, y) is a justified objection, we also have that
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) > f(|Q|) = f(|P |).
Hence, xk < x`. By the assumption on x ∈ I(f), this yields that k < `.
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Claim 2. Player k has a justif ied objection against player n.
Proof. Let (P, y) be a justified objection of player k against player `. According to Claim 1
we know that k 6= n. Define P¯ ∈ Γkn by
P¯ := {`} ∪ P \{n} if n ∈ P and P¯ := P if n /∈ P
and define y¯ ∈ RP¯+ by
y¯j := yj if j ∈ P¯ \{`} and y¯` := yn.
Observe that y¯ = y whenever n /∈ P . Furthermore, we have that y¯` = yn > xn ≥ x` and of
course that y¯j = yj > xj for all j ∈ P¯\{`}. Hence, (P¯ , y¯) is an objection of player k against
player n with respect to x ∈ I(f). Next, we prove that it is a justified objection.
Suppose player n is able to counter this objection by coalition Q¯ ∈ Γnk. This means that
y¯(P¯ ∩ Q¯) + x(Q¯\P¯ ) ≤ f(|Q¯|).
Define Q ∈ Γ`k by
Q := Q¯ if ` ∈ Q¯ and Q := {`} ∪ Q¯\{n} if ` /∈ Q¯.
Then it can be verified that
y(P ∩Q) = y¯(P¯ ∩ Q¯) and x(Q\P ) ≤ x(Q¯\P¯ ).
Since f(|Q|) = f(|Q¯|), this yields that
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) ≤ y¯(P¯ ∩ Q¯) + x(Q¯\P¯ ) ≤ f(|Q¯|) = f(|Q|).
This means that player ` is able to counter the objection (P, y) of player k via coalition
Q ∈ Γ`k. Contradiction.
So far, we can conclude that player k has a justified objection against player n. Using a
similar reasoning as in the proof of Claim 2, one can prove that also player 1 has a justified
objection against player n. Say, player 1 has a justified objection against player n using coali-
tion P := {i(1), . . . , i(p)} with 1 = i(1) < . . . < i(p). Define P¯ := {1, . . . , p} and define
y¯j := yi(j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ p.
Then y¯j = yi(j) > xi(j) ≥ xj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ p. Furthermore, y¯(P¯ ) = y(P ) = f(p). So,
(P¯ , y¯) is also objection from player 1 against player n with respect to x. It is straightforward
to prove that for any coalition Q ∈ Γn1 it holds that
y¯(P¯ ∩Q) = y(P ∩Q) and x(Q\P¯ ) ≥ x(Q\P ).
Hence, since player n is not able to counter the objection (P, y), he also cannot counter the
objection (P¯ , y¯).
Finally, by ordering the coordinates of y¯ ∈ RP¯ in a weakly increasing order we still obtain a
justified objection from player 1 against player n. So, we may assume that y¯1 ≤ . . . ≤ y¯p.
This completes the proof. 2
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So, for symmetric TU-games we may assume, without loss of generality, that every (justified)
objection in terms of the bargaining set is from player 1 against player n. Therefore, it is
sufficient to give the (justified) objection (P, y) only in which we furthermore may assume
that P = {1, . . . , p} and that y1 ≤ . . . ≤ yp.
Next, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for an element outside the core to be an
element of the bargaining set. To do so, we define two types of values, the counter-value
and the objection-value. With the help of these values one can check whether an objection is
justified or not. Let us make this more formal.
Let 〈N, f〉 be a balanced and symmetric TU-game. Take x ∈ I(f) \ C(f). Recall that
x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn. Since, x /∈ C(f), there exists at least one number 2 ≤ p ≤ n−1 such that
x1 + . . . + xp < f(p). Furthermore, this implies that xn > f(n)/n > x1.
x1
x2
x3 x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
xn−1
xn
x :
Figure 4. The ordered vector x ∈ I(f)\C(f).
We assume that there exists at least one number 2 ≤ q ≤ n−1 such that xn+
∑q
i=2 xi ≤ f(q).
Otherwise, any objection of player 1 is justified. Then we define the counter-value of x by
ζ(x) := min{ζ ≥ x2 | xn +
q∑
i=2
max{ζ, xi} ≥ f(q) for all 2 ≤ q ≤ n−1}.
Lemma 2.11. We have ζ(x) < f(n)
n
.
Proof. Suppose ζ(x) ≥ f(n)
n
. Then, because xn > f(n)n and the TU-game 〈N, f〉 is balanced,
it follows that for all 2 ≤ q ≤ n−1,
xn +
q∑
i=2
max{ζ(x), xi} > q ·
f(n)
n
≥ f(q).
Contradiction with the definition of ζ(x). 2
Define the vector z(x) ∈ RN with z(x) ≥ x by
z(x)1 := x1 and z(x)i := max{ζ(x), xi} for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Furthermore, we define q(x) := min{2 ≤ q ≤ n − 1 | xn +
∑q
i=2 z(x)i = f(q)} and we
define s(x) := max {2 ≤ i ≤ n | z(x)i = ζ(x)}. Hence,
z(x) = (x1,
s(x)−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ζ(x), ζ(x), . . . , ζ(x), xs(x)+1, . . . , xn)
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x1
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
x7
x8
z(x) :
xn−1
xn
Figure 4(i). The vector z(x). Here, s(x) = 6 and q(x) = 5.
Since ζ(x) < f(n)
n
< xn (Lemma 2.11), we have that s(x) + 1 ≤ n. Furthermore, observe
that
xn +
q(x)∑
i=2
z(x)i = f(q(x)).
This means that the surface of the gray area in Figure 4(i) is equal to f(q(x)). So, the
vector z(x) can be understood as an upper-bound for all improvements upon x which still
admit a counter-objection via coalition {2, . . . , q(x), n}.
For all 2 ≤ p ≤ n−1 we define the objection-value η(p, x) of x as,
η(p, x) := min{η ≥ x2 | x1 +
p∑
i=2
max{η, xi} ≥ f(p)}.
Furthermore, we define the vector y(p, x) ∈ RN with y(p, x) ≥ x by
y(p, x)1 := x1 , y(p, x)i := max{η(p, x), xi} for 2 ≤ i ≤ p and
y(p, x)i := xi for p +1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let t(p, x) := max {1 ≤ i ≤ p | y(p, x)i > xi}. Hence,
y(p, x) = (x1,
t(p,x)−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
η(p, x), η(p, x), . . . , η(p, x), xt(p,x)+1, . . . , xn)
x1
η η η η η x7
x8
y(p, x) :
xn−1
xn
Figure 4(ii). The vector y(p, x). Here, p = 8 and t(p, x) = 6.
Observe that η(p, x) > x2 if and only if x1 + . . . + xp < f(p). Furthermore, note that,
x1 +
p∑
i=2
y(p, x)i = f(p).
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This means that the gray surface in Figure 4(ii) equals f(p). So, the vector y(p, x) re-
stricted to coalition {1, . . . , p} is a (weak) improvement upon x. In Figure 4(ii) all players in
{1, . . . , 8} strictly improve with respect to x, except players 1,7 and 8.
Given an imputation x ∈ I(f)\C(f), one can check with the help of the counter-value and the
objection-values whether x admits a justified objection or not. The idea is as follows. Using
a continuity argument the vector y(p, x) restricted to coalition {1, . . . , p} can be transformed
into an objection of player 1 against player n. If ζ(x) ≥ η(p, x), then player n is able
to counter this objection via coalition {2, . . . , q(x), n}. If the vector ζ(x) < η(p, x), then
player n is only able to counter if there are enough players left outside coalition {1, . . . , p},
he can use to counter. The following theorem formalizes this idea.
Theorem 2.12. Let 〈N, f〉 be a balanced and symmetric TU-game and let x ∈ I(f)\C(f).
(i) If ζ(x) ≥ η(p, x), then x admits no justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , p},
(ii) If ζ(x) < η(p, x) and p ≥ s(x), then x admits a justified objection by coalition
{1, . . . , p},
(iii) If ζ(x) < η(p, x) and p < s(x), then x admits no justified objection by coalition
{1, . . . , p} if and only if there exists a pair (q, i) such that
1 ≤ i ≤ min{p, q} , p + q − i ≤ n− 1 and
(i− 1) · η(p, x) + xp+1 + . . . + xp+q−i + xn ≤ f(q). (C)
Proof. (i) Let ζ(x) ≥ η(p, x) and let (P, ω) be an objection. Recall from Lemma 2.10 that
we may assume that P := {1, . . . , p} and that ω1 ≤ . . . ≤ ωp. Then it it can be verified by
induction, starting at i = p, that for all 2 ≤ i ≤ p,
ω2 + . . . + ωi < y(p, x)2 + . . . + y(p, x)i.
Define Q := {2, . . . , q(x), n}. If q(x) ≤ p, then
ω(Q ∩ P ) + x(Q\P ) = ω2 + . . . + ωq(x) + xn
< y(p, x)2 + . . . + y(p, x)q(x) + xn
≤ z(x)2 + . . . + z(x)q(x) + xn = f(q(x)).
If q(x) > p, then
ω(Q ∩ P ) + x(Q\P ) = ω2 + . . . + ωp + xp+1 + . . . + xq(x) + xn
< y(p, x)2 + . . . + y(p, x)p + xp+1 + . . . + xq(x) + xn
≤ z(x)2 + . . . + z(x)p + z(x)p+1 + . . . + z(x)q(x) + xn
= f(q(x)).
So, the coalition {2, . . . , q(x), n} is able to counter.
(ii) Let ζ(x) < η(p, x) and p ≥ s(x). Recall that
y(p, x) := (x1,
t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
η(p, x), η(p, x), . . . , η(p, x), xt+1, . . . , xn)
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From this vector y(p, x) we construct the objection (P, ω) with P := {1, . . . , p} and with
ω ∈ RP defined as,
ω := (x1 + ε , η(p, x) − δ, . . . , η(p, x)− δ , xt+1 + ε, . . . , xp + ε),
with the numbers δ > 0 and ε > 0 such that η(p, x) − δ > max{ζ(x), xi} for all 2 ≤ i ≤ t
and (p − t + 1) · ε = (t − 1) · δ. It turns out that it is a justified objection, as we now
demonstrate.
Let Q ∈ Γn1 with |Q| = q. Then:
• For i ∈ Q with 2 ≤ i ≤ t we have, ωi > z(x)i,
• For i ∈ Q with t < i ≤ p we have, ωi > xt+1 ≥ η(p, x) > ζ(x) and ωi > xi. Hence,
again ωi > z(x)i,
• For i ∈ Q with i > p, we have xi ≥ xp+1 ≥ xs(x)+1 > ζ(x). This means xi = z(x)i.
Let i := |Q ∩ P |+ 1 and thus |Q\P | = q − i + 1. If i ≥ 2, then
ω(Q ∩ P ) + x(Q\P ) = ω2 + . . . + ωi + xp+1 + . . . + xp+q−i + xn
> z(x)2 + . . . + z(x)i + z(x)p+1 + . . . + z(x)p+q−i + xn
≥ z(x)2 + . . . + z(x)i + z(x)i+1 + . . . + z(x)q + xn
≥ f(q).
And if i = 1, then
ω(Q ∩ P ) + x(Q\P ) = x(Q\P ) = xp+1 + . . . + xp+q−1 + xn
> z(x)2 + . . . + z(x)q + xn ≥ f(q).
The last inequality follows from the fact that xp+m ≥ xs(x)+m > ζ(x) and xp+m ≥ xm+1
yield that xp+m ≥ z(x)m+1 and from the fact that xp+1 ≥ xs(x)+1 > ζ(x) ≥ x2 yields
xp+1 > z(x)2.
Hence, from both cases it follows that the objection (P, ω) is justified.
(iii) Let ζ(x) < η(p, x) and p < s(x) and let (q, i) such that condition (C) is satisfied. Take
any objection (P, ω). Then
ω2 + . . . + ωi < y(p, x)2 + . . . + y(p, x)i = (i− 1) · η(p, x).
Hence,
ω2 + . . . + ωi + xp+1 + . . . + xp+q−i + xn < f(q).
And thus the coalition {2, . . . , i, p+1, . . . , p+q−i, n} is able to counter the objection (P, ω).
Conversely, take ε > 0 such that η(p, x) − ε > ζ(x) and η(p, x) − ε > xp. Define the
objection (P, ω) as follows,
ω1 := x1 + (p− 1) · ε,
ωi := η(p, x) − ε for all 2 ≤ i ≤ p.
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Because the objection (P, ω) is not a justified objection it follows that there exists a coalition
Q ∈ Γn1 with |Q ∩ P | = i− 1 such that
(i− 1) · (η(p, x) − ε) + xp+1 + . . . + xp+q−i + xn ≤ f(q).
This is true for all sufficiently small numbers ε, and therefore condition (C) holds. 2
Although Theorem 2.12 is rather technical, it can be very useful. In Section 2.6 an example is
studied in which Theorem 2.12 will be very useful. In the proof of the following proposition
this theorem plays also an important role.
Proposition 2.13. Let 〈N, f〉 be a balanced TU-game and let x ∈ I(f)\C(f). If x ∈M(f)
then
2 ≤ q(x) ≤ s(x)− 1 and f(s(x))
s(x) <
f(q(x))
q(x) .
Proof. Let x ∈ M(f)\C(f). Note that in this case there exists a number 2 ≤ q ≤ n− 1 such
that xn +
∑q
i=2 xi ≤ f(q) and thus q(x) is well-defined. Suppose q(x) ≥ s(x). Then
x1 + (s(x) −1)·ζ(x) + xs(x)+1 + . . . + xq(x) <
xn + (s(x)−1)·ζ(x) + xs(x)+1 + . . . + xq(x) = f(q(x)).
This strict inequality implies that ζ(x) < η(q(x), x). According to Theorem 2.12(ii), this
means that x admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , q(x)}. Contradiction.
So, 2 ≤ q(x) ≤ s(x)−1. Therefore, xn+(q(x)−1)·ζ(x) = f(q(x)). Since, xn > f(n)/n
(otherwise x ∈ C(f)) and because f(n)/n ≥ f(q(x))/q(x) (balancedness) it can be verified
that
ζ(x) = f(q(x))−xn
q(x)−1 <
f(q(x))
q(x) .
On the other hand, Theorem 2.12(ii) tells us that ζ(x) ≥ η(s(x), x). Therefore,
x1 + (s(x) − 1) · ζ(x) ≥ f(s(x)).
Because ζ(x) ≥ x2 ≥ x1, the inequality above yields that s(x)·ζ(x) ≥ f(s(x)). Hence, we
can conclude that
f(s(x))
s(x) ≤ ζ(x) <
f(q(x))
q(x) . 2
Total balancedness of a symmetric TU-game 〈N, f〉 implies for the map s 7−→ f(s)/s to
be weakly monotonic. Therefore, the following result can be directly derived from Proposi-
tion 2.13.
Corollary 2.14. If 〈N, f〉 is a totally balanced and symmetric TU-game, then
M(f) = C(f) 2
For arbitrary totally balanced TU-games the bargaining set and the core do not necessarily
coincide (see e.g., the five-person market game given in Maschler (1976)).
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2.5.3 Summary
In the previous two subsections we have shown that for a symmetric TU-game 〈N, f〉 with a
non-empty imputation set the following implications hold:
(i) 〈N, f〉 is balanced ⇒ Mr(f) = C(f), (Theorem 2.8)
(ii) 〈N, f〉 is superadditive and balanced ⇒ Msr(f) = C(f), (Theorem 2.9)
(iii) 〈N, f〉 is totally balanced ⇒ M(f) = C(f). (Corollary 2.14)
Clearly, balancedness is a necessary assumption in (i) and (ii). In the following section we
give two examples which illustrate that the assumption of superadditivity in (ii) and the as-
sumption of total balancedness in (iii) cannot be omitted.
2.6 Examples
In this section we study two symmetric TU-games. Recall from Corollary 2.6 that the prop-
erty ‘the bargaining set coincides with the core’ is a weak prosperity property. The first
example illustrates that none of the (weak) prosperity properties, extendability, largeness and
stability of the core implies that the (semireactive) bargaining set coincides with the core.
The example also shows that the notion of superadditivity in Theorem 2.9 cannot be omitted.
The second TU-game shows that the notion of total balancedness cannot be omitted in Corol-
lary 2.14. Furthermore, this TU-game illustrates a rather surprisingly phenomenon of the
bargaining set. It turns out that the bargaining set and the core coincide for all possible values
of the grand coalition, except for exactly one value. There, the bargaining set is the union
of the core with a finite number of imputations outside the core. So, from this example we
can conclude that the property ‘the bargaining set coincides with the core’ is not a prosperity
property.
Since, the property ‘the bargaining set and the core coincide’ is a weak prosperity property,
it might be of interest to illustrate that the prosperity property largeness of the core does
not imply for the bargaining set and the core to coincide nor for the semireactive bargaining
set and the core to coincide. Because on the class of symmetric games the properties large-
ness, exactness and stability of the core are equivalent (Biswas, Ravindran and Parthasarathy
(2000)), and therefore according to Theorem 2.2 also extendability is equivalent with large-
ness of the core, neither of these four properties imply that the semireactive bargaining set
nor the bargaining set coincides with the core.
Example. Let δ ≥ 0, |N | = 20 and fδ : {0, 1, . . . , 20} −→ R be defined as follows:
s 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
fδ 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 10.5 12 13.5 15 16.5 18.9
s 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
fδ 21.3 23.7 26.1 28.5 30.9 33.3 35.7 38 + δ
Define x ∈ I(f1)\C(f1) by
x1 = . . . = x11 := 1.5 and x12 = . . . = x20 := 2.5.
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Claim. x ∈ Msr(f1).
Proof. Observe that only player k with 1 ≤ k ≤ 11 can raise an objection with respect to x
and that the only possible objections are by a coalition P ⊆ {1, . . . , 11} such that |P | = 5
or such that |P | = 6 (only for these coalitions the core condition is violated). Assume
player k makes an objection against an other player ` via P . If 12 ≤ ` ≤ 20, then take
Q′ ⊆ {1, . . . , 11}\P such that |Q′| = 5 and define Q := Q′ ∪ {`}. Let (P, y) be any
objection, then
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) = x` + x(Q
′) = 2.5 + 5 · 1.5 = 10 = fδ(6).
If 1 ≤ ` ≤ 11, then take Q′ ⊆ {1, . . . , 11}\ (P ∪ {`}) such that |Q′| = 4 and define
Q := Q′ ∪ {`, 20}. Let (P, y) be any objection, then again
y(P ∩Q) + x(Q\P ) = x` + x(Q
′) + x20 = 5 · 1.5 + 2.5 = 10 = fδ(6).
Hence, given the coalition P , player ` can counter every objection (P, y) of player k and
therefore x ∈ Msr(f1) ⊆M(f1).
Biswas et al. (2000) contains an algorithm to compute the value αLC(f) of a symmetric
TU-game 〈N, f〉. Applying their algorithm yields αLC(f0) = 38.1 (i.e., δ = 0.1). Hence,
because largeness of the core is a prosperity property, the core is large if δ = 1. However,
in the symmetric TU-game 〈N, f1〉 neither the semireactive bargaining set nor the bargaining
set coincides with the core. ◦
Remark.
(i) The symmetric TU-games 〈N, fδ〉, given in the preceding example, are not superad-
ditive. Indeed, for every δ ≥ 0 we have that fδ(4) + fδ(5) > fδ(9). Hence, because
Msr(f1) 6= C(f1), we can conclude that the assumption of superadditivity in Theo-
rem 2.9 cannot simply be omitted in order for the semireactive bargaining set and the
core to coincide,
(ii) The example above also illustrates that the value αMC(v0) (see Subsection 2.4) can
be larger than the value αLC(v0) (and the value αExt(v0)) for certain incomplete TU-
games 〈N, v0〉. ◦
The next example illustrates that the property ‘the bargaining set coincides with the core’ is
neither monotone nor closed and therefore it is not a prosperity property.
Example. Let δ ≥ 0, |N | = 13 and fδ : {0, 1, . . . , 13} −→ R be defined as follows:
s 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
fδ 0 0 0 0 0 22 22 22 22 22 47 47 47 61.1 + δ
Claim. Let δ ≥ 0 and let x ∈ I(fδ)\C(fδ) such that x1 ≤ . . . ≤ x13. Then
x ∈M(fδ) if and only if x1 = x7 = 2 and x8 = x13 = 8.
Before we give a proof for this claim, observe that it implies for the bargaining set M(fδ)
and the core C(fδ) to coincide if and only if δ 6= 0.9. But the bargaining set M(f0.9)
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is the union of the core C(f0.9) with the set of all possible permutations of the imputation
(2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8) (see Figure 5 for an impression of this phenomenon). This
illustrates that the property ‘the bargaining set coincides with the core’ is neither monotone
nor closed and therefore it is not a prosperity property.
r
r r
r r r rr r
r rr rr r
M(f0) = C(f0) = 4.7· e13
(2, . . . , 8)
δ
0
C(f0.9)
M(fδ) = C(fδ)
M(f0.9) :
M(fδ) = C(fδ)
Figure 5. Sketch of the bargaining set and the core of the 13-person symmetric TU-game 〈N, fδ〉 for every δ ≥ 0:
• The bargaining set and the core coincide for 0 ≤ δ < 0.9,
• When δ = 0.9, the bargaining set M(f0.9) is the union of the gray part (the core C(f0.9)) with the bullets
(i.e., all possible permutations of the imputation (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8)),
• The bargaining set and the core coincide again for δ > 0.9.
Proof. ⇐) Let x ∈ I(f0.9) be defined by x1 = x7 := 2 and x8 = x13 := 8. Then x /∈
C(f0.9). Furthermore, some straightforward calculations yield that ζ(x) = 14·(22−8) = 3
1
2
and thus s(x) = 7. Using Theorem 2.12 we now prove that x ∈M(f0.9).
If p ≥ 7, then η(p, x) ≤ 3 12 = ζ(x) (only for p = 10 we have an equality). According to
Theorem 2.12(i) this means that for any p ≥ 7 there is no justified objection by coalition
{1, . . . , p}.
Furthermore, it can be verified that η(5, x) = 5 and that η(6, x) = 4. However,
3·η(6, x) + x7 + x13 = 22 = f(5) and 2·η(5, x) + x6 + x7 + x13 = 22 = f(5).
So, condition (C) in Theorem 2.12(iii) is in both cases satisfied. This means that x admits
also no justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 5} or by coalition {1, . . . , 6}. Clearly, there
are no objections via {1, . . . , p} for p ≤ 4. So, we can conclude that x ∈M(f0.9).
⇒) The proof of the converse is long and tedious. Nevertheless, it illustrates the power of
Theorem 2.12.
2.6 Examples 37
Let δ ≥ 0 and assume that x ∈ M(fδ)\C(fδ) such that x1 ≤ . . . ≤ x13. Then in particular
x1 < 4.7 +
δ
13 < x13.
Claim 1. q(x) = 5 or q(x) = 10.
Proof. By Proposition 2.13 and the values fδ(s) it immediately follows that q(x) ≥ 5.
Suppose 6 ≤ q(x) ≤ 9. Proposition 2.13 also tells us that s(x) > q(x). Hence, we obtain in
this case that
x13 + 4·ζ(x) ≥ 22 and x13 + (q(x)− 1)·ζ(x) = fδ(q(x)) = 22.
Contradiction. On the other hand, if 11 ≤ q(x) ≤ 12, then we obtain (again using the fact
that s(x) > q(x))
x13 + 9·ζ(x) ≥ 47 and x13 + (q(x)− 1)·ζ(x) = fδ(q(x)) = 47.
Again a contradiction. So, q(x) = 5 or q(x) = 10. This proves Claim 1.
Since s(x) > q(x) (Proposition 2.13), we can conclude from Claim 1 and the definitions of
ζ(x), s(x) and q(x) that
ζ(x) = 14 ·(22− x13) if q(x) = 5 and ζ(x) =
1
9 ·(47− x13) if q(x) = 10.
As x1 < x13, it follows that η(5, x) > ζ(x) if q(x) = 5 and that η(10, x) > ζ(x) if
q(x) = 10. So, by definition of η(5, x) and η(10, x) this implies that
η(5, x) = 14 ·(22− x1) if q(x) = 5 and η(10, x) =
1
9 ·(47− x1) if q(x) = 10.
Given these statements on q(x), ζ(x), η(5, x) and η(10, x), we now investigate which val-
ues s(x) can attain.
Claim 2. s(x) = 7.
Proof. Let x ∈ M(fδ)\C(fδ). Since q(x) = 5 or q(x) = 10 (Claim 1), we immediately
obtain by Proposition 2.13 that s(x) /∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}. Furthermore, fδ(10)/10 ≥ fδ(s)/s for
all 1 ≤ s ≤ 12. So, again by Proposition 2.13, it follows that s(x) 6= 10. For all the
remaining possibilities, except s(x) = 7, we prove that x admits a justified objection, either
by coalition {1, . . . , 5} or by coalition {1, . . . , 10}.
• Suppose s(x) ∈ {11, 12}. According to Claim 1, we have q(x) = 5 or q(x) = 10.
However, if q(x) = 5 then ζ(x) = 14 · (22 − x13). By definition of ζ(x), we know that
x13 + 9·ζ(x) ≥ fδ(10) = 47. This implies that x13 ≤ 2. So, q(x) 6= 5.
Hence, if s(x) ∈ {11, 12}, then q(x) = 10 which, in turn, means that ζ(x) = 19 ·(47− x13)
and that η(10, x) = 19 · (47 − x1). We demonstrate that in this case x admits a justified
objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10}.
Observe that ζ(x) < η(10, x) and q(x) = 10 < s(x). So, according to Theorem 2.12(iii), x
admits no justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10} if and only if there exists a pair (q, i)
such that condition (C) is satisfied. Due to the values of fδ(s) for all 2 ≤ s ≤ 12 there are
two main candidates for q, namely, q = 5 or q = 10 (i.e., player 13 counters via a coalition
of size 5 or via a coalition of size 10). Furthermore, the best candidate for i has to be such
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that player 13 can take a player in {11, 12} whenever x11 < η(10, x) or x12 < η(10, x).
Differently, according to Theorem 2.12(iii), player 13 is able to counter if
2·η(10, x) + η(10, x) ∧ x11 + η(10, x) ∧ x12 + x13 ≤ fδ(5) = 22, (C5)
or if
7·η(10, x) + η(10, x) ∧ x11 + η(10, x) ∧ x12 + x13 ≤ fδ(10) = 47. (C10)
We denote a ∧ b := min{a, b}. If s(x) = 12, then, by definition, we have that η(10, x) >
ζ(x) ≥ x12 ≥ x11. Recall that η(10, x) > 4.7 (since x1 < 4.7) and observe that x11 +x12 +
x13 = x(N)− (x1 + . . . + x10) > 61.1− 47 = 14.1. Combining these observations, we can
conclude that nor equation (C5) nor equation (C10) holds whenever s(x) = 12. Differently, x
admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10} whenever s(x) = 12.
Similarly, if s(x) = 11, then η(10, x) > ζ(x) ≥ x11. Now we assume that x12 > η(10, x)
(otherwise we refer to the case s(x) = 12). Then equation (C5) implies (again we use the
fact that η(10, x) > 4.7)
x11 + x13 ≤ 22− 3·η(10, x) < 7.9
and equation (C10) implies
x11 + x13 ≤ 47− 8·η(10, x) < 9.4.
In both cases we obtain a contradiction since,
x(N) ≤ 6·(x11 + x13) + x1 < 6 · 9.4 + 4.7 +
δ
13 ≤ fδ(N).
This means again that neither equation (C5) nor equation (C10) is satisfied. Differently, if
s(x) = 11, then x also admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10}.
• Suppose s(x) ∈ {8, 9}. According to Proposition 2.13 and Claim 1 we know that q(x) = 5
and thus ζ(x) = 14 ·(22− x13). If s(x) = 9, we can conclude that
x1 + 8·ζ(x) + x10 ≤ x13 + 8·ζ(x) + x13 = 44 < fδ(10).
And if s(x) = 8 we obtain the strict inequality
x1 + 7·ζ(x) + x9 + x10 ≤ 8·ζ(x) + 2·x13 = 44 < fδ(10).
Hence, in both cases we obtain from the definition of η(10, x) that η(10, x) > ζ(x). How-
ever, in both cases 10 > s(x). Combining these two observations with Theorem 2.12(ii), we
can conclude that x admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10} whenever s(x) ∈
{8, 9}.
• Suppose s(x) = 6. Then q(x) = 5 and thus ζ(x) = 14·(22−x13) and η(5, x) =
1
4·(22−x1).
We demonstrate that in this case x admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 5}.
Observe that ζ(x) < η(5, x) and q(x) = 5 < s(x). So, according to Theorem 2.12(iii), x
admits no justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 5} if and only if there exists a pair (q, i)
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such that condition (C) is satisfied. Similarly, as in the case of s(x) ∈ {11, 12}, there are two
candidates for q, namely, q = 5 or q = 10. Furthermore, i can be taken such that player 13
takes those players outside coalition {1, . . . , 5} whose payoff according to x is less or equal
than η(5, x). This means that, according to Theorem 2.12(iii), player 13 is able to counter if
x6 + η(5, x) ∧ x7 + η(5, x) ∧ x8 + η(5, x) ∧ x9 + x13 ≤ 22, (C5)
(since x6 ≤ ζ(x) < η(5, x)) or if
2·η(5, x) + x6 + . . . + x10 + η(5, x) ∧ x11 + η(5, x) ∧ x12 + x13 ≤ 47 (C10)
(since there are exactly four coordinates in y(5, x) equal to η(5, x)).
First, we prove that if equation (C10) holds, then x admits a justified objection by coalition
{1, . . . , 10}. Because η(5, x) > ζ(x), x13 ≥ x12 ≥ x11 > ζ(x) and x6 ≥ x1, equation (C10)
in particular yields that
x1 + 5·ζ(x) + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 < 47 = fδ(10).
But this means, by definition of η(10, x), that η(10, x) > ζ(x). Since 10 > s(x) = 6,
Theorem 2.12(ii) tells us that x admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10}. So,
equation (C10) does not hold.
Next, we prove that equation (C5) does not hold either. To do so, we distinguish between the
following two cases:
Case (1). Assume that x7 ≥ η(5, x). Then equation (C5) becomes
x6 + 3·η(5, x) + x13 ≤ 22.
But, since x6 ≥ x1 and x13 ≥ x7 ≥ η(5, x), this inequality implies that
22 = x1 + 4·η(5, x) ≤ x6 + 3·η(5, x) + x13 ≤ 22.
Hence, x1 = . . . = x6 and x7 = . . . = x13 = η(5, x). But then
x1 + 5·ζ(x) + x7 + . . . + x10 ≤ x1 + 4·ζ(x) + 4·η(5, x) + x13
= 22 + 22 = 44 < fδ(10).
This means again that η(10, x) > ζ(x). So, if equation (C5) holds and x7 ≥ η(5, x), then x
admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 10} (Theorem 2.12(ii)).
Case (2). Assume that x7 < η(5, x). Now, we already assume that ζ(x) ≥ η(10, x) (oth-
erwise x admits a justified objection by {1, . . . , 10} (Theorem 2.12(ii)) and we are done).
Recall, that by definition of ζ(x), this means that
x1 + 5·ζ(x) + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 ≥ fδ(10) = 47.
Because 4 ·ζ(x) + x13 = 22, x6 ≥ x1 and x13 ≥ x10 ≥ x9, it can be verified from the
equation above that
x6 + x7 + x8 + ζ(x) + x13 ≥ 25. (D)
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So, if ζ(x) ≥ η(10, x) (and thus x does not admit a justified objection by {1, . . . , 10}), then
equation (D) holds. Since we are in the case that x7 < η(5, x), equation (C5) becomes
x6 + x7 + η(5, x) ∧ x8 + η(5, x) ∧ x9 + x13 ≤ 22.
Combining this equality with equation (D) it can be verified that
x8 + ζ(x) > η(5, x) ∧ x8 + η(5, x) ∧ x9 + 3.
Note that η(5, x) ∧ x9 > ζ(x) (since, η(5, x), x9 > ζ(x)). Combining this observation with
the strict inequality above, we immediately can conclude that x8 > η(5, x). Hence,
x8 + ζ(x) > η(5, x) ∧ x8 + η(5, x) ∧ x9 + 3 = 2·η(5, x) + 3.
However, since x8 > η(5, x) equation (C5) in fact equals, x6 + x7 +2·η(5, x) + x13 ≤ 22.
But now we can derive a contradiction. Indeed,
x6 + x7 + 2·η(5, x) + x13 ≥ x1 + ζ(x) + 2·η(5, x) + x8
> x1 + 2·η(5, x) + 2·η(5, x) + 3
= 22 + 3 = 25.
The strict inequality follows from x8 + ζ(x) > 2·η(5, x) + 3. Thus, if x7 < η(5, x), then x
either admits a justified objection by {1, . . . , 5} or by {1, . . . , 10} since equation (C5) and
equation (D) cannot both be true. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
According to Claim 2 we know that x admits a justified objection whenever s(x) 6= 7. So,
there is only one more value left for s(x) which we need to investigate. As it turns out, the
imputation x ∈ M(fδ)\C(fδ) is completely determined if s(x) = 7.
Claim 3. If s(x) = 7, then x1 = . . . = x7 = 2 and x8 = . . . = x13 = 8.
Proof. Let s(x) = 7. Then q(x) = 5 and thus ζ(x) = 14·(22−x13) and η(5, x) = 14·(22−x1).
Because 5 < s(x) and ζ(x) < η(5, x) Theorem 2.12(iii) tells us now that x does not admit a
justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 5} if
x6 + x7 + η(5, x) ∧ x8 + η(5, x) ∧ x9 + x13 ≤ 22, (C5)
(since η(5, x) > ζ(x) ≥ x7 ≥ x6) or if
2·η(5, x) + x6 + . . . + x10 + η(5, x) ∧ x11 + η(5, x) ∧ x12 + x13 ≤ 47 (C10)
(since there are exactly four coordinates in y(5, x) equal to η(5, x)).
Furthermore, Theorem 2.12(ii) tells us that ζ(x) ≥ η(10, x) (otherwise there is a justified
objection via coalition {1, . . . , 10}). By definition of ζ(x) this means that
x1 + 6·ζ(x) + x8 + x9 + x10 ≥ 47.
Because 4·ζ(x) + x13 = 22 and x13 ≥ x10, we can derive from this inequality
x1 + x8 + x9 + 2·ζ(x) ≥ 25. (D)
So, if ζ(x) ≥ η(10, x) (and thus x does not admit a justified objection via {1, . . . , 10}), then
equation (D) holds. With the help of this equation (D) we first prove that if equation (C10)
holds then equation (C5) also holds.
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Assume that equation (C10) holds. Because η(5, x) > ζ(x) and x10 ≥ x1, equation (D)
yields in particular that
x8 + x9 + x10 + 2·η(5, x) > 25.
By subtracting this strict inequality from equation (C10), we obtain that
x6 + x7 + η(5, x) ∧ x11 + η(5, x) ∧ x12 + x13 ≤ 47− 25 = 22.
Since, x12 ≥ x9 and x11 ≥ x8 it follows that equation (C5) also holds.
Next, we prove that if equation (C5) holds, then x1 = x7 = 2 and x8 = x13 = 8. To do so,
we distinguish between the following two cases:
Case (1). Assume that x1 < 2. Then x admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 6} as
we now demonstrate.
Suppose η(6, x) ≤ ζ(x). This means that x1 + 5 · ζ(x) ≥ 22 and thus ζ(x) > 4. By
definition of ζ(x), this yields that x13 < 6. Furthermore, ζ(x) = 14 ·(22− x13) < 4
13
40 (since
x13 > 4.7). By taking these two upper-bounds on x13 and ζ(x) we obtain that
x1 + x8 + x9 + 2· ζ(x) < 2 + 2·6 + 2·4
13
40 < 25.
But this contradicts equation (D). Differently, if η(6, x) ≤ ζ(x), then equation (D) is violated
and thus ζ(x) < η(10, x) which means that x admits a justified objection via {1, . . . , 10}.
So, we may assume that η(6, x) > ζ(x). This means that x admits an objection via coalition
{1, . . . , 6} and that η(6, x) = 15 ·(22 − x1). Because, s(x) = 7 and η(6, x) > ζ(x) ≥ x7,
Theorem 2.12(iii) tells us that player 13 is only able to counter if
x7 + η(6, x) ∧ x8 + η(6, x) ∧ x9 + η(6, x) ∧ x10 + x13 ≤ 22, (C∗5)
or if
3·η(6, x) + x7 + . . . + x10 + η(6, x) ∧ x11 + η(6, x) ∧ x12 + x13 ≤ 47 (C∗10)
(since there are exactly five coordinates in y(6, x) equal to η(6, x)).
Recall that ζ(x) ≥ η(10, x) (otherwise there is a justified objection via {1, . . . , 10} (Theo-
rem 2.12(ii)). Therefore, equation (D) holds. Using this equation we first prove that equa-
tion (C∗5) holds whenever equation (C∗10) holds.
Because η(6, x) > ζ(x) > x1, equation (D) also yields that x9 + x10 + 3 ·η(6, x) > 25.
By subtracting this expression from equation (C∗10) and using the fact that x12 ≥ x10 and
x11 ≥ x9 it follows that equation (C∗10) holds whenever equation (C∗5) holds.
However, using equation (D) we now prove that equation (C∗5) is violated. Equation (D) in
particular yields that
x7 + x8 + x13 + 2·ζ(x) ≥ 25.
Because η(6, x) ∧ x10 ≥ η(6, x) ∧ x9 > ζ(x) equation (C∗5) yields that
x7 + η(6, x) ∧ x8 + 2·ζ(x) + x13 < 22.
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Hence, x8 ≥ η(6, x)∧x8 + (25−22) and thus η(6, x) < x8. This means that equation (C∗5)
in fact states that
x13 +
2
5 ·x1 + 13
1
5 = x13 + x1 + 3·η(6, x) ≤ x13 + x7 + 3·η(6, x) ≤ 22.
Furthermore, observe that equation (D) in particular states that
x1 + 11 + 1
1
2 ·x13 = x1 + 2·x13 + 2·ζ(x) ≥ x1 + x8 + x9 + 2·ζ(x) ≥ 25.
From these two inequalities it is straightforward to verify that x1 ≥ 2. But this contradicts
the assumption that x1 < 2. Hence, equation (C∗5) nor equation (C∗10) holds. Differently, if
s(x) = 7 and x1 < 2, then x admits a justified objection by coalition {1, . . . , 6}.
Case (2). So, we are left with the case that x1 ≥ 2. In this case we demonstrate that equa-
tion (C5) and equation (D) hold only if x1 = x7 = 2 and x8 = x13 = 8.
Observe that η(5, x) ∧ x9 ≥ η(5, x) ∧ x8 > ζ(x), x6 ≥ x1 and x13 ≥ x9. Therefore,
equation (D) yields that
x6 + x8 + x13 + η(5, x) ∧ x8 + η(5, x) ∧ x9 > 25.
Recall that equation (C5) states that x6 + x7 + η(5, x)∧x8 + η(5, x)∧x9 + x13 ≤ 22. So,
if equation (C5) holds, then x8 > x7 + (25− 22) = x7 + 3. Since, we are in the case that
x1 ≥ 2, this yields that x8 > 5 ≥ η(5, x). Hence, η(5, x) ∧ x9 = η(5, x) ∧ x8 = η(5, x).
But then equations (C5) and (D) state that
x13 + 2·x6 +
2
4 ·(22− x6) ≤ x13 + x6 + x7 + 2·η(5, x) ≤ 22,
x6 + 2·x13 +
2
4 ·(22− x13) ≥ x1 + x8 + x9 + 2·ζ(x) ≥ 25.
Hence, x13 +1 12 ·x6 ≤ 11 and x6 +1
1
2 ·x13 ≥ 14. From these two observations one can verify
that x6 ≤ 2. Since x1 ≥ 2, this yields that x1 = x6 = 2. From this it is straightforward to
verify by these two previous inequalities that x1 = x7 = 2 and that x8 = x13 = 8. ◦
Remark.
(i) The symmetric TU-game 〈N, fδ〉, given in the previous example, is for every δ ≥ 0
superadditive. Hence, the assumption of total balancedness in Corollary 2.14 cannot
be weakened to superadditivity,
(ii) It is left to the reader to check that αMC(f0) = 117.5 (i.e., I(fδ) =
⋃
i∈N Ai(fδ)
whenever δ > 56.4). The algorithm of Biswas et al. (2000) tells us that αLC(f0δ ) =
198 (i.e., the core C(fδ) is large whenever δ ≥ 136.9). Hence, αMC(v0) < αLC(v0)
for certain incomplete TU-games 〈N, v0〉.
(iii) According to Biswas et al., the core C(f0.9) is not stable (see Subsection 2.2). In-
deed, any of the imputations outside the core of the type (2, . . . , 2, 8, . . . , 8) cannot be
dominated by a core allocation. ◦
3
Bargaining Sets and Price Equilibria in
Exchange Economies
3.1 Introduction
The main part of this chapter defines and investigates the reactive and the semireactive bar-
gaining set in exchange economies with indivisible goods and one perfectly divisible good
(money). This part of the chapter is adapted from Meertens, Potters and Reijnierse (2005).
Additionally, the final section, based on Meertens (2005), illustrates that every non-negative,
superadditive and balanced TU-game generates an exchange economy with a price equilib-
rium.
Exchange economies, as investigated in this chapter, find their origin in Debreu (1959)(see also Debreu (1983)). In these economies a group of people, called agents, can buy
and sell indivisible goods (e.g., houses, cars) by payments made in units of one infinitely
divisible good that, following standard use, is referred to as money. Each agent ‘arrives at the
market’ with an amount of money and a number of indivisible goods. Moreover, each agent
has an appreciation for the indivisible goods and the amounts of money. Since, we allow
these agents to obtain more than one good, they have preferences on consumption bundles
consisting of a number of objects and an amount of money. The preferences are assumed
to be complete, transitive and continuous binary relations on the set of consumption bundles
under the four additional assumptions that ‘more money is better than less money’, ‘large
amounts of money can change preferences’, ‘indivisible goods are weakly desired’ and that
‘the marginal utility for money is constant’. These preference relations can be represented by
quasi-linear utility functions.
Exchange economies with indivisible goods, money and quasi-linear utilities have been stud-
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ied in so many papers, one cannot even hope to give an overview. We therefore only mention
Bevia´, Quinzii and Silva (1999), Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) and the more recent paper
by Potters, Reijnierse and Gellekom (2002), since we use some of their results. The main
problems studied in the literature on these type of exchange economies are the existence
of price (i.e., Walrasian) equilibria and/or the existence of core reallocations. In the first
part of this chapter, however, we introduce and investigate other solution concepts for these
economies. Since, the reactive and the semireactive bargaining set, investigated in Chapter 2
for TU-games, are defined in ordinal terms, they can be extended to exchange economies
with indivisible goods and money. This is done in the first part of the present chapter.
As in the theory of TU-games the reactive bargaining set of an exchange economy is a subset
of the semireactive bargaining set and both bargaining sets contain the core whenever the
latter is non-empty. Given an abundance condition on the amounts of money agents initially
have (the so-called Total Abundance (TA) condition), we prove that the (semi)reactive bar-
gaining set is non-empty, even if the core is empty. However, if the exchange economy does
not satisfy the TA-condition or if the utilities are not quasi-linear, then the reactive and the
semireactive bargaining set may be empty. Furthermore, it is shown that in a reallocation of
the (semi)reactive bargaining set, each agent receives a bundle which he appreciates at least
as much as his initial endowment. Differently, reallocations in one of these two bargaining
sets are individual rational. This result does not hold for the bargaining set of Aumann and
Maschler (1964).
By assigning to every exchange economy, satisfying the TA-condition, a non-negative and
superadditive TU-game, we prove that every reallocation in the (semi)reactive bargaining set
of the economy generates an imputation in the (semi)reactive bargaining set of the TU-game.
Also this result does not hold for the bargaining set. That is, we show that reallocations in
the bargaining set of the economy may not even generate efficient allocations of the corre-
sponding TU-game. Furthermore, the (semi)reactive bargaining set and the (strong) core of
an exchange economy, satisfying the TA-condition, coincide if and only if the (semi)reactive
bargaining set and the core of the corresponding TU-game coincide. An interesting observa-
tion is that every non-negative and superadditive TU-game gives rise to an exchange economy
with quasi-linear utility functions. Recall from Chapter 2 that there are several structured
classes of superadditive TU-games for which the core coincides with the (semi)reactive bar-
gaining set. Therefore, each of these classes of superadditive TU-games generates exchange
economies in which the (semi)reactive bargaining set and the (strong) core coincide.
The observation that every non-negative and superadditive TU-game gives rise to an exchange
economy is the starting point for the second part of the chapter. Here, we prove that such a
TU-game generates an exchange economy with a price equilibrium whenever it is balanced.
However, different economies may yield the same TU-game. So, it is possible that the set
of price equilibria of two exchange economies, yielding the same TU-game, may be differ-
ent. This illustrates that the concept of price equilibrium is not a game theoretical solution
concept, i.e., it is a solution rule for economies, but not for the corresponding games.
Let us start by fixing the terminology used in this chapter and by deriving some basic results.
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3.2 Preliminaries and some basic results
An exchange economy with indivisible goods and money, studied in this chapter and denoted
by E , has the following features:
• There is a finite set of agents N , with n := |N | ≥ 2,
• There is a finite set of indivisible goods Ω, with |Ω| ≥ 1,
• Each agent i ∈ N has an initial endowment (Ai, mi), in which Ai ⊆ Ω denotes the collec-
tion of indivisible goods initially held by agent i and mi > 0 denotes the strictly positive
amount of money agent i has in the beginning. The list (Ai)i∈N is an N -distribution of Ω,
i.e.,
⋃
i∈NAi = Ω and Ai ∩Aj = ∅ whenever i 6= j. We allow, however, Ai = ∅ for some
agents i ∈ N ,
• Each agent i ∈ N has a preference relationi on the set 2Ω×R+ which has the following
properties:
(i) i is a complete, transitive binary relation on 2Ω × R+,
(ii) for all bundles (B, x) and (C, y) with (B, x) i (C, y) and x > 0 there exists a
strictly positive number δ such that (B, x − δ) i (C, y) and (B, x) i (C, y + δ)
and if (B, 0) i (C, y) for certain B, C ⊆ Ω and y ∈ R+, then there exists a strictly
positive number δ such that (B, 0) i (C, y + δ) (continuity in money),
(iii) for all B ⊆ Ω, if x > y, then (B, x)  (B, y) (strict monotonicity in money),
(iv) (B, 0) i (∅, 0) for all B ⊆ Ω (weak desirability for goods),
(v) for every consumption bundle (B, x) there exists a positive number ∆ such that
(B, x) i (∅, ∆) (archimedean property),
(vi) for all B ⊆ Ω and every x ∈ R+ with (B, 0) ∼i (∅, x) it holds that (B, d) ∼i (∅, x+d)
for every d ∈ R+ (marginal utility of money is constant).
The set of all preference relations satisfying the Properties (i)–(vi) is denoted by P . Prop-
erty (ii) states that small changes in money do not change the preference. According to
Property (iii) more money is better than less money and Property (iv) states that the indi-
visible goods are weakly desired objects. Observe that the latter property is weaker than
‘weak monotonicity in goods’ (i.e., for all x ∈ R+ and i ∈ N it holds that (B, x) i (C, x)
whenever C ⊆ B), a property quite common in the literature. Property (v) states that large
amounts of money can change preferences and Property (vi) states that money can be used to
transfer utility from one agent to another, since the marginal utility of money does not depend
on the agent nor on his wealth.
We start this section by proving that each preference relation ∈ P can be presented by a
quasi-linear utility function.
Proposition 3.1. For each preference relation ∈ P there exists a unique map V : 2Ω −→
R+ with the properties:
(i) V (∅) = 0 (ii) (B, x)  (C, y) if and only if V (B) + x ≤ V (C) + y.
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Proof. We prove that
for every B ⊆ Ω and every x ∈ R+ there exists exactly one real number uB(x) ∈ R+
such that (B, x) ∼ (∅, uB(x)).
Let B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R+. Define K := {y ∈ R+ | (B, x)  (∅, y)} and G := {y ∈
R+ | (B, x)  (∅, y)}. Then K is non-empty according to the archimedean property. Also G
is non-empty since, according to strict monotonicity in money and weak desirability for
goods, we have that 0 ∈ G. Moreover, both sets are closed according to continuity in money.
By completeness of  we have K ∪G = R+. Hence K ∩G 6= ∅.
If y1, y2 ∈ K ∩ G, then (∅, y1) ∼ (B, x) ∼ (∅, y2). According to transitivity of , this
yields, (∅, y1) ∼ (∅, y2) and therefore, by strict monotonicity in money, we have y1 = y2.
Hence, for every B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R+ there exists a unique number uB(x) ∈ R+ such that
(B, x) ∼ (∅, uB(x)).
Define V (B) := uB(0) for all B ⊆ Ω, then V : 2Ω −→ R+ is uniquely determined and
V (∅) = 0. Furthermore, let B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R+. By constant marginal utility in money,
we have that (∅, uB(0) + x) ∼ (B, 0 + x) ∼ (∅, uB(x)). Hence, by transitivity and strict
monotonicity in money, we have that uB(x) = uB(0) + x = V (B) + x for all B ⊆ Ω and
x ∈ R+. From this observation it immediately follows that the map V : 2Ω −→ R+ also
satisfies property (ii) mentioned in the proposition. 2
Remark. Conversely, if  is a binary relation on 2Ω × R+ that can be represented by the
utility function U(B, x) := V (B) + x, in which V : 2Ω −→ R+ with V (∅) = 0, then 
belongs to P . ◦
The value Vi(B) ∈ R+ is the reservation value of agent i ∈ N for B ⊆ Ω. Due to the
assumptions on the preference relations, an exchange economy E can be described by the
tuple 〈N, Ω, (Ai, mi, Vi)i∈N 〉.
In an exchange economy a coalition of agents can exchange their initial endowments. To put
it differently, the indivisible goods and the amounts of money can be reallocated among a
coalition of agents. Therefore, we introduce the following definitions in this context.
Definition. Let S ⊆ N . An S-redistribution is a list (Bi)i∈S with
⋃
i∈SBi =
⋃
i∈SAi and
Bi ∩Bj = ∅ whenever i 6= j. So, we allow that Bi = ∅ for some agents i ∈ S. If (Bi)i∈S is
an S-redistribution and x ∈ RS+ is such that
∑
i∈S xi =
∑
i∈S mi, then the list (Bi, xi)i∈S
is an S-reallocation. ◦
Remark. The assumption that in an S-reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈S the vector x ∈ RS+ should be
non-negative, in fact states that money is scarce. This assumption is also made in Bevia´ et al.
(1999). Observe, that this assumption is only restrictive inasmuch as it places an upper-bound
on the amount of money an agent may borrow. Without loss of generality, one may assume
this upper-bound to be zero. ◦
Let (Bi, xi)i∈N be an N -reallocation and let S ⊆ N be non-empty. An S-reallocation
(Ci, yi)i∈S is a weak improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N if Vi(Ci) + yi ≥ Vi(Bi) + xi for all
i ∈ S and Vj(Cj)+yj > Vj(Bj)+xj for at least one agent j ∈ S. It is a strong improvement
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upon (Bi, xi)i∈N if Vi(Ci) + yi > Vi(Bi) + xi for all i ∈ S. As usual, an N -reallocation
is Pareto efficient/weakly Pareto efficient if coalition N has no weak improvement/strong
improvement. An N -reallocation is a strong core reallocation
/
core reallocation if it does
not admit for a coalition S to have a weak improvement
/
strong improvement .
Given an exchange economy E we define, similarly as in Shapley and Shubik (1969), the
corresponding TU-game 〈N, vE〉 by
vE(S) := max{
∑
i∈S
Vi(Ci) | (Ci)i∈S is an S-redistribution} for all S ⊆ N,
i.e., vE(S) is the maximum social welfare in the sub-economy with only agents in coalition S.
Note that the TU-game 〈N, vE〉 is superadditive, i.e., vE(S ∪T ) ≥ vE(S)+ vE (T ) whenever
S ∩ T = ∅. Furthermore, since Vi(C) ≥ Vi(∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N and C ⊆ Ω, it is a
non-negative TU-game.
The main goal of this chapter is to extend certain solution concepts known in the theory of
TU-games to exchange economies and to establish a two-way correspondence between the
concepts in the two models. For instance, we would like to extend core elements of the TU-
game into (strong) core reallocations of the economy and vice versa. To achieve this goal, the
amounts of money initially held by the agents should be large enough. This is demonstrated
in the following example.
Example. Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, 2, 3} and Ω := {α, β, γ}. The
reservation values Vi : 2Ω −→ R+ are for each i ∈ N the same and given by:
{α} {β} {γ} {α, β} {α, γ} {β, γ} {α, β, γ}
agents 1–3 0 0 0 5 5 5 10
Let A1 := {α}, A2 := {β} and A3 := {γ}. Although, the initial amounts of money m ∈ RN+
are not yet specified, it can already be verified that the TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 has a non-empty
core. Indeed, vE(N) = 10, vE(S) = 5 whenever |S| = 2 and vE(S) = 0 whenever |S| ≤ 1.
Now let us discuss the strong core and the core of the economy E while varying m ∈ RN+ .
Assume that m1 := 2 and m2 = m3 := 1. Then it can be verified that the strong core is
empty. Indeed, the best candidate would be the N -reallocation (({α, β, γ},0), (∅, 2), (∅, 2)).
However, it allows for coalition {2, 3} to have a weak improvement, via the {2, 3}-reallo-
cation ((∅, 2), ({β, γ}, 0)), and therefore it is not a strong core reallocation. Observe that
this weak improvement of coalition {2, 3} cannot be transformed into a strong improvement.
This is due to the lack of money of agents 2 and 3. Hence, the N -reallocation is an element
of the core of the economy.
Next, assume that mi := 2 for all i ∈ N . In this case the core is empty. Indeed, similar as
before, the only possible core candidate is (({α, β, γ}, 0), (∅, 3), (∅, 3)). This time however,
it allows for coalition {2, 3} to have a strong improvement.
Finally, assume that Vi({α, β, γ}) := 5 (instead of 10) for all i ∈ N . Then the TU-game
〈N, vE 〉 has an empty core. However, if m1 := 2 and m2 = m3 := 1, then the N -reallocation
(({α, β, γ},0), (∅, 2), (∅, 2)) is still a core reallocation. ◦
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So, although we assume for money to be scarce, the initial amounts of money held by the
agents should be large enough to avoid phenomena like in the example above. Therefore, we
give the following abundance condition for the amounts of money agents initially have.
Definition. An exchange economy E satisfies the Total Abundance (TA) condition if every
coalition S ⊆ N has an S-redistribution (Ci)i∈S such that∑
i∈S
Vi(Ci) = vE(S) and Vi(Ci) ≤ Vi(Ai) + mi for all i ∈ S.
Such an S-redistribution (Ci)i∈S is said to satisfy the TA-condition for coalition S. ◦
Assume that for coalition S ⊆ N to maximize its social welfare agent i ∈ S should re-
ceive Ci. The TA-condition stipulates that agent i ∈ S has enough money to buy Ci for
the price Vi(Ci) (the highest price he is willing to pay), when he can sell Ai for the price
Vi(Ai) (the lowest price for which he is willing to sell Ai). The TA-condition is weaker than
abundance conditions that can be found in the literature, namely, Vi(C) ≤ Vi(Ai) + mi or
even Vi(C) ≤ mi for all i ∈ N and C ⊆ Ω (see e.g., Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) or
Bevia´ et al. (1999)).
The following lemma states that in an exchange economy satisfying the TA-condition indi-
vidual rational N -reallocations admit a strong improvement whenever they admit a weak
improvement. An N -reallocation is said to be individual rational whenever each agent re-
ceives a bundle which he (weakly) prefers to his initial endowment.
Lemma 3.2. Let E be an exchange economy satisfying the TA-condition. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N be
an N -reallocation such that Vi(Bi)+xi ≥ Vi(Ai)+mi for all i ∈ N . If (Bi, xi)i∈N admits
a weak improvement, then it also admits a strong improvement.
Proof. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N be an N -reallocation such that Vi(Bi) + xi ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi for all
i ∈ N . Assume that coalition S ⊆ N has a weak improvement upon this N -reallocation, say
via the S-reallocation (C ′i , y′i)i∈S . Then, by definition,
vE(S) +
∑
i∈S
mi ≥
∑
i∈S
[Vi(C
′
i) + y
′
i] >
∑
i∈S
[Vi(Bi) + xi]. (1)
Let (Ci)i∈S be an S-redistribution which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition S. For all
i ∈ S we define zi := Vi(Bi) + xi − Vi(Ci). Observe that
zi ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi − Vi(Ci) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.
The last inequality follows from the TA-condition. Furthermore, due to inequality (1), we
have that δ := 1|S|
∑
i∈S [mi − zi] > 0. Next, define yi := zi + δ for all i ∈ S. Then
(Ci, yi)i∈S is an S-reallocation and a strong improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . 2
Since, core reallocations are in particular individual rational, Lemma 3.2 tells us that the
strong core and the core coincide for exchange economies satisfying the TA-condition. We
write C(E) for the set of (strong) core reallocations in such an economy E . Note that Lem-
ma 3.2 is not true if the TA-condition is violated. This is illustrated in the first example of
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this section. The next example demonstrates that for an exchange economy satisfying the
TA-condition, the difference between Pareto efficiency and weak Pareto efficiency remains.
The reason is that a weak Pareto efficient reallocation is not necessarily individual rational.
Example. Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, 2}, Ω := {α, β} and initial endow-
ments (Ai, mi)i∈N := ((α, 1) , (β, 1)). The reservation values Vi : 2Ω −→ R+ for i = 1, 2
are given by:
{α} {β} {α, β}
agent 1 7 8 15
agent 2 7 9 16
The exchange economy E satisfies the TA-condition, since vE(N) = V1(A1) + V2(A2).
However, ((β, 1), (α, 1)) is a weak Pareto efficient reallocation, but it is not Pareto efficient.
Indeed, it allows for the weak improvement ((α, 2), (β, 0)), but this weak improvement can-
not be transformed into a strong improvement. ◦
The following proposition illustrates that every (strong) core reallocation of an economy E
which satisfies the TA-condition gives rise to a core element of the TU-game 〈N, vE〉 and
vice versa.
Proposition 3.3. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition.
(i) If (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ C(E), then (Vi(Bi) + xi −mi)i∈N ∈ C(vE),
(ii) If X ∈ C(vE), then (Bi , Xi + mi − Vi(Bi))i∈N ∈ C(E) for some N -redistribu-
tion (Bi)i∈N .
Proof. (i) Let (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ C(E) and define Xi := Vi(Bi) + xi − mi for all i ∈ N .
Suppose X(S) < vE(S) for some coalition S ⊆ N (observe that also S = N is one of
the possibilities). Let (Ci)i∈S be an S-redistribution which satisfies the TA-condition for
coalition S. Then∑
i∈S
[Vi(Bi) + xi] = X(S) +
∑
i∈S
mi < vE(S) +
∑
i∈S
mi =
∑
i∈S
[Vi(Ci) + mi].
For all i ∈ S there is a number yi ∈ R such that Vi(Ci) + yi = Vi(Bi) + xi. Take i ∈ S.
Then by the core-condition for coalition {i} we have,
Vi(Bi) + xi ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi.
Therefore, yi = Vi(Bi) + xi − Vi(Ci) ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi − Vi(Ci) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S. Define
δ := 1|S|
∑
i∈S [ mi − yi]. Since,
∑
i∈S mi >
∑
i∈S yi, we conclude that the S-reallocation
(Ci, yi + δ)i∈S is a strong improvement for coalition S upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . This yields the
desired contradiction.
(ii) Let X ∈ C(vE). Take an N -redistribution (Bi)i∈N which satisfies the TA-condition for
coalition N and define xi := Xi + mi − Vi(Bi) for all i ∈ N . Observe that
∑
i∈N xi =∑
i∈N mi and that xi ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi − Vi(Bi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Hence, (Bi, xi)i∈N is an
N -reallocation.
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Suppose the coalition S ⊆ N has an improvement upon this N -reallocation, i.e., there exists
an S-reallocation (Ci, yi)i∈s such that
Vi(Ci) + yi > Vi(Bi) + xi for all i ∈ S.
This means that Vi(Ci) + yi > Xi + mi for all i ∈ S. Because
∑
i∈S yi =
∑
i∈S mi, this
inequality yields, vE(S) ≥
∑
i∈S Vi(Ci) > X(S). But X ∈ C(vE). Contradiction. 2
Recall from the first example in this section that if the TA-condition is violated, then Propo-
sition 3.3 is no longer true. However, if an exchange economy E satisfies the TA-condition,
then the corresponding TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 is balanced if and only if the core C(E) is non-
empty. In the next section, we study two other sets of N -reallocations which can be seen as
a substitute of the core when the latter is empty, namely, the reactive and the semireactive
bargaining set.
3.3 Bargaining sets in exchange economies
In Chapter 2 we investigated the reactive and the semireactive bargaining set for (symmetric)
TU-games. These concepts can be extended to exchange economies with indivisible goods
and money. To do so, we first need to reformulate the definitions of an objection and of a
counter-objection. Recall that for all k, ` ∈ N with k 6= ` we denote Γk` := {S ⊆ N | k ∈
S ⊆ N \{`}}.
Definition. An objection of agent k against an other agent ` with respect to an N -realloca-
tion (Bi, xi)i∈N is a pair (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) with P ∈ Γk` and (Ci, yi)i∈P a P -reallocation
such that (Ci, yi) i (Bi, xi) for all i ∈ P . ◦
Given an objection of agent k against agent `, with respect to an N -reallocation, we can give
the definition of a counter-objection.
Definition. Given an objection (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) of agent k against agent ` with respect
to an N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N , a counter-objection of agent ` against agent k is a pair
(Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q) with Q ∈ Γ`k and (Di, zi)i∈Q a Q-reallocation such that
(Di, zi) i (Bi, xi) for all i ∈ Q\P,
(Di, zi) i (Ci, yi) for all i ∈ P ∩Q.
If agent ` is not able to counter, then the objection (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) of agent k is justified. ◦
Next, we give the formal definitions of the reactive and the semireactive bargaining set for
an exchange economy.
Definition. Let E be an exchange economy. A weakly Pareto efficient N -reallocation is an
element of the reactive bargaining set Mr(E) if for all agents k and ` in N there exists a
coalition Q ∈ Γ`k such that every objection (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) of k against `, with respect to
this N -reallocation, can be countered via (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q). ◦
3.3 Bargaining sets in exchange economies 51
So, if in the reactive bargaining set agent k can formulate an objection against agent `, the
latter agent must have a coalition Q ∈ Γ`k which he can use to counter all possible objections
of agent k.
Definition. Let E be an exchange economy. A weakly Pareto efficient N -reallocation is an
element of the semireactive bargaining set Msr(E) if for all agents k and ` in N and every
coalition P ∈Γk` there exists a coalition Q∈Γ`k such that every objection (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P )
of k against `, with respect to this N -reallocation, can be countered via (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q). ◦
So, if in the semireactive bargaining set agent k announces to object against agent ` via
coalition P ∈ Γk`, the latter agent must be able to give a coalition Q ∈ Γ`k which he can
use to counter all possible objections of agent k via this coalition P . Given the definitions of
an objection and a counter-objection, one also can extend the definition of the bargaining set
(Aumann and Maschler (1964)) to exchange economies. For the sake of completeness, we
give the formal definition.
Definition. Let E be an exchange economy. A weakly Pareto efficient N -reallocation is
an element of the bargaining set M(E) if for all agents k and ` in N and every objection
(P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) of k against ` with respect to this N -reallocation there exists a counter-
objection (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q). ◦
Remark. In the above definitions we required an N -reallocation in the particular bargaining
set to be weakly Pareto efficient. If one chose to leave out this requirement, then the initial
endowments (Ai, mi)i∈N would be an element of every bargaining set, since every ` ∈ N
can counter any possible objection against him via the one-coalition {`}. ◦
Note that like in the theory of TU-games (see Section 2.3) we have for an exchange econ-
omy E the following inclusions
Mr(E) ⊆ Msr(E) ⊆ M(E).
3.3.1 Existence results
Similarly as for TU-games, an N -reallocation contained in the core does not admit any ob-
jection and therefore the core is contained in the reactive bargaining set. Hence, as long as
the core is non-empty, the reactive bargaining set is also non-empty. This subsection proves
that for the exchange economies studied in this chapter the reactive bargaining set is non-
empty, even if the core is empty. By the inclusions given in the previous subsection, the same
statement holds for the semireactive bargaining set and the bargaining set. So, if an exchange
economy has an empty core there still exists an N -reallocation which may be appealing, since
it does not allow any justified objection. Therefore, one can think of these bargaining sets as
(alternative) solution concepts for exchange economies.
Theorem 3.4. Let E := 〈N, Ω, (Ai, mi, Vi)i∈N 〉 be an exchange economy which satisfies the
TA-condition, then Mr(E) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition and let (Bi)i∈N be
an N -redistribution which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition N . Observe that due to
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superadditivity, the TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 has a non-empty imputation set and thereforeMr(vE)
is non-empty (Theorem 2.3). Let X ∈Mr(vE) and define
xi := Xi + mi − Vi(Bi) for all i ∈ N.
Observe that
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N mi and because Xi ≥ vE({i}) = Vi(Ai) for all i ∈ N
it follows from the TA-condition that xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Hence, (Bi, xi)i∈N is an
N -reallocation. It is straightforward to verify that this N -reallocation is (weakly) Pareto
efficient. Moreover, we prove that this N -reallocation is contained in the reactive bargaining
set Mr(E).
Let k ∈ N be an agent who plans to object against agent ` ∈ N . Because X ∈ Mr(vE)
there exists a Q ∈ Γ`k such that for every (possible) objection (P, Y ) from k against ` there
exists a vector Z ∈ RQ with Z(Q) = vE(Q) such that (Q, Z) is a counter-objection.
Let (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) be an objection from k against ` with respect to the N -reallocation
(Bi, xi)i∈N . Define Yi := Vi(Ci) + yi −mi for all i ∈ P . Then
Y (P ) =
∑
i∈P
Vi(Ci) +
∑
i∈P
yi −
∑
i∈P
mi =
∑
i∈P
Vi(Ci) ≤ vE(P ).
Furthermore,
Yi = Vi(Ci) + yi −mi > Vi(Bi) + xi −mi = Xi for all i ∈ P .
So, (P, Y ) is an objection from k against ` with respect to X ∈ Mr(vE ). Hence, there exists
a Z ∈ RQ such that (Q, Z) is a counter-objection. Let (Di)i∈Q be a Q-redistribution which
satisfies the TA-condition for coalition Q and define
zi := Zi + mi − Vi(Di) for all i ∈ Q.
Then
∑
i∈Q zi =
∑
i∈Q mi and because Zi ≥ Xi ≥ vE({i}) = Vi(Ai) for all i ∈ Q
it follows from the TA-condition that zi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Q. Hence, (Di, zi)i∈Q is a Q-
reallocation. Furthermore, since (Q, Z) is a counter-objection, we also have that
Vi(Di) + zi = Zi + mi ≥ Yi + mi = Vi(Ci) + yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ P ,
Vi(Di) + zi = Zi + mi ≥ Xi + mi = Vi(Bi) + xi for all i ∈ Q\P.
Hence, the pair (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q) is a counter-objection. 2
Remark. In the proof of Theorem 3.4 it is shown that if X ∈ Mr(vE), then the N -
reallocation (Bi, Xi + mi − Vi(Bi))i∈N in which (Bi)i∈N satisfies the TA-condition for
coalition N is contained in the reactive bargaining setMr(E). The proof of Theorem 3.4 can
be suitably modified to obtain the same result for the semireactive bargaining set and for the
bargaining set. ◦
So, for exchange economies with quasi-linear utilities and satisfying the TA-condition, each
of the bargaining sets is non-empty. But what happens if one of these conditions is violated?
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First, we revisit the first example of this chapter to illustrate that if the TA-condition does not
hold, then each of the bargaining sets may be empty. Thus, the TA-condition cannot simply
be omitted in Theorem 3.4.
Example. Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, 2, 3}, Ω := {α, β, γ} and initial
endowments (Ai, mi)i∈N := (({α}, 2) , ({β}, 2) , ({γ}, 2)). Again the reservation values
Vi : 2
Ω −→ R+ are for each i ∈ N given by:
{α} {β} {γ} {α, β} {α, γ} {β, γ} {α, β, γ}
agents 1–3 0 0 0 5 5 5 10
In Section 3.2 it is already demonstrated that E has an empty (strong) core. Next, we illustrate
that the bargaining set is also empty. One candidate for an N -reallocation in the bargaining
set M(E) would be (({α, β, γ}, 0) , (∅, 3) , (∅, 3)). However, it allows for agent 3 to have
a justified objection against agent 1, via the {2, 3}-reallocation (({β, γ}, 0), (∅, 4)). Indeed,
agent 1 can only counter this objection via coalition {1, 2}. But, agents 1 and 2 do not have
enough money nor high enough reservation values for their initial goods α and β to exceed
the utility level of 15 = U1({α, β, γ}, 0) + U2({β, γ}, 0). This means that agent 1 cannot
counter the objection of agent 3 via coalition {1, 2}.
If agent 1 would receive the bundle ({α, β}, 0) (instead of ({α, β, γ}, 0)) and either agent 2
or agent 3 would receive {γ}, then agent 3 has the same justified objection against agent 1.
Using the symmetry in the reservation values and in the initial endowments, we can conclude
that M(E) is empty. ◦
For exchange economies with preference relations that are represented by utility functions
which are not quasi-linear, one still can define each of the bargaining sets. However, they
may be empty. We demonstrate this by proving that the bargaining set may be empty. So,
also the notion of quasi-linearity cannot simply be omitted in Theorem 3.4.
Example. Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, 2, 3}, Ω := {α1, α2, α3}, Ai :=
{αi} and mi := 12 for i = 1, 2, 3. The utility functions Ui : 2Ω × R+ −→ R are:
U1(B, x) := 7·W (B) + x,
U2(B, x) := 6·W (B) + (
1
100 ·W (B) + 1)·x,
U3(B, x) := 5·W (B) + x
in which W (B) := 1 if |B| ≥ 2 and W (B) := 0 else. So, the reservation values of
every agent do only depend on the number of indivisible goods and each agent has the same
reservation value for two or three goods. Furthermore, observe that only the utility function
of agent 2 is not quasi-linear.
Claim 1. If (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈M(E), then Vi(Bi) + xi ≥ 12 for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ M(E). Suppose Vk(Bk) + xk < 12 for some k ∈ N . By weak
Pareto efficiency, there is an agent ` ∈ N such that V`(B`) + x` > 12. Otherwise the
N -reallocation (({αk}, 12 − ε) , ({α`}, 12 + ε2 ) , ({αj}, 12 +
ε
2 )) with ε > 0 sufficiently
small would be a strong improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N .
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Clearly, the pair ({k}, ({αk}, 12)) is an objection of agent k against agent `. Since agent `
strictly prefers the bundle (B`, x`) to his initial bundle ({α`}, 12) he needs coalition {`, j}
to counter this objection of agent k. Say, he is able to counter via the {`, j}-reallocation
((D`, z`), (Dj , zj)). But then the N -reallocation(
({αk}, 12− ε) , (D`, z` +
ε
2 ) , (Dj , zj +
ε
2 )
)
with ε > 0 sufficiently small, is a strong improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . This contradicts
the weak Pareto efficiency of (Bi, xi)i∈N .
Claim 2. If (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈M(E), then (Bi, xi)i∈N = ((Ω, 36− 2·t) , (∅, t) , (∅, t)) for
some number 12 < t ≤ 15.
Proof. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ M(E). By weak Pareto efficiency, it follows that there is an agent
j ∈ N such that |Bj | ≥ 2. Due to the reservation values of the agents we may assume without
loss of generality that Bj = Ω. Hence, according to Claim 1, we have that xk , x` ≥ 12 for
the two remaining agents k, ` ∈ N \{j}.
If k = 1, then the N -reallocation ((Ω, xk − 7 + ε2 ) , (∅, x` +
ε
2 ) , (∅, xj + 7 − ε)) with
ε > 0 sufficiently small is a strong improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . This contradicts the
weak Pareto efficiency of (Bi, xi)i∈N . So, we can conclude that k, ` 6= 1 and thus j = 1.
Again, due to Claim 1 this implies that x1 ≥ 5. Furthermore, if 12 ≤ xk < x`, then the
pair ({1, k} , (({α1, αk}, 24− xk − ε), (∅, xk + ε))) with ε < min{x` − xk, 24− xk − x1}
is an objection of agent k against agent `. Observe that agent ` is not able to counter via
coalition {`}. Hence, there exists a {1, `}-reallocation ((D1, z1), (D`, z`)) such that
V1(D1) + z1 + V`(D`) + z` ≥ V1({α1, αk}) + 24− xk − ε + V`(∅) + x`
= 31− xk − ε + x` > 31.
But, V1(D1)+z1+V`(D`)+z` ≤ 7+24 = 31. So, we can conclude that x2 = x3 ≥ 12. It is
left to the reader to verify, by using a similar argument as above, that if x1 = x2 = x3 = 12,
the pair ({2, 3} , ((∅, 12 + ε), ({α2, α3}, 12− ε))) with ε > 0 sufficiently small is a justified
objection of agent 2 against agent 1. Hence, so far we can conclude that
(Bi, xi)i∈N = ((Ω, 36− 2·t) , (∅, t) , (∅, t)) with t > 12.
Recall that due to Claim 1 we have x1 = 36− 2·t ≥ 5. Thus, t ≤ 15 12 . However, if t > 15,
then it can be verified that agent 1 has a justified objection against agent 3, via the {1, 2}-
reallocation ((∅, 43− 2·t + ε) , ({α1, α2}, 2·t− 19− ε)) with ε > 0 sufficiently small. So,
we obtain that 12 < t ≤ 15. This proves Claim 2.
Until now, we have not used the fact that the utility function of agent 2 is not quasi-linear.
For the remaining part this will be important.
Suppose (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈M(E). Then, due to Claim 2, we know that
(Bi, xi)i∈N = ((Ω, 36− 2·t) , (∅, t) , (∅, t)) for some number 12 < t ≤ 15.
Now, consider the {1, 3}-reallocation
3.3 Bargaining sets in exchange economies 55
(
({α1, α3}, 36− 2·t) , (∅, 2·t− 12)
) (2)
and the {2, 3}-reallocation(
({α2, α3},
100
101 ·[t− 6]) , (∅, 24−
100
101 ·[t− 6])
)
. (3)
Since 12 < t ≤ 15, it can be verified that agent 3 strictly improves himself in both reallo-
cations with respect to the bundle (∅, t). Agent 1 and agent 2 obtain in these reallocations
bundles which they prefer equally as the bundle (Ω, 36 − 2 · t) and (∅, t), respectively. So,
since the utility functions are continuous in money, both reallocations can be transformed into
objections with respect to (Bi, xi)i∈N . To be more precise, the {1, 3}-reallocation in (2) can
be transformed into an objection from agent 1 against agent 2 with respect to (Bi, xi)i∈N ,
and the {2, 3}-reallocation in (3) can be transformed into an objection from agent 2 against
agent 1 with respect to (Bi, xi)i∈N .
To counter this possible objection of agent 2, agent 1 needs coalition {1, 3}. In fact, the
best attempt to counter is the {1, 3}-reallocation in (2). Similarly, agent 2 needs the {2, 3}-
reallocation in (3) to counter this possible objection of agent 1. Hence, unless
2·t− 12 = 24− 100101 ·[t− 6],
agent 3 strictly prefers one of the two bundles (∅, 2 ·t − 12) or (∅, 24 − 100101 · [t − 6]) to the
other. This would imply that either the reallocation stated in (2) or the reallocation stated
in (3) could be transformed into a justified objection.
Therefore, we can conclude that 2 ·t − 12 = 24 − 100101 · [t − 6] and thus t = 4
4
151 . But in
this case agent 3 can raise an objection against agent 1 in which he offers agent 2 the bundle
({α2, α3}, 9
147
151−ε) (and keeps the bundle (∅, 14 4151 +ε) for himself) with ε > 0 sufficiently
small. The best agent 1 can offer agent 2 , in order to counter this objection, is the bundle
(∅, 16 8151 ). However,
U2({α2, α3}, 9
147
151 − ε) = 6 +
101
100 ·[9
147
151 − ε] > 16
8
151 = U2(∅, 16
8
151 ).
So, the objection is justified and the desired contradiction is obtained. Hence, the bargaining
set M(E) = ∅ and as a result Mr(E) = Msr(E) = M(E) = ∅. ◦
Remark. The utility functions in the example are complete, transitive and satisfy next to
strict monotonicity and continuity in money also the archimedean property. Moreover, the
indivisible goods are weakly desired by all agents i ∈ N . However, the utility function
U2 : 2
Ω × R+ −→ R+ of agent 2 does not satisfy the property of constant marginal utility
for money. So, in fact this property on the preferences cannot simply be omitted for the
non-emptiness of the bargaining set in exchange economies. ◦
3.3.2 Bargaining sets and the core
According to the proof of Theorem 3.4 we obtain that an element of the (semi)reactive bar-
gaining set M(s)r(vE) of the TU-game 〈N, vE〉 can be converted into an N -reallocation in
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the (semi)reactive bargaining setM(s)r(E) of the exchange economy E . The converse of this
statement is also true. To prove this, we first need the following lemma which states that ev-
ery N -reallocation in the semireactive bargaining set is individual rational. Observe, that this
also implies for the N -reallocations in the reactive bargaining set to be individual rational.
Lemma 3.5. Let E be an exchange economy satisfying the TA-condition. If (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈
Msr(E), then Vi(Bi) + xi ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi for all i ∈ N .
Proof (Due to Peter Sudho¨lter). Let (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈Msr(E) and define the set
I := {i ∈ N | Vi(Bi) + xi < Vi(Ai) + mi}.
Suppose I 6= ∅ and let k ∈ I . For every P ⊆ N \{k} we denote
E(P ) := vE(P ) −
∑
i∈P∩I
Vi(Ai) −
∑
i∈P\I
[Vi(Bi) + xi −mi].
Observe that due to superadditivity of 〈N, vE 〉 we have E(P ∪Q) ≥ E(P )+E(Q) whenever
P ∩Q = ∅. Define
µ := max{E(P ) | P ⊆ N \{k}} and P := {P ⊆ N \{k} | E(P ) = µ}.
Let P ∗ ∈ P such that |P ∗| is maximal. Observe that µ ≥ E(P ) ≥ 0 whenever P ⊆ I\{k}.
Therefore, due to maximality of |P ∗|, we have I\{k} ⊆ P ∗. Select ε > 0 satisfying
|P ∗|·ε < min{mk , Vk(Ak) + mk − Vk(Bk)− xk}
and let (Ci)i∈P∗ be a P ∗-redistribution satisfying the TA-condition for coalition P ∗. Let
y ∈ RP
∗∪{k} be defined by
yi :=


Vi(Ai) + mi + ε− Vi(Ci) if i ∈ I\{k},
Vi(Bi) + xi + ε− Vi(Ci) if i ∈ P ∗\I ,
mk − |P ∗|·ε if i = k.
Observe that yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ P ∗ ∪ {k} and that∑
i∈P∗∪{k}
yi =
∑
i∈I\{k}
Vi(Ai) +
∑
i∈I
mi +
∑
i∈P∗\I
[Vi(Bi) + xi]−
∑
i∈P∗
Vi(Ci)
=
∑
i∈I\{k}
Vi(Ai) +
∑
i∈P∗\I
[Vi(Bi) + xi −mi] +
∑
i∈P∗∪{k}
mi − vE(P
∗)
=
∑
i∈P∗∪{k}
mi − µ.
We distinguish between the following two cases:
Case (1). If P ∗ = ∅, then I = {k} and µ = 0. Take ` ∈ N \{k}. Because the pair
({k}, (Ak, mk)) is an objection of agent k against agent `, there exists a counter-objection
(Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q). Since in particular Q ⊆ N \{k} and I = {k} we obtain that
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E(Q) = vE(Q) +
∑
i∈Q
mi −
∑
i∈Q
[Vi(Bi) + xi]
≥
∑
i∈Q
[Vi(Di) + zi] −
∑
i∈Q
[Vi(Bi) + xi] ≥ 0 = µ.
Hence, E(Q) = µ. But since Q 6= ∅, we have a contradiction to the maximality of |P ∗|.
Case (2). If P ∗ 6= ∅, then we define for every j ∈ P ∗,
Rj :=
(
(Ak , yk) , (Cj , yj + µ) , (Ci, yi)i∈P∗\{j}
)
.
Observe thatRj is a P ∗ ∪ {k}-reallocation and for every j ∈ P ∗a strong improvement upon
(Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ Msr(E). So, by weak Pareto efficiency, this yields that P ∗ ∪ {k} 6= N . Let
` ∈ N \(P ∗ ∪ {k}). Then agent k can raise an objection against agent `. Hence, for every
objection via coalition P ∗ ∪ {k} there exists a coalition Q ∈ Γ`k which ` can use to counter
every objection via P ∗ ∪ {k}. In particular this yields E(Q) ≥ 0. Due to the maximality
of |P ∗| it follows that |P ∗ ∩ Q| 6= ∅. Take j ∈ P ∗ ∩ Q. We prove that the objection
(P ∗ ∪ {k},Rj) cannot be countered via coalition Q. Suppose that the pair (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q)
is a counter-objection of agent `. Then it is straightforward to verify that∑
i∈Q
[Vi(Di) + zi] >
∑
i∈Q\I
[Vi(Bi) + xi] +
∑
i∈Q∩I
[Vi(Ai) + mi] + µ. (4)
Because vE(Q)+
∑
i∈Q mi ≥
∑
i∈Q[Vi(Di)+zi] and Q ⊆ N\{k}, inequality (4) contradicts
the definition of µ. This yields the desired contradiction. 2
Remark. According to Lemma 3.5 every N -reallocation in the (semi)reactive bargaining set
is individual rational. Due to Lemma 3.2, this implies in particular for the N -reallocations in
the (semi)reactive bargaining set not only to be weakly Pareto efficient, but even to be Pareto
efficient. ◦
In the proof of Lemma 3.5 we explicitly used the fact that in the (semi)reactive bargaining
the agent who can expect an objection has to give the coalition he uses to counter before the
reallocation in the objection is specified. It might be of interest to point out that Lemma 3.5
is not true for the bargaining set.
Example. Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, . . . , 4} and Ω := {α1, α2, α3, β1,
β2, β3}. The initial endowments are Ai := {αi}, mi = 12 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and A4 :=
{β1, β2, β3}, m4 := 2. The reservation values Vi : 2Ω −→ R for all i ∈ N are given by:
{αp} {βq} {αp, αq} {α1, α2, α3} {β1, β2, β3} {α1, α2, α3, βq}
agents 1–3 0 1 12 12 1 13
agent 4 0 0 0 0 4 0
The remaining reservation values follow by taking the minimal worths that respect mono-
tonicity. Observe that vE(N) = V1({α1, α2, α3}) + V4({β1, β2, β3}) = 16. Hence, there
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exists an N -redistribution satisfying the TA-condition for coalition N . In fact, it can be easily
verified that this exchange economy satisfies the TA-condition. Consider the N -reallocation
(Bi, xi)i∈N := (({α1, α2, α3, β1}, 4) , ({β2}, 16) , ({β3}, 16) , (∅, 2)).
Claim. (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ M(E).
Proof. Observe that the utilities of the agents 1, 2 and 3 for the bundles in the proposed
N -reallocation are all equal to 17. Since, all of their reservation values and their initial
endowments are also the same, these agents are interchangeable. Therefore, they can be
treated similarly.
The N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N is (weakly) Pareto efficient. Indeed, using the symmetry, the
best attempt to make a weak improvement is via an N -redistribution
({α1, α2, α3} , ∅ , ∅ , {β1, β2, β3}).
However, it cannot be extended to a weak improvement. This can be seen as follows. Agent 1
should at least receive (next to {α1, α2, α3}) an amount of money 5 to exceed the worth of
17 = V1({α1, α2, α3, β1}) + 4. But then there is not enough money left for agents 2 and 3
such that their utilities exceed the worth of 17 = V2({β2}) + 16 = V3({β3}) + 16.
It is left to the reader to verify that none of agents 1, 2 and 3 have a justified objection against
one another. Observe that agent 4 can counter every possible objection, since V4(A4)+m4 >
V4(B4) + x4. So, the only potential justified objection is from agent 4 to, say, agent 1. The
best attempt for agent 4 to do so is via coalition P := {2, 3, 4} and the P -reallocation
(({α2, α3}, 7) , (∅, 19) , ({β1, β2, β3}, 0)).
However, agent 1 can counter this objection via coalition Q := {1, 2} and the Q-reallocation
(({α1, α2}, 5) , (∅, 19)).
Hence, (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ M(E), but agent 4 strictly prefers his initial endowment (A4, m4) to
the bundle (B4, x4). ◦
With Lemma 3.5 we can now prove that every N -reallocation in the (semi)reactive bargaining
set of the exchange economy can be converted into an element in the (semi)reactive bargain-
ing set of its corresponding TU-game. The proof is only given for the semireactive bargaining
set, but it can be easily modified to provide the same result for the reactive bargaining set.
Proposition 3.6. Let E be an exchange economy satisfying the TA-condition. If (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈
Msr(E), then (Vi(Bi) + xi −mi)i∈N ∈Msr(vE).
Proof. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ Msr(E) and define Xi := Vi(Bi) + xi −mi for all i ∈ N . Then
Lemma 3.5 tells us that Xi ≥ Vi(Ai) = vE({i}) for all i ∈ N .
Claim. X(N) = vE(N).
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Proof. Suppose ∑i∈N Vi(Bi) < vE(N). Let (Ci)i∈N be an N -redistribution which satisfies
the TA-condition for coalition N . Define for all i ∈ N ,
yi := Vi(Bi) + xi − Vi(Ci) +
1
n
∑
i∈N
[Vi(Ci)− Vi(Bi)].
Because Vi(Bi) + xi ≥ Vi(Ai) + mi for all i ∈ N it follows that yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Furthermore, 1
n
∑
i∈N [Vi(Ci) − Vi(Bi)] > 0. Hence, the N -reallocation (Ci, yi)i∈N is
a strong improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . This contradicts the (weak) Pareto efficiency of
(Bi, xi)i∈N .
So, X is an imputation of 〈N, vE 〉. Next, we prove that X ∈Msr(vE).
Assume agent k ∈ N can raise an objection against an other agent ` ∈ N via coalition
P ∈ Γk`. Because (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ Msr(E) there exists a coalition Q ∈ Γ`k such that for
every objection (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) from k against ` there exists a Q-reallocation (Di, zi)i∈Q
such that (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q) is a counter-objection.
Let (P, Y ) be an objection from k against ` with respect to X . Take a P -redistribution
(Ci)i∈P which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition P . Define δ := 1|P | [vE(P )− Y (P )],
then δ ≥ 0. Furthermore, define
yi := Yi − Vi(Ci) + mi + δ for all i ∈ P .
Then
∑
i∈P yi =
∑
i∈P mi and because Yi > Xi ≥ vE ({i}) = Vi(Ai) it follows from the
TA-condition that yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ P . We also have that
Vi(Ci) + yi ≥ Yi + mi > Xi + mi = Vi(Bi) + xi for all i ∈ P .
So, (P, (Ci, yi)i∈P ) is an objection from k against ` with respect to (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ Msr(E).
Thus, there exists a Q-reallocation (Di, zi)i∈Q such that (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q) is a counter-objec-
tion. Define Zi := Vi(Di)+zi−mi for all i ∈ Q. Clearly, Z(Q) =
∑
i∈Q Vi(Di) ≤ vE(Q).
Furthermore, since (Q, (Di, zi)i∈Q) is a counter-objection, we also have that
Zi = Vi(Di) + zi −mi ≥ Vi(Ci) + yi −mi ≥ Yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ P,
Zi = Vi(Di) + zi −mi ≥ Vi(Bi) + xi −mi = Xi for all i ∈ Q\P.
Hence, the pair (Q, Z) is a counter-objection and thus X ∈Msr(vE ). 2
Remark. In the proof of Proposition 3.6 we explicitly used Lemma 3.5. We already illus-
trated, by means of an example, that Lemma 3.5 does not hold in case of the bargaining set.
Nevertheless, one can still ask whether every element of the bargaining set of an exchange
economy E at least generates an element of the prebargaining set of 〈N, vE 〉 (the vector
X ∈ RN is in the prebargaining set if X is efficient and it does not allow, like in the bar-
gaining set, any justified objections. However, X is not necessarily individual rational). The
example stated directly after Lemma 3.5 answers this question negatively. In this example,
the vector X := (Vi(Bi) + xi −mi)i∈N ∈ RN, derived from the proposed N -reallocation
(Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ M(E), is not an element of the prebargaining set of the TU-game 〈N, vE〉,
since X(N) =
∑
i∈N Vi(Bi) = 13 + 1 + 1 = 15 < 16 = vE(N). ◦
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Combining the results of Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.6 with the proof of Theorem 3.4
yields the following result.
Corollary 3.7. Let E := 〈N, Ω, (Ai, mi, Vi)i∈N 〉 be an exchange economy which satisfies
the TA-condition, then:
Msr(E) = C(E) if and only if Msr(vE ) = C(vE),
Mr(E) = C(E) if and only if Mr(vE) = C(vE). 2
For an exchange economy satisfying the TA-condition and with four or fewer agents, the
(semi)reactive bargaining set and the core coincide whenever the latter is non-empty. This
follows immediately by Corollary 3.7 and the result by Solymosi (2002). Recall that the ex-
change economies studied in this chapter give rise to (non-negative) superadditive TU-games.
It may be of interest to point out the fact that also every non-negative and superadditive TU-
game generates an exchange economy, since several classes of superadditive balanced TU-
games can be found in the literature for which the core and the (semi)reactive bargaining set
coincide (see Section 2.1 for an overview).
Proposition 3.8. If 〈N, v〉 is a non-negative and superadditive TU-game, then there exists an
exchange economy E , satisfying the TA-condition, such that vE = v.
Proof. Let 〈N, v〉 be a non-negative and superadditive TU-game. Define Ω := {α1, . . . , αn}
and Ai := {αi} for all i ∈ N . The amounts of money m ∈ RN+ are not relevant and can be
chosen such that the TA-condition will be satisfied. Furthermore, we define for all i ∈ N the
reservation values Vi : 2Ω −→ R+ by
Vi(B) := v({j ∈ N | αj ∈ B}) for all B ⊆ Ω.
We prove that v(S) = vE(S) for all S ⊆ N . Let S ⊆ N . Observe that any S-redistribu-
tion (Bi)i∈S obeys,∑
i∈S
Vi(Bi) =
∑
i∈S
v({j ∈ N | αj ∈ Bi}) ≤ v(S).
The last inequality follows from the superadditivity of 〈N, v〉 in combination with the fact
that the collection of coalitions
{
{j ∈ N | αj ∈ Bi}
}
i∈S
is in particular a partitioning of
coalition S. Hence, according to this inequality we have, vE(S) ≤ v(S).
By giving all indivisible goods within the coalition S ⊆ N to exactly one agent, we also have
that vE(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N . 2
Clearly, two different exchange economies may give the same non-negative and superaddi-
tive TU-game. Neither the number of indivisible goods, nor the initial endowments need
to be the same. Nevertheless, a non-negative and superadditive TU-game for which the
(semi)reactive bargaining set and the core coincide, generates exchange economies in which
the (semi)reactive bargaining set and the core also coincide.
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3.4 Price equilibria in exchange economies
According to Proposition 3.8 every non-negative and superadditive TU-game generates an ex-
change economy with quasi-linear utilities. In this section, we extend this result by proving
that every non-negative, superadditive and balanced TU-game generates an exchange econ-
omy with a price equilibrium. But before we do so, let us start by repeating the definition of
a price equilibrium (see e.g., Arrow and Debreu (1954) or Arrow and Hahn (1991)).
Definition. An N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N is a price equilibrium, if there exists a price vec-
tor p ∈ RΩ (p 6= 0) with the following two properties:
(i) p(Bi) + xi ≤ p(Ai) + mi for all i ∈ N, (budget constraints)
(ii) If Vi(C) + y > Vi(Bi) + xi for a certain C ⊆ Ω, y ∈ R and i ∈ N ,
then p(C) + y > p(Ai) + mi. (maximality conditions)
For all C ⊆ Ω, we denote p(C) :=
∑
α∈C
pα. ◦
If p ∈ RΩ is a price vector, the budget agent i ∈ N has to his disposal equals p(Ai) + mi.
So, if (Bi, xi)i∈N is a price equilibrium supported by this price vector p ∈ RΩ, the budget
constraint states that each agent i ∈ N did not spend more money than his total budget to
purchase the bundle (Bi, xi). The maximality condition states that by purchasing the bundle
(Bi, xi), agent i ∈ N receives, according to his preferences, the best bundle he can afford
within his budget.
Remark.
(i) In the literature the concept of a price equilibrium, as stated above, is also referred to
as a market equilibrium, competitive equilibrium or Walrasian equilibrium,
(ii) Since, for all agents i ∈ N the utility functions Ui : 2Ω × R+ −→ R+ are strict
monotonic in money, the maximality conditions imply that the budget constraints are
in fact equalities. ◦
Next, we prove that an exchange economy with a price equilibrium and satisfying the TA-
condition generates a balanced TU-game.
Lemma 3.9. If E is an exchange economy which satisfies the TA-condition and has moreover
a price equilibrium, then the corresponding TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 is balanced.
Proof. Let E be an exchange economy with a price equilibrium and satisfying the TA-
condition. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N be a price equilibrium supported by the price vector p ∈ RΩ.
Suppose coalition S has a strong improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . So, there exists an S-
reallocation (Ci, yi)i∈S such that Vi(Ci) + yi > Vi(Bi) + xi for all i ∈ S. Hence, by the
maximality conditions, this yields that p(Ci)+yi > p(Ai)+mi for all i ∈ S. But, by taking
the sum over i ∈ S, we obtain a contradiction. Hence, (Bi, xi)i∈N ∈ C(E).
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Since the exchange economy E satisfies the TA-condition, we obtain according to Proposi-
tion 3.3(i) that C(vE) 6= ∅. 2
Remark. Lemma 3.9 in fact shows that a price equilibrium in an exchange economy E is
contained in the core C(E) which is a well-known result. Observe, that by definition, this
implies for a price equilibrium to be an element of the reactive bargaining set Mr(E). ◦
From Lemma 3.9 we can conclude that for an exchange economy satisfying the TA-condition,
the notion of balancedness of the corresponding TU-game is necessary for the existence of a
price equilibrium. However, it is known that it is not sufficient. Therefore, an other condition
can be found in the literature, the so-called Social Welfare condition (see e.g., Potters et al.
(2002)). This a condition on the reservation values in the economy.
Definition. An exchange economy E satisfies the Social Welfare (SW) condition if the linear
program (LP)
maximize
∑
i∈N
∑
C⊆Ω
µiC ·Vi(C) subject to:
µiC ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and C ⊆ Ω,∑
C⊆Ω
µiC = 1 for all i ∈ N, (5)
∑
C:α∈C
∑
i∈N
µiC = 1 for all α ∈ Ω (6)
has an integer-valued optimal solution. ◦
A feasible solution of (LP) can be understood as a stochastic redistribution of Ω. Indeed, by
Constraint (5) the number µiC ≥ 0 can be seen as the probability that agent i receives C. Ac-
cording to Constraint (6) each indivisible good α is assigned with probability one to an agent.
Observe that an integer-valued feasible solution of (LP) corresponds with an N -redistribution.
So, the SW-condition states that the highest expected social welfare is obtained by an N -
redistribution (and therefore it can actually be realized).
The following proposition can be found in Potters et al. (2002) (see also Bikhchandani and
Mamer (1997)) which states that the SW- and the TA-condition are sufficient for the existence
of a price equilibrium.
Proposition 3.10 (Potters et al. (2002)). An exchange economy has a price equilibrium if it
satisfies the TA-condition and the SW-condition.
Proof. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies the TA- and SW-condition. Let
(Bi)i∈N be an N -redistribution which satisfies the TA-condition for coalition N and let
(p∗, q∗) ∈ RΩ×RN be any optimal solution of the following linear program (LP∗), which is
the dual of (LP),
minimize p(Ω) + q(N) subject to:
p(C) + qi ≥ Vi(C) for all C ⊆ Ω and i ∈ N.
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Note that feasible region of (LP) is compact and thus it has an optimal solution. Therefore,
due to duality, also (LP∗) has an optimal solution. Furthermore, since Constraint (6) is an
equality it can be derived from complementary slackness that p∗ 6= 0.
Define xi := p∗(Ai)+mi−p∗(Bi) for all i ∈ N . According to the SW-condition the integer-
valued solution µiC := 1 if C = Bi and µiC := 0 else, is an optimal solution of (LP). Hence,
by complementary slackness, this yields that p∗(Bi)+ q∗i = Vi(Bi) for all i ∈ N . Therefore,
for all i ∈ N ,
xi = p
∗(Ai) + mi − p
∗(Bi) = p
∗(Ai) + q
∗
i + mi − Vi(Bi)
≥ Vi(Ai) + mi − Vi(Bi) ≥ 0.
The last inequality follows from the TA-condition. So, (Bi, xi)i∈N is an N -reallocation
which clearly satisfies the budget constraints with respect to the price vector p∗ ∈ RΩ. The
maximality conditions are also satisfied. Indeed, if Vi(C)+y > Vi(Bi)+xi for some C ⊆ Ω,
y ≥ 0 and i ∈ N , then
p∗(C) + y ≥ Vi(C)− q
∗
i + y > Vi(Bi)− q
∗
i + xi
= p∗(Bi) + xi = p
∗(Ai) + mi.
Hence, the N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N is a price equilibrium supported by the price vector
p∗ ∈ RΩ. 2
From Lemma 3.9 and Proposition 3.10 it can be verified that an exchange economy, satisfying
the TA- and the SW-condition, generates a non-negative, superadditive and balanced TU-
game. The converse of this statement is also true, as we now demonstrate.
Theorem 3.11. Every non-negative, superadditive and balanced TU-game generates an ex-
change economy with a price equilibrium.
Proof. Let 〈N, v〉 be a superadditive and balanced TU-game which is non-negative. Define
the exchange economy E with Ω := {α(i)}i∈N . In this proof it might be useful to con-
sider α : N −→ Ω as a bijection. For all i ∈ N we define, similarly as in the proof of
Proposition 3.8, Ai := {α(i)} and the reservation values Vi : 2Ω −→ R+ by
Vi(C) := V (C) = v({α
−1(C)}) for all C ⊆ Ω.
For all C ⊆ Ω, we denote α−1(C) := {j ∈ N | α(j) ∈ C}. The amounts of money m ∈ RN+
in E are for the moment not relevant. According to Proposition 3.8 this economy E generates
the TU-game 〈N, v〉, i.e., vE(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N . Next, we illustrate that E satisfies
the SW-condition.
Let {µiC}[C⊆Ω,i∈N ] be a feasible solution of (LP). Define for all S ⊆ N ,
ΛS :=
∑
i∈N
µiα(S).
Then ΛS ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . Furthermore, by Constraint (6) of (LP) we have for all j ∈ N
that
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∑
S:j∈S
ΛS =
∑
S:j∈S
∑
i∈N
µiα(S) =
∑
C:α(j)∈C
∑
i∈N
µiC = 1.
Hence, {ΛS}S⊆N is a non-negative solution of the equation
∑
S⊆N ΛS ·eS = eN . Balanced-
ness of 〈N, v〉 (see Section 2.2) tells us that∑
C⊆Ω
∑
i∈N
µiC ·V (C) =
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈N
µiα(S) ·V (α(S)) =
∑
S⊆N
ΛS ·v(S) ≤ v(N) = V (Ω).
As a result, we obtain that (LP) has an integer-valued optimal solution. Indeed, given a
fixed agent i∗ ∈ N , the feasible solution µiC := 1 if (i, C) = (i∗, Ω) and µiC := 0 else,
maximizes social welfare of V (Ω). Hence, the highest expected social welfare is obtained by
an N -redistribution and thus the SW-condition is satisfied.
Finally, by setting the initial amounts of money mi for all i ∈ N large enough such that the
TA-condition is satisfied (for instance, define mi := v(N)− v({i}) for all i ∈ N ) it follows,
by Proposition 3.10, that the economy E has a price equilibrium. 2
Let us have a look at the following example which is taken from Bevia´ et al. (1999).
Example (Bevia´ et al. (1999)). Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, 2, 3}, Ω :=
{α, β, γ} and (Ai, mi)i∈N := (({α}, 6) , ({β}, 3) , ({γ}, 1)). The reservation values Vi :
2Ω −→ R+ for i ∈ N are given by:
{α} {β} {γ} {α, β} {α, γ} {β, γ} {α, β, γ}
agent 1 10 8 2 13 11 9 14
agent 2 8 5 10 13 14 13 15
agent 3 1 1 8 2 9 9 10
It is left to the reader to verify that E satisfies the TA-condition. Bevia´ et al. prove that the
unique N -redistribution (β, α, γ) maximizing social welfare of 24 is not supported by a price
vector. The reason is that the stochastic redistribution µ1α = µ1β := 12 , µ2γ = µ2αβ :=
1
2
and µ3γ = µ3∅ := 12 obtains an expected social welfare of 24
1
2 . So, this economy has no
price equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the corresponding TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 is balanced. So indeed, balancedness
is not sufficient for the existence of a price equilibrium. However, the balanced TU-game
〈N, vE 〉 is also generated by the exchange economy E ′ with N := {1, 2, 3}, Ω := {α, β, γ},
initial endowments (Ai, mi)i∈N := (({α}, 14) , ({β}, 19) , ({γ}, 16)) and the reservation
values V ′i : 2Ω −→ R+ for all i ∈ N given by:
{α} {β} {γ} {α, β} {α, γ} {β, γ} {α, β, γ}
agents 1–3 10 5 8 16 18 13 24
According to Theorem 3.11 the exchange economy E ′ has a price equilibrium. Indeed, the
N -reallocation (({α, β}, 8) , ({γ}, 17) , (∅, 24)) supported by the price vector p := (10, 6, 8)
is a price equilibrium in E ′.
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Hence, the economy E has no price equilibrium while the economy E ′ yielding the same TU-
game does have a price equilibrium. This illustrates that the concept of price equilibrium is
not a game-theoretical solution concept, i.e., it is a solution concept for exchange economies,
not for the corresponding TU-games. ◦
Remark. It is known that the phenomenon described in the previous example also occurs in
case of the Owen set (Owen (1975)) as a solution rule for linear production processes. These
processes give rise to totally balanced TU-games, nevertheless the Owen sets of two linear
production processes generating the same TU-game may be different (see Example 2.7 in
Gellekom, Potters, Reijnierse, Tijs and Engel (2000)). ◦
If one chose (Ai)i∈N := (γ, β, α) as the initial N -distribution in the (original) exchange
economy E of Bevia´ et al. (1999) (see the previous example), then the corresponding TU-
game 〈N, vE〉 is not balanced. Because in this case we obtain the strict inequality
1
2 ·vE({1, 2}) +
1
2 ·vE({1, 3}) +
1
2 ·vE({2, 3}) =
1
2 ·[18 + 18 + 13] = 24
1
2 > 24 = vE(N).
This illustrates that balancedness of the TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 also depends on the initial N -
distribution (Ai)i∈N in the exchange economy E . Nevertheless, if E satisfies the SW-condi-
tion, then for every initial N -redistribution the corresponding TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 is balanced.
This statement follows immediately from Lemma 3.9 and Proposition 3.10. So, the SW-
condition is suff icient for the corresponding TU-game to be balanced, but the following sim-
ple example illustrates that it is not a necessary condition.
Example. Let E be an exchange economy with N := {1, 2}, Ω := {α, β} and the reservation
values Vi : 2Ω −→ R+ for i = 1, 2 given by:
{α} {β} {α, β}
agent 1 5 7 14
agent 2 8 9 13
Because E has two agents, we may conclude from the superadditivity that the TU-game
〈N, vE 〉 is balanced, no matter which initial endowments is chosen. If we set in this example
the initial endowments as (A1, m1) := ({α}, 3) and (A2, m2) := ({β}, 3), then the exchange
economy E satisfies the TA-condition and thus, according Proposition 3.3(ii), its (strong) core
is non-empty. However, vE (N) = 15 and the stochastic redistribution µ1αβ = µ1∅ := 12 and
µ2α = µ2β :=
1
2 obtains a expected social welfare of 15
1
2 . Hence, the SW-condition is not
satisfied, but for any initial endowments the TU-game 〈N, vE 〉 is balanced. ◦
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4
Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency
4.1 Introduction
The subject of this chapter is the existence of envy-free allocations and the compatibility
of envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency in economies with finitely many indivisible goods
and one perfectly divisible good (money). Most of the results of the chapter are taken from
Meertens, Potters and Reijnierse (2000) and from Meertens, Potters and Reijnierse (2002).
The main problem studied in this chapter is to allocate in a fair way a number of indivis-ible goods (e.g., houses, cars) among a group of people, called agents, when monetary
compensations are allowed. The main difference with the economies studied in the previous
chapter is that in the present chapter the agents do not have initial endowments, i.e., there is no
a priori allocation of the indivisible goods and money. So in this chapter, we are not dealing
with the problem how a number of agents should reallocate their initial endowments in an op-
timal way. Instead, we try to find ‘from scratch’ a distribution of the indivisible goods along
with monetary compensations, such that we obtain an allocation considered to be fair by all
agents. Like in Chapter 3 the agents have preferences on consumption bundles consisting of
a number of indivisible goods and an amount of money. However, in this chapter we inves-
tigate more general preferences than in the previous one. The preferences are assumed to be
complete, transitive and continuous binary relations on the set of consumption bundles under
the two additional assumptions that ‘more money is better than less money’ and that ‘large
amounts of money can change preferences’. Again, we call these properties monotonicity in
money and the archimedean property, respectively. However, in contrast with Chapter 3, we
do not assume for the marginal utility of money to be constant nor for the indivisible goods
to be (weakly) desired by all agents.
The first normative concept, studied in this chapter, is envy-freeness. An allocation is envy-
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free if no agent prefers the consumption bundle of an other agent to his own bundle. This
concept originates from a paper by Foley (1967) (see also Varian (1974) and Maskin (1987)).
In fact, it is an elaboration of the ‘fairness’ concept (every agent gets a fair part of the whole),
because there are more situations in which envy-freeness makes sense and, quite often, envy-
freeness implies fairness when both concepts make sense (‘if you think you get the best part,
you have no reason to complain’). The second normative concept, studied in this chapter, is
envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. An allocation is Pareto efficient if no agent can improve
himself without hurting the interests of the other agents.
In case of an economy with only divisible goods, one way to prove the existence of envy-free
allocations is by extending the economy with initial endowments, i.e., every agent obtains one
n-th of the total quantity of each good, n being the number of agents. A price equilibrium
in such an economy is envy-free and Pareto efficient. Envy-freeness follows from the fact
that each agent has the same budget, whatever the price vector may be, and thus they can
afford the same bundles. Indeed, as an agent can afford the bundle of any other agent and
he has already the best consumption bundle among the bundles he can afford, there will be
no envy. Pareto efficiency follows from the First Welfare Theorem (see e.g., Arrow (1951)
or Arrow and Hahn (1991)). In an economy with only indivisible goods the initial allocation
‘one n-th of each of the goods’ makes no sense. However, if one defines the budget of each
agent as ‘one n-th of the price of all the indivisible goods together’, the same reasoning can
be followed. Also in this case a price equilibrium is envy-free and Pareto efficient. Observe
however, that a price equilibrium places stronger restrictions than envy-freeness. Indeed, in
a price equilibrium the bundle assigned to an agent is the best in the set of all bundles he can
afford, but in an envy-free allocation each agent only compares his bundle with the n − 1
bundles assigned to the other agents. Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) contain necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of price equilibria if the preference relations can
be represented by utility functions which are quasi-linear (see also Section 3.4). However,
in this chapter we investigate the existence of envy-free allocations in case of more general
preference relations.
This chapter contains a proof for the existence of an envy-free allocation under the rather
mild condition that the preferences are complete, transitive and continuous binary relations
on the set of consumption bundles which satisfy monotonicity in money and the archimedean
property. We start by illustrating that these preference relations can be represented by con-
tinuous utility functions. The existence of an envy-free allocation is first proved for the case
that the preferences are represented by utility functions which are kink functions, i.e., the
utility functions are piecewise-linear. Using this result and a basic result from calculus which
states that every continuous function can be approximated uniformly by kink functions, the
existence of an envy-free allocation in economies with indivisible goods and money can be
guaranteed.
Furthermore in this chapter, the existence of envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations is stud-
ied. Svensson (1983) proves that every envy-free allocation is automatically Pareto efficient
under the condition that the agents receive exactly one item of the indivisible goods and the
utilities are quasi-linear. This result has been extended by Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991)
to the case of more general utilities. From these results many people got the idea that envy-
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freeness and Pareto efficiency are closely related. In Subsection 4.4.1 however, we give an
example in which the set of envy-free allocations and the set of Pareto efficient allocations
are both non-empty but disjoint. This is a phenomenon that can occur as soon as agents are
allowed to obtain more than one indivisible good and the utilities are not quasi-linear. In the
case that the utilities are quasi-linear the set of envy-free allocations and the set of Pareto
efficient allocations are not disjoint. However, also in this case not every envy-free allocation
is automatically Pareto efficient.
The existence results for envy-free allocations or envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in
the literature put more restrictive conditions on the preferences or on the set of agents and
indivisible goods. Mixtures of the following restrictions can be found in the literature:
• The number of indivisible goods is at most equal to the number of agents (Svensson
(1983)),
• Agents are only interested in one item of the indivisible goods (Klijn (2000), Aragone`s
(1995), Alkan et al. (1991), Svensson (1983), Tadenuma and Thomson (1991), Su
(1999)),
• The indivisible goods have a non-negative marginal value, i.e., the goods are desired
by the agents (Quinzii (1994), Gale (1984)),
• The appreciation for the indivisible goods and money is separable,
• The appreciation for money is linear and the same for all agents, i.e., quasi-linear util-
ities (Klijn (2000), Haake, Raith and Su (2002)).
None of these restrictions are made in this chapter. Only the following conditions are kept:
(i) The marginal value of money is positive (‘more money is better than less money’),
(ii) Preferences are continuous in money,
(iii) The preference of a commodity bundle compared with a commodity bundle which
contains no indivisible good can be changed by adding or subtracting (large) amounts
of money (‘money matters’).
Properties like (ii) and (iii) are necessary for the existence of envy-free allocations as is shown
by examples. Furthermore, we illustrate that the preferences satisfying Properties (i)–(iii) in
particular satisfy Condition (2) in Alkan et al. (1991):
(2) For each agent and each commodity bundle there exists a unique amount of money that
is deemed equivalent to the commodity bundle.
As the existence result of Alkan et al. (1991) is the closest to the results in this chapter, it
might be a good idea to point out the main differences:
(a) The preference relations of Alkan et al. are only defined for commodity bundles (B, x)
with |B| ≤ 1 and x ∈ R,
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(b) The agents are only interested in one item of the indivisible goods,
(c) Essentially, the number of agents and the number of indivisible goods are the same,
(d) There is also an amount of money M to divide.
So, in the setting of Alkan et al. the number of agents and the number of indivisible goods
need to be the same (see point (c)). However, if these numbers are different they change
the situation into a situation with an equal number of agents and indivisible goods. If the
number of indivisible goods is smaller than the number of agents, some ‘worthless pieces
of paper’ are added to the indivisible goods to obtain equality. If, however, the number of
indivisible goods is larger than the number of agents, ‘fictive agents’ are added. These fictive
agents appreciate a consumption bundle (B, x) only because of the money. Note that the
resulting allocation assigns only a part of the indivisible goods to the ‘real’ agents and that
the indivisible goods assigned to fictive agents are in fact not allocated. To give an example,
suppose the head of a department has to allocate three tasks, say, α, β and γ among the two
members of the department. Suppose there is a budget of 10 units to compensate the agents
for the performance of the tasks. To keep things simple we assume that the preferences are
represented by the following utility functions:
{α} {β} {γ}
agent 1 −2 + x −3 + x −10 + x
agent 2 −3 + x −2 + x −10 + x
So, both agents agree that the tasks α and β are relatively easy and that the task γ is hard
to do. Alkan et al. will come with an envy-free allocation ({α}, x) 7→ 1, ({β}, y) 7→ 2
and the fictive agent 3 obtains the difficult task γ (he does not mind which task he gets) and
a payoff z, for some numbers x, y, z ∈ R. To be envy-free, one must have x ≥ y − 1,
y ≥ x − 1 and z ≥ max{x, y} (since the fictive agent 3 appreciates a consumption bundle
only because of the money). Finally, due to feasibility, one must also have x + y = 10. So,
the whole budget is spent and only the easy tasks are actually executed. A similar example
can be formulated in the case of students who rent a house collectively that has more rooms
than there are students. In this case some of the rooms remain empty if the setting of Alkan et
al. is chosen. One can imagine, however, that some student likes to have an additional room
and is willing to pay a larger part of the rent in return.
If there is also an amount of money M to divide in the economy (see point (d)), one can start
with an equal distribution of M among the agents and replace for each agent his preference
relation i with a new preference relation∗i such that
(B, x) ∗i (C, y) if and only if (B, x + Mn ) i (C, y +
M
n
).
Therewith the economy has been transformed into an economy in which M = 0. So, one
may assume without loss of generality that M = 0.
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4.2 Preliminaries
An economy with indivisible goods and money, studied in this chapter, can be described by
the tuple 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉. Here, N denotes the set of agents, with n := |N | ≥ 2 and Ω
denotes a finite set of indivisible goods, with |Ω| ≥ 1. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with
a preference relation i on the set 2Ω × R, i.e., the set of consumption bundles (B, x). The
coordinate x ∈ R measures the positive or negative quantity of a perfectly divisible good that
is referred to as money. The preference relations that are considered in these economies have
the following properties:
(i)  is a complete, transitive binary relation on 2Ω × R,
(ii) for all B ⊆ Ω, if x > y, then (B, x)  (B, y) (strict monotonicity in money),
(iii) for all consumption bundles (B, x) and (C, y) with (B, x)  (C, y), there exists a
strictly positive number δ such that (B, x − δ)  (C, y) and (B, x)  (C, y + δ)
(continuity in money),
(iv) for all consumption bundles (B, x) there exists a positive number ∆ such that (B, x) 
(∅, ∆) and (B, x)  (∅, −∆) (archimedean property).
The set of all preference relations satisfying the Properties (i)–(iv) is denoted by R. Observe
that the preference relations inR are more general than the preference relations in Chapter 3.
The main goal of the chapter is to find allocations of the indivisible goods along with mone-
tary compensations which all agents consider to be fair. Therefore, we introduce the following
definitions in this context.
Definition. An n-partition of Ω is a collection {Bk}1≤k≤n with Bk ⊆ Ω for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,⋃n
k=1Bk = Ω and Bk ∩ B` = ∅ whenever k 6= `. We allow that Bk = ∅ for some
1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω , pi : N −→ {1, . . . , n} a bijection
and x ∈ Rn a money distribution, i.e.,
∑n
k=1 xk = 0. Then the list (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is an
allocation. This means that in this allocation the bundle (Bpi(i), xpi(i)) is assigned to agent i
by the bijection pi. ◦
Our first normative concept for an allocation to be fair is no-envy. An allocation is envy-free
if no agent strictly prefers the bundle of anyone else to his own. So, in such an allocation
each agent receives according to his preference relation the best bundle within this allocation.
In Section 4.3, we give a more formal definition of this normative concept. The following
example shows that the Properties (iii) and (iv) of a preference relation cannot simply be
omitted for the existence of an envy-free allocation.
Example. Let 〈{1, 2}, {α}, (i)i=1,2〉 be an economy with two agents and one indivisible
good.
(i) Assume that both agents have the same preference relation which is strictly monotonic in
money and satisfies the following two additional assumptions:
({α}, x)  (∅, x) for all x ∈ R, (1)
(∅, x)  ({α}, y) if x > y. (2)
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This preference relation is not continuous. Indeed, given the situation ({α}, x)  (∅, x) for
some x ∈ R, then by subtracting or adding a small amount of money, this preference will
be reversed, according to (2). Furthermore, there is no envy-free allocation in this economy.
Because, given the allocation ((∅, x) , ({α}, y)) for some numbers x, y ∈ R, to avoid envy
we must have x ≤ y according to (2). However, in this case we have according to strict
monotonicity in money and (1) that (∅, x)  (∅, y) ≺ ({α}, y). So, to avoid envy both
agents must get the same amount of money, but then the agent getting the good α will be
envied by the agent not-getting α.
(ii) Assume that both agents have again the same preference relation which is this time strictly
monotonic in money and satisfies the following assumption:
({α}, x)  (∅, y) for all x, y ∈ R.
It follows immediately, that this preference relation does not have the archimedean property,
since the good α cannot be compensated by any amount of money. Furthermore, there is no
envy-free allocation in this economy, since the agent getting the good α will clearly be envied
by the agent not-getting α, whatever he will pay to the latter agent. ◦
Remark. Both examples have a lexicographic flavor. In example (i) money is all important
and only when the amounts of money are the same, getting the good α plays a role. In
example (ii) getting the good α is all important and cannot be compensated by any amount
of money. ◦
Later on in this chapter, in Section 4.4, we consider a second concept for allocating the indi-
visible goods, namely, the concept of no-envy and Pareto efficiency. Recall from Chapter 3
that an allocation is Pareto efficient if no agent can improve himself without hurting the other
agents. In Section 4.4 we repeat the formal definition.
This section ends with providing a canonical way to represent each preference relation in R
by a so-called utility function. In fact, we prove that if the preference relation of an agent is
an element of R, then for each consumption bundle there exists a unique amount of money
which is deemed equivalent to this consumption bundle, according to the preference of this
agent (this is Condition (2) in Alkan et al. (1991)).
Proposition 4.1. For each preference relation ∈ R there exists a map V : 2Ω −→ R and
a strictly increasing continuous function fB : R −→ R for all B ⊆ Ω with the following
properties:
(i) V (∅) = 0, f∅(x) = x for all x ∈ R,
(ii) fB(0) = 0 for all B ⊆ Ω,
(iii) (B, x)  (C, y) if and only if V (B) + fB(x) ≤ V (C) + fC(y).
The map V and the functions fB are uniquely determined by  and the properties (i)–(iii).
Proof. We start by proving that
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for every B ⊆ Ω and every x ∈ R there exists exactly one real number uB(x) ∈ R such
that (B, x) ∼ (∅, uB(x)).
Let B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R. Define K := {y ∈ R | (B, x)  (∅, y)} and G := {y ∈
R | (B, x)  (∅, y)}. Then K and G are non-empty and closed, according to the archimedean
property and continuity in money, respectively. By completeness of  we have K ∪G = R.
Hence, K ∩G 6= ∅.
Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, by using transitivity of and strict monotonicity
in money, it follows that |K ∩ G| = 1. Hence, for every B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R, there exists a
unique number uB(x) ∈ R such that (B, x) ∼ (∅, uB(x)).
Accordingly, define V (B) := uB(0) for all B ⊆ Ω and fB(x) = uB(x) − V (B) for all
B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R. Then V : 2Ω −→ R and fB : R −→ R are uniquely determined and
it is straightforward to verify that these maps satisfy the properties (i)–(iii) mentioned in the
proposition. 2
Remark. Conversely, if is a binary relation on 2Ω×R that can be represented by the utility
function
U(B, x) := V (B) + fB(x)
in which fB : R −→ R are continuous and strictly increasing functions with f∅(x) = x for
all x ∈ R, then belongs to R. ◦
From here, an economy 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 is considered in which for all i ∈ N the preference
relation i is represented by a utility function Ui(B, x) = Vi(B) + fiB(x) in which Vi(B)
are real numbers and fiB : R −→ R are strictly increasing and continuous functions for all
B ⊆ Ω with the additional convention that Vi(∅) = 0 and fi∅(x) = x for all x ∈ R.
4.3 Envy-free allocations
This section contains a proof for the existence of an envy-free allocation in the economies
〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 with i ∈ R for all i ∈ N . Let us start by giving the formal definition of
such an allocation.
Definition (Foley (1967)). An allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free if
Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) ≥ Ui(Bpi(j), xpi(j)) for all i, j ∈ N. ◦
So, in an envy-free allocation each agent i ∈ N prefers his bundle (Bpi(i), xpi(i)) over all
other bundles in the allocation.
Next, we define the envy-measure of an allocation. Given an allocation this function measures
‘how much envy’ there is among the agents expressed in the utility functions of the agents.
We write Π as the family of all bijections pi : N −→ {1, . . . , n} and we denote M := {x ∈
Rn |
∑n
k=1 xk = 0 } for the set of all money-distributions.
Definition. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω, pi ∈ Π and x ∈ M. Define for all
1 ≤ k ≤ n and i ∈ N ,
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Eki (pi, x) := [Ui(Bk, xk)− Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i))]+ .
Here, [a]+ denotes max{a, 0}. Furthermore, we define for all i ∈ N ,
Ei(pi, x) :=
n∑
k=1
Eki (pi, x) .
The map
E : Π×M −→ R+
(pi , x) 7−→
∑
i∈N
Ei(pi, x)
is the envy-measure of the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N . ◦
Remark. Given an n-partition {Bk}1≤k≤n of Ω, the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-
free if and only if E(pi, x) = 0. ◦
The following proposition will turn out to be very useful in our analysis.
Proposition 4.2. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω and let ε ≥ 0. Then for all pi ∈ Π
the set
Api(ε) := {x ∈ M | E(pi, x) ≤ ε}
is a (possible empty) compact set of Rn.
Proof. Let ε ≥ 0 and {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω. It is easy to verify that the map
x 7−→ E(pi, x) is continuous on M for every pi ∈ Π. Therefore, Api(ε) is closed for every
pi ∈ Π.
Let pi ∈ Π and let x ∈ Api(ε). Take i ∈ N , then certainly Ei(pi, x) ≤ ε. This means that for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Vi(Bk) + fiBk(xk) − Vi(Bpi(i))− fiBpi(i) (xpi(i)) ≤ ε.
There exists at least one number 1 ≤ ` ≤ n such that x` ≥ 0 (here ` = pi(i) is also one of the
possibilities) and therefore, fiB`(x`) ≥ fiB`(0) = 0. Hence,
fiBpi(i) (xpi(i)) ≥ Vi(B`) + fiB`(x`) − Vi(Bpi(i)) − ε
≥ Vi(B`) − Vi(Bpi(i)) − ε
≥ min
1≤k≤n
Vi(Bk) − Vi(Bpi(i)) − ε.
As the function fiBpi(i) : R −→ R is strictly monotonic, this yields,
xpi(i) ≥ f
−1
iBpi(i)
(
min
1≤k≤n
Vi(Bk) − Vi(Bpi(i))− ε
)
=: mpi(i).
So, xpi(i) ≥ mpi(i) for all i ∈ N whenever x ∈ Api(ε). Because
∑
i∈N
xpi(i) = 0, we also ob-
tain that
xpi(i) = −
∑
j 6=i
xpi(j) ≤ −
∑
j 6=i
mpi(j) =: Mpi(i).
Hence, mpi(i) ≤ xpi(i) ≤ Mpi(i) for all i ∈ N whenever x ∈ Api(ε) and thus Api(ε) is a
bounded set in Rn. 2
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Similarly, as in the proof for the existence of envy-free allocations by Alkan et al. (1991) in
their setting, we start by investigating economies in which the functions fiB : R −→ R are
kink functions for all i ∈ N and B ⊆ Ω. To do so, we first repeat the definition of a kink
function.
Definition. A function f : R −→ R is a kink function if f is a strictly increasing continuous
function on R and for each point x ∈ R there exists a number δ > 0 and positive numbers
λ, µ ≥ 0 such that
f(y) =
{
f(x) + λ·(y − x) for x− δ ≤ y ≤ x,
f(x) + µ·(y − x) for x ≤ y ≤ x + δ.
If λ 6= µ, then the point x is a kink point of the kink function f . We write λ = d−f(x) and
µ = d+f(x). We denote K as the family of all kink functions. ◦
The following theorem, proved in Section 4.5, states that any n-partition of Ω can be ex-
tended to an envy-free allocation whenever the preference relations can be represented by
kink functions.
Theorem 4.3K. Let 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 be an economy in which the preference relations are
represented by utility functions Ui(C, x) = Vi(C) + fiC(x) with fiC ∈ K for all i ∈ N
and C ⊆ Ω. If {Bk}1≤k≤n is an n-partition of Ω, then there exists a bijection pi ∈ Π and a
money-distribution x ∈ M such that the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free. 2
Using Theorem 4.3K and a basic result from calculus which states that every strictly increas-
ing continuous function can be approximated uniformly by a kink function (see e.g., Courant
and John (1974)), one can prove the existence of an envy-free allocation in an economy
〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 with i ∈ R for all i ∈ N . That is, any n-partition of Ω can be extended to
an envy-free allocation.
Theorem 4.3. Let 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 be an economy with i ∈ R for all i ∈ N and let
{Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω. Then there exists a bijection pi ∈ Π and a money-
distribution x ∈ M such that the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free.
Proof. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω and let the preference relations i ∈ R be
represented by the utility functions Ui(C, x) = Vi(C) + fiC(x) for all i ∈ N .
Take ε > 0. Each of the functions fiC can be approximated uniformly by kink functions, i.e.,
there are kink functions giC ∈ K such that
| giC(x) − fiC(x) | <
ε
2n2 for all x ∈ R, i ∈ N and C ⊆ Ω.
In the economy with the utility functions U ′i(C, x) := Vi(C) + giC(x) there exists according
to Theorem 4.3K a bijection pi ∈ Π and a money-distribution x ∈ M such that the allocation
(Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free. Let i ∈ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then
Eki (pi, x) = [Vi(Bk) + fiBk (xk)− (Vi(Bpi(i)) + fiBpi(i) (xpi(i)))]+
≤ 2· ε2n2 + [Vi(Bk) + giBk(xk)− (Vi(Bpi(i)) + giBpi(i) (xpi(i)))]+
= ε
n2
+ [U ′i(Bk, xk)− U
′
i(Bpi(i), xpi(i))]+
= ε
n2
.
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The last equality follows from the fact that the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free in
the economy with utility functions U ′i : 2Ω × R −→ R. Hence, we obtain that
E(pi, x) =
∑
i∈N
n∑
k=1
Eki (pi, x) ≤ ε.
So, for every ε > 0 there exists a bijection pi ∈ Π such that
Api(ε) = {x ∈ M | E(pi, x) ≤ ε} 6= ∅.
Let {εk}k∈N be a sequence of positive numbers such that εk ↓ 0. Then for each k ∈ N there is
a bijection pik ∈ Π such thatApik(εk) 6= ∅. As pik ∈ Π allows only finitely many possibilities,
we may assume that for all k ∈ N, pik = pi for a certain pi ∈ Π. Furthermore, according to
Proposition 4.2, the set Api(εk) is compact for every k ∈ N. Hence, the sets {Api(εk)}k∈N
are compact, pairwise non-empty and moreover, the sequence is weakly decreasing in k.
Therefore, ⋂
k∈N
Api(εk) 6= ∅.
For a point x in the intersection
⋂
k
Api(εk) it holds that E(pi, x) < εk for all k ∈ N. Hence,
E(pi, x) = 0 and thus the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free. 2
So, in the economies with indivisible goods and money, studied in this chapter, there exists an
allocation which is fair for all agents with respect to the normative concept of envy-freeness.
4.4 Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations
This part of the chapter deals with the existence of a second concept for allocating the indi-
visible goods among the agents, that is, the concept of envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency.
Let us start by repeating the definition of a Pareto efficient allocation.
Definition. Let (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N be an allocation. Then the allocation (Cϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N is
an improvement upon (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N if
Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) for all i ∈ N.
An allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is Pareto efficient if it does not admit an improvement. ◦
Remark. In most studies one makes a difference between weak Pareto efficiency and (strong)
Pareto efficiency (see e.g., Chapter 3). However, since we consider preference relations which
satisfy strict monotonicity and continuity in money and moreover the monetary compensa-
tions may be negative, these two concepts are the same. Indeed, given a weak improvement
upon an allocation (i.e., the strict inequalities may be tight except for at least one agent), it is
a straightforward exercise, by using strict monotonicity and continuity, to construct a (strong)
improvement. ◦
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4.4.1 Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in general
In this subsection we give an example of an economy 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉, with i∈ R for all
i ∈ N , in which the set of envy-free allocations and the set of Pareto efficient allocations are
both non-empty but disjoint.
Example. Let 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 be an economy with N := {1, 2} and Ω := {α, β}. The
utility functions Ui : 2Ω × R −→ R for i = 1, 2 are given by:
(∅, x) ({α}, x) ({β}, x) ({α, β}, x)
agent 1 x 10 + x 11 + 2·x 12 + 2·x
agent 2 x x 1 1920 ·x 19 + 1
19
20 ·x
The following allocations are possible:
(a) Assume that the allocation (({α, β},−x) , (∅, x)) is envy-free for a certain x ∈ R.
This means that U1({α, β},−x) = 12 − 2 ·x ≥ x = U1(∅, x) and U2(∅, x) = x ≥
19 − 1 1920 ·x = U2({α, β},−x). This yields, x ≤ 4 and x ≥ 6
26
59 . So, the allocation
(({α, β},−x) , (∅, x)) is never envy-free.
The possible utility levels of the allocation ({(α, β},−x) , (∅, x)) fill the line [αβ, ∅]
with equation u1 + 2·u2 = 12 (see Figure 6).
(b) Assume that the allocation (({α},−x) , ({β}, x)) is envy-free for a certain x ∈ R.
This means that 10−x ≥ 11 + 2·x and 1 1920 ·x ≥ −x. This yields, x ≥ 0 and x ≤ −
1
3 .
So, the allocation (({α},−x) , ({β}, x)) is not envy-free for any x ∈ R.
The possible utility levels of the allocation (({α},−x) , ({β}, x)) fill the line [α, β]
with equation 1 1920 ·u1 + u2 = 19
1
2 .
(c) Assume that the allocation (({β}, x) , ({α},−x)) is envy-free for a certain x ∈ R.
Then 11 + 2 ·x ≥ 10 − x and −x ≥ 1 1920 ·x which yields, −
1
3 ≤ x ≤ 0. Thus, the
allocation (({β}, x) , ({α},−x)) is envy-free whenever− 13 ≤ x ≤ 0.
The possible utility levels of the allocation (({β},−x) , ({α}, x)) fill the line [β, α]
with equation u1 + 2·u2 = 11.
(d) Assume that the allocation ((∅, x) , ({α, β},−x)) is envy-free for a certain x ∈ R.
Then x ≥ 12 − 2 ·x and 19 − 1 1920 ·x ≥ x which yields, 4 ≤ x ≤ 6
26
59 . Thus, the
allocation ((∅, x) , ({α, β},−x)) is envy-free whenever 4 ≤ x ≤ 6 2659 .
The possible utility levels of the allocation ((∅, x) , ({α, β},−x)) fill the line [∅, αβ]
with equation 1 1920 ·u1 + u2 = 19.
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u1
u2
0
19 1
2
19
6
5 1
2
1211109 29
39
[α, β]
[∅, αβ]
[β, α]
[αβ, ∅]
Figure 6. The possible utility levels in the economy:
• The envy-free allocations correspond with the dashed part of the line [β,α] and with the dashed part of the
line [∅, αβ] (Case (c) and Case (d), respectively).
• The Pareto efficient allocations correspond with the union of the dark part of the line [αβ, ∅] and of the dark
part of the line [α, β] (Case (a) and Case (b), respectively). ◦
Remark. If we define in the previous example for each agent i ∈ N a new utility func-
tion U ′i : 2Ω × R −→ R as,
U ′i(B, x) := max
C⊆B
Ui(C, x) for all B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R,
then all the indivisible goods have a non-negative marginal value for both agents, i.e., all the
indivisible goods are desired by both agents. It is left to the reader to check that in this case
the sets of envy-free allocations and Pareto efficient allocations are also disjoint. ◦
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4.4.2 Sufficient conditions for compatibility
The example given in Subsection 4.4.1 illustrates that in general the concept of envy-freeness
and the concept of Pareto efficiency are incompatible. However, this subsection gives two
conditions for economies, each sufficient for the compatibility, namely, the existence of a
price equilibrium and the existence of a weakly dominant n-partition. Finally in this sub-
section, we look at economies in which the utilities are quasi-linear. But first we give the
definition of a price equilibrium.
Definition. An allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is a price equilibrium, if there exists a price
vector p ∈ RΩ (p 6= 0) with the following two properties:
(i) p(Bpi(i)) + xpi(i) = 1n ·p(Ω) for all i ∈ N, (budget constraints)
(ii) If Ui(C, y) > Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) for a certain C ⊆ Ω, y ∈ R and i ∈ N ,
then p(C) + y > 1
n
·p(Ω). (maximality conditions)
For all C ⊆ Ω, we denote p(C) :=
∑
α∈C
pα. ◦
In contrast to the definition given in Section 3.4, in this definition of a price equilibrium the
budget of an agent is defined as ‘one n-th of the price of all the indivisible goods added
together’. The reason for this alteration is the absence of initial endowments. However, the
interpretation of the budget constraints as well as the maximality conditions remain the same
as given in Section 3.4.
The existence of a price equilibrium is sufficient for the existence of an envy-free and Pareto
efficient allocation.
Proposition 4.4. If 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 is an economy withi∈ R for all i ∈ N in which there
exists a price equilibrium, then there exists an envy-free and Pareto efficient allocation.
Proof. Let (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N be a price equilibrium supported by the price vector p ∈ RΩ.
Suppose Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) < Ui(Bpi(j), xpi(j)) for some i, j ∈ N . Then, according to the
maximality conditions, it follows that p(Bpi(j)) + xpi(j) > 1n ·p(Ω). Contradiction with the
budget constraints. So, the allocation is envy-free.
Suppose the allocation (Cϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N is an improvement upon (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N . This
means that Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) for all i ∈ N and therefore, according to the
maximality conditions,
p(Cϕ(i)) + yϕ(i) >
1
n
·p(Ω) for all i ∈ N.
Taking the sum over all i ∈ N and using the fact that
∑
i∈N
yϕ(i) = 0 yields a contradiction. 2
So, the existence of a price equilibrium assures the existence of an envy-free and Pareto
efficient allocation. However, there may be envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations which
are not supported by a price vector, even in an economy which has price equilibria. We
illustrate this phenomenon at the end of the section by means of an example.
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Next, we give another condition guaranteeing the compatibility of envy-freeness and Pareto
efficiency, namely, the existence of a weakly dominant n-partition of Ω. This means that
there exists an n-partition from which all Pareto efficient utility levels can be obtained. The
following definition makes this more formal.
Definition. An n-partition {Bk}1≤k≤n is called weakly dominant if for every allocation
(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N , there exists a bijection pi ∈ Π and a money-distribution x ∈ M such
that
Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) ≥ Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)) for all i ∈ N. ◦
A weakly dominant n-partition can be extended to an envy-free and Pareto efficient alloca-
tion, as we now demonstrate.
Proposition 4.5. If the n-partition {Bk}1≤k≤n is weakly dominant, then there exists a bi-
jection pi ∈ Π and a money-distribution x ∈ M such that the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is
envy-free and Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be a weakly dominant n-partition. Then, by Theorem 4.3, there exists
a bijection pi ∈ Π and a money-distribution x ∈ M such that (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is envy-free.
Suppose the allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is not Pareto efficient. Then there exists an alloca-
tion (Cϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N such that
Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) for all i ∈ N.
Because the n-partition {Bk}1≤k≤n is weakly dominant, there exists a bijection τ ∈ Π and
a money-distribution z ∈ M with
Ui(Bτ(i), zτ(i)) ≥ Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)) for all i ∈ N.
Take i ∈ N . Due to the envy-freeness of the allocation (Bpi(j), xpi(j))j∈N , it follows that
Ui(Bτ(i), zτ(i)) ≥ Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) ≥ Ui(Bpi(j), xpi(j)) for all j ∈ N.
In particular (select j such that pi(j) = τ(i)) this yields,
Ui(Bτ(i), zτ(i)) > Ui(Bτ(i), xτ(i)).
And thus, by strict monotonicity in money, we obtain that zτ(i) > xτ(i).
Hence, zτ(i) > xτ(i) for all i ∈ N . Because x and z are money-distributions, one obtains the
desired contradiction. 2
Remark. In the example given in Subsection 4.4.1, there exists no weakly dominant n-
partition. This can be best seen in Figure 6. In this figure the Pareto efficient utility lev-
els are obtained via two different n-partitions (namely, via the 2-partitions {{α}, {β}} and
{{α, β}, ∅}). Hence, the assumption of a weakly dominant n-partition cannot simply be
omitted for the compatibility of an envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency. ◦
Finally in this section, economies are studied in which for all agents the marginal utility of
money is constant. That is, we assume that for each agent i ∈ N the preference relation
i∈ R to satisfy the following additional property:
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for every B ⊆ Ω and every x ∈ R such that (B, 0) ∼i (∅, x) it holds that
(B, d) ∼i (∅, x + d) for all d ∈ R.
Using this property it is easy to verify that fiB(x) = fiB(0 + x) = fiB(0) + x = x for all
B ⊆ Ω and i ∈ N and therefore, Ui(B, x) = Vi(B) + x for all B ⊆ Ω, x ∈ R and i ∈ N
(see also Proposition 3.1). Thus, the utility functions are quasi-linear. In this quasi-linear
setting we prove the existence of an envy-free and Pareto efficient allocation. The following
well-known proposition states a necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation to be
Pareto efficient in economies with quasi-linear utilities. For the sake of completeness, we
give a proof.
Proposition 4.6. If 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 is an economy with quasi-linear utilities, then an allo-
cation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is Pareto efficient if and only if∑
i∈N
Vi(Bpi(i)) ≥
∑
i∈N
Vi(Cϕ(i))
for all n-partitions {Ck}1≤k≤n and all bijections ϕ ∈ Π.
Proof. ⇒) Let (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N be a Pareto efficient allocation. Suppose there exists an
n-distribution {Ck}1≤k≤n such that
∑
i∈N
Vi(Bpi(i)) <
∑
i∈N
Vi(Cpi(i)). Define
δ := 1
n
∑
i∈N
[ Vi(Cpi(i))− Vi(Bpi(i)) ] ,
ypi(i) := Vi(Bpi(i))− Vi(Cpi(i)) + xpi(i) + δ (for all i ∈ N).
Then δ > 0 and thus Ui(Cpi(i), ypi(i)) > Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) for all i ∈ N . Contradiction.
⇐) Let (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N be an allocation with
∑
i∈N Vi(Bpi(i)) ≥
∑
i∈N Vi(Cϕ(i)) for
all n-partitions {Ck}1≤k≤n and all bijections ϕ ∈ Π. Suppose this allocation admits an
improvement. Then there exists an allocation (Cpi(i), ypi(i))i∈N such that
Vi(Cpi(i)) + ypi(i) > Vi(Bpi(i)) + xpi(i) for all i ∈ N.
Hence,
∑
i∈N
Vi(Cpi(i)) >
∑
i∈N
Vi(Bpi(i)). Contradiction. 2
Proposition 4.6 in fact states that in an economy in which the utility functions are quasi-linear
(and in which there is an abundance of money), the Pareto efficient allocations are exactly
those allocations which maximize social welfare. Note that in Proposition 4.6 there are no
conditions on the money-distribution. The reason is exactly that there is an abundance of
money (therefore, Proposition 4.6 is no longer true for the exchange economies in Chapter 3).
Next, we prove that the n-partition used in such an allocation is in fact weakly dominant.
Proposition 4.7. If 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 is an economy with quasi-linear utilities, then there
exists a weakly dominant n-partition.
Proof. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition and pi ∈ Π be a bijection such that
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∑
i∈N
Vi(Bpi(i)) ≥
∑
i∈N
Vi(Cϕ(i))
for all n-partitions {Ck}1≤k≤n and all bijections ϕ ∈ Π.
Let (Cϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N be any allocation. Define, for all i ∈ N ,
xpi(i) := Vi(Cϕ(i))− Vi(Bpi(i)) + yϕ(i) +
1
n
∑
i∈N
[ Vi(Bpi(i))− Vi(Cϕ(i)) ].
Then (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is an allocation. Furthermore, for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) = Vi(Bpi(i)) + xpi(i) ≥ Vi(Cϕ(i)) + yϕ(i) = Ui(Cϕ(i), yϕ(i)).
Hence, the n-partition {Bk}1≤k≤n is weakly dominant. 2
The following result can be immediately derived from Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.7.
Corollary 4.8. If 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 is an economy with i ∈ R and the marginal utility of
money is constant for all i ∈ N , so the utility functions are quasi-linear, then there exists an
envy-free and Pareto efficient allocation. 2
Although, according to Corollary 4.8 the existence of an envy-free and Pareto efficient alloca-
tion is guaranteed in an economy with quasi-linear utilities, there may remain Pareto efficient
allocations that are not envy-free and envy-free allocations that are not Pareto efficient. The
latter is in contrast with Theorem 1 in Alkan et al. (1991) in their setting. This is shown in
the following example. The example is also used to illustrate that an envy-free and Pareto
efficient allocation is not necessarily a price equilibrium, even in an economy with a price
equilibrium.
Example. Let 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 be an economy with N := {1, 2} and Ω := {α, β}. The
utility functions Ui : 2Ω × R −→ R for i = 1, 2 are quasi-linear and given by:
(∅, x) ({α}, x) ({β}, x) ({α, β}, x)
agent 1 x 8 + x 9 + x 13 + x
agent 2 x 5 + x 7 12 + x 14 + x
The allocation ((∅, 7) , ({α, β},−7)) is envy-free. However, it is not Pareto efficient. In-
deed, V1(∅) + V2({α, β}) = 14 < 15 12 = V1({α}) + V2({β}) and therefore, according to
Proposition 4.6, it cannot be Pareto efficient.
The allocation (({α}, 2) , ({β},−2)) is Pareto efficient. However, it is not envy-free, since
U2({β},−2) = 5
1
2 < 7 = U2({α}, 2).
The allocation (({α}, 1) , ({β},−1)) is envy-free and Pareto efficient. However, it is not a
price equilibrium as we now demonstrate. Suppose (({α}, 1) , ({β},−1)) is a price equilib-
rium supported by a price vector p := (pα, pβ) ∈ RΩ. Because
U2(∅, 7) = 7 > 6
1
2 = U2({β},−1) and U2({α, β},−7) = 7 > 6
1
2 = U2({β},−1),
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we have according to the maximality conditions that
7 > 12 ·(pα + pβ) and pα + pβ − 7 >
1
2 ·(pα + pβ).
This yields a contradiction. However, it is a straightforward calculation to illustrate that the
allocation (({α}, 12 ) , ({β},−
1
2 )), supported by the price vector p := (6
1
2 , 7
1
2 ), is a price
equilibrium and therefore, according to Proposition 4.4, also envy-free and Pareto efficient.◦
4.5 Proof of Theorem 4.3K
This final section of the chapter contains a proof for Theorem 4.3K. Throughout this section
economies 〈N, Ω, (i)i∈N 〉 are considered in which the given preference relations i∈ R
for all i ∈ N are represented by kink functions, i.e.,
Ui(B, x) = Vi(B) + fiB(x) with fiB ∈ K for all B ⊆ Ω and x ∈ R.
Recall that if f ∈ K is a kink function we denote for every x ∈ R,
d+f(x) := lim
y↓x
f(x)−f(y)
x−y and d
−f(x) := lim
y↑x
f(x)−f(y)
x−y .
Note that d+f(x) = d−f(x) = d
dx
f(x) almost everywhere, since a kink function has a
countable number of kink points.
Before we prove Theorem 4.3K, we first recall a result from combinatorial optimization (see
e.g., Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988)).
Lemma 4.9. Let I and J be two f inite index sets with |I | = |J |. Furthermore, let Dij ∈
R∪{−∞,∞} for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , such that for all i ∈ I , Diϕ(i) ∈ R for some bijection
ϕ : I −→ J .
(i) If Dij < ∞ for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , then there are real numbers {vj}j∈J and a
bijection pi : I −→ J such that
Dipi(k) − vpi(k) ≤ Dipi(i) − vpi(i) for all i, k ∈ I and Dipi(i) 6= −∞ for all i ∈ I,
(ii) If Dij > −∞ for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , then there are real numbers {vj}j∈J and a
bijection pi : I −→ J such that
Dipi(k) − vpi(k) ≥ Dipi(i) − vpi(i) for all i, k ∈ I and Dipi(i) 6= ∞ for all i ∈ I.
Proof. (i) Let Dij ∈ R ∪ {−∞} for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J . Define the linear program (LP)
maximize
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
Dij ·Xij subject to:
Xij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J,∑
i∈I
Xij =
∑
j∈J
Xij = 1 for all j ∈ J and i ∈ I, respectively.
84 4 Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency
Since there exists a bijection ϕ : I −→ J such that Diϕ(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ I and because the
feasible region of (LP) is compact it follows that (LP) has an optimal solution. Moreover, the
matrix (Xij)[i∈I,j∈J] is double-stochastic. Hence, there exists a bijection pi : I −→ J such
that for all i ∈ I ,
Xipi(i) := 1 and Xipi(k) := 0 whenever k 6= i
is an optimal solution of (LP). Furthermore, Dipi(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ I .
By complementary slackness if follows that the dual program (LP∗) has an optimal solution
{ui, vpi(k)}i,k∈I such that
ui + vpi(i) = Dipi(i) and ui + vpi(k) ≥ Dipi(k) for all i, k ∈ I.
So, we can conclude that there are real numbers {vj}j∈J and a bijection pi : I −→ J such
that Dipi(k) − vpi(k) ≤ Dipi(i) − vpi(i) for all i, k ∈ I and Dipi(i) 6= −∞ for all i ∈ I .
(ii) If Dij ∈ R∪ {∞} for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J and we minimize (in stead of maximize) in the
(LP) above, a similar reasoning can be used to prove the second statement. The details are
left to the reader. 2
The proof of Theorem 4.3K boils down to the following proposition. In the proof of this
proposition Lemma 4.9 is used.
Proposition 4.10. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition. If ϕ ∈ Π is a bijection and y ∈ M a
money-distribution such that E(ϕ, y) > 0, then there exists a bijection pi ∈ Π and a money-
distribution x ∈ M such that E(pi, x) < E(ϕ, y).
Proof. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be an n-partition of Ω. Let ϕ ∈ Π and y ∈ M such that E(ϕ, y) > 0.
We construct a new bijection pi ∈ Π and a new money-distribution x ∈ M such that
E(pi, x) < E(ϕ, y).
As a tool to keep track of envy, we introduce a so-called envy-graph belonging to the partition
{Bk}1≤k≤n, bijection ϕ ∈ Π and money-distribution y ∈ M. The same method is used in
Klijn (2000) in the case that all utility functions are quasi-linear. The nodes of the graph are
identified with the bundles (Bk, yk). There is a weak arc from (Bk, yk) to (B`, y`) (with
` 6= k) if
Ui(Bk, yk) = Ui(B`, y`) and k = ϕ(i).
(Bk, yk) (B`, y`)
Figure 7(i). A weak arc.
There is a strong arc from (Bk, yk) to (B`, y`) (with ` 6= k) if
Ui(Bk, yk) < Ui(B`, y`) and k = ϕ(i).
(Bk, yk) (B`, y`)
Figure 7(ii). A strong arc.
Agent i ∈ N is the owner of node (Bk, yk) (or shortly, node Bk) if ϕ(i) = k, i.e., the bundle
(Bk, yk) is assigned, by the bijection ϕ ∈ Π, to agent i. So, if agent i is indifferent between
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the bundles (Bk, yk) and (B`, y`), there is a weak arc from node Bk to node B`. If he
strictly prefers the bundle (B`, y`) above his own bundle (Bk, yk), there is a strong arc from
node Bk to node B`. If he dislikes the bundle (B`, y`), there is no arc. Here we emphasize
that if ϕ(i) = k and ϕ(j) = `, then a strong/weak/no arc from node Bk to node B` has a
different meaning that a strong/weak/no arc from node B` to node Bk. In the first case the arc
follows from agent i’s point of view (and his utility function Ui), while the second case is in
the perspective of agent j and his utility function Uj . Also note that an allocation is envy-free
if and only if the envy-graph does not contain a strong arc.
If the envy-graph of the allocation (Bϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N contains a strong arc, then to improve
the situation, i.e., decrease the envy E(ϕ, y), agents are allowed to move to an other node
(i.e., the bijection ϕ ∈ Π changes) and/or the amounts of money yk can change (i.e., the
money-distribution y ∈ M changes).
Assume that the envy-graph of (ϕ, y) has a circuit containing a strong arc. Then it is easy
to construct a bijection pi ∈ Π and money-distribution x ∈ M such that E(pi, x) < E(ϕ, y).
The bundles (Bk, yk) remain the same (i.e., x := y) but the agents owning a bundle in the
circuit move one step in the direction of the circuit. Then every agent obtains a weakly better
bundle and at least one agent obtains a strictly better bundle. The value of Ei(pi, y) is at most
Ei(ϕ, y) for all i ∈ N and Ei∗(pi, y) is strictly less than Ei∗(ϕ, y), if the strong arc in the
circuit connects k∗ := ϕ(i∗) to `∗ := pi(i∗).
(Bk, yk)
ϕ: j
j∗i∗
(Bk∗, yk∗) (B`∗, y`∗)
pi: j∗
i∗j
(Bk, yk)
(Bk∗, yk∗) (B`∗, y`∗)
Figure 8(i). A circuit containing a strong arc. The strong arc disappears if the agents move one step in the direction
of the circuit, i.e., the bijection ϕ is changed into bijection pi.
If the envy-graph of (ϕ, y) does not have a circuit containing a strong arc then it is more
difficult to construct pi ∈ Π and x ∈ M such that E(pi, x) < E(ϕ, y). Consider an arbitrarily
chosen strong arc in the graph from, say from node Bk∗ to node B`∗ . The nodes in the
graph are labeled as follows. Node Bk∗ gets label ⊕, node B`∗ gets label 	. A node Bk
(k 6= k∗, `∗) gets label⊕ if there is a path of weak or strong arcs from Bk to Bk∗ . A node B`
(` 6= k∗, `∗) gets label 	 if there is a path of weak or strong arcs arcs from B`∗ to B`.
Because there is no cycle with a strong arc, it is not possible that a node gets both labels ⊕
and 	. The remaining nodes (that have neither label ⊕ nor label 	) get label . We define
the following partition of N :
N⊕ := {i ∈ N | node Bϕ(i) has label ⊕},
N	 := {i ∈ N | node Bϕ(i) has label 	},
N = {i ∈ N | node Bϕ(i) has label }.
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ϕ:
(Bk, yk) (B`, y`) (Bp, yp)
(Bq , yq)
	⊕ 	
⊕ ⊕ 

(Bk∗, yk∗) (B`∗, y`∗) (Bm, ym)
Figure 8(ii). The labels in the envy-graph if there are no circuits containing a strong arc, but there is a strong arc.
Here, this arc is depicted in gray and from node (Bk∗, yk∗) (labeled ⊕) to node (B`∗, y`∗) (labeled 	).
The primary idea to decrease the envy E(ϕ, y) in this case, is by increasing the amounts
of money in the nodes with label ⊕ and by decreasing the amounts of money in the nodes
with label 	. For the nodes with label  nothing changes. If agents would have the same
valuation for money (for example, if they have quasi-linear utility functions), then the amount
of money in each node labeled ⊕ can be increased with the same number. For each node
labeled 	 money can be decreased with a fixed number. By doing so, no new strong arc will
arise between nodes with label ⊕ or label 	, respectively. Furthermore, by the definitions of
the labels and the continuity in money, these two numbers can be chosen in such a way that
no new strong arc arises from a node labeled 	 to a node labeled ⊕ or , and that no new
strong arc arises from a node labeled  to a node labeled ⊕. We refer to Klijn (2000) for all
the details.
However, agents have a different valuation for money. Nevertheless, since the utility func-
tions are kink functions, this primary idea, as described above, can be modified in such a way
that no new strong arcs arise between the nodes. Next to increasing the amounts of money in
nodes with label⊕, we also move agents in N⊕ to other nodes labeled⊕. A similar approach
will be taken for the agents in N	. So, the idea is to construct a new money-distribution and
a new bijection for the agents in N⊕ and for the agents in the N	, respectively. For the
agents in N nothing changes.
First, we look at the agents in N⊕. Define for all i, j ∈ N⊕
D⊕iϕ(j) :=
{
log(d+fiBϕ(j) (yϕ(j))) if Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) ≤ Ui(Bϕ(j), yϕ(j)),
−∞ if Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bϕ(j), yϕ(j)).
Note that D⊕iϕ(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N⊕, since d+fiBϕ(i) (yϕ(i)) > 0 for all i ∈ N⊕. So, we
can apply Lemma 4.9(i) with I = N⊕, J = ϕ(N⊕) and Dik = D⊕iϕ(j) for all i, j ∈ N⊕.
Hence, there are real numbers {vj}j∈ϕ(N⊕) and a bijection pi⊕ : N⊕ −→ ϕ(N⊕) such that
D⊕ipi⊕(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N⊕ and
D⊕ipi⊕(j) − vpi⊕(j) ≤ D
⊕
ipi⊕(i) − vpi⊕(i) for all i, j ∈ N⊕. (1)
As D⊕ipi⊕(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N⊕ we also obtain, by definition of D⊕ and the fact that there
are no circuits with strong arcs, the equality
Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) = Ui(Bpi⊕(i), ypi⊕(i)) for all i ∈ N⊕. (2)
Indeed, as far as ϕ(i) 6= pi⊕(i) for certain i ∈ N⊕, there is a weak/strong arc from node
(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) to node (Bpi⊕(i), ypi⊕(i)). This follows from the definition of D⊕ and the fact
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that D⊕ipi⊕(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N⊕. But, each of these arcs are in a circuit and therefore, they
are all weak arcs (since there is no circuit containing a strong arc). Hence, Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) =
Ui(Bpi⊕(i), ypi⊕(i)) for all i ∈ N⊕.
The bijection pi⊕ : N⊕ −→ ϕ(N⊕) is used to allocate the bundles with label ⊕ among
the agents in N⊕. Furthermore, the numbers {vj}j∈ϕ(N⊕) are used to increase the amounts
of money in the bundles with label ⊕. To be more precise, if for all i ∈ N⊕ we denote
api⊕(i) := e
−v
pi⊕(i), then agent i ∈ N⊕ receives the bundle
(Bpi⊕(i) , xpi⊕(i)) with xpi⊕(i) := ypi⊕(i) + ε·api⊕(i).
The number ε > 0 is yet to be determined. For the moment, we select ε > 0 such that:
(P1) For all i ∈ N and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label⊕, the function fiBk is
linear on the interval [yk , yk + ε·ak],
(P2) For all i ∈ N and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕, ε > 0 satisfies
Ui(Bk, yk + ε·ak) ≤ Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)),
(P3) For all i ∈ N⊕ and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕, ε > 0 satisfies
Ui(Bpi⊕(i), ypi⊕(i)) ≥ Ui(Bk, yk + ε·ak)
whenever Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bk, yk).
According to Property (P1) the amounts of money may at most increase until they reach kink
point. Indeed, given any agent i ∈ N and yk ∈ R, take the smallest kink point of fiBk
strictly larger than yk. Then ε > 0 can be chosen such that yk + ε ·ak is still smaller than
this kink point. Because there are a finite number of agents and a countable number of kink
points ε > 0 can be selected such that Property (P1) is satisfied. Furthermore, note that
Property (P1) implies for all i ∈ N that
Ui(Bk, yk + ε·ak) = Ui(Bk, yk) + ε·ak ·d
+fiBk(yk) whenever Bk has label ⊕.
Property (P2) states that no strong arc arises from a node with label to a node with label⊕.
By the definition of the labels, we have for all i ∈ N,
Ui(Bk , yk) < Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) whenever Bk has label ⊕.
Using the continuity in money ε > 0 can be selected such that Property (P2) is satisfied.
Finally, if i ∈ N⊕ and Bk has label⊕ such that Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bk, yk), Property (P3)
implies that
Ui(Bpi⊕(i), xpi⊕(i)) > Ui(Bpi⊕(i), ypi⊕(i)) ≥ Ui(Bk, xk).
So, this property implies that whenever agent i ∈ N⊕ disliked the bundle (Bk, yk) with
label⊕ in the original situation, he will also dislike or equally appreciate the bundle (Bk, xk)
in the new situation. Note that, again by continuity in money and by (2), ε > 0 can be selected
such that Property (P3) is satisfied.
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Similarly, we construct a new bijection and money-distribution for the agents in N	. Define
for all i, j ∈ N	
D	iϕ(j) :=
{
log(d−fiBϕ(j) (yϕ(j))) if Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) ≤ Ui(Bϕ(j), yϕ(j)),
∞ if Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bϕ(j), yϕ(j)).
Note that D	iϕ(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N	 since d−fiBϕ(i) (yϕ(i)) > 0 for all i ∈ N	. So, we
can apply Lemma 4.9(ii) with I = N	, J = ϕ(N	) and Di` = D	iϕ(j) for all for all
i, j ∈ N	.
Hence, there are real numbers {vj}j∈ϕ(N	) and a bijection pi	 : N	 −→ ϕ(N	) such that
D	ipi	(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N	 and
D	ipi	(j) − vpi	(j) ≥ D
	
ipi	(i) − vpi	(i) for all i, j ∈ N	. (3)
As D	ipi	(i) ∈ R for all i ∈ N	, we obtain, by definition of D	 and the fact that there are
no circuits with strong arcs, the equality
Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) = Ui(Bpi	(i), ypi	(i)) for all i ∈ N	. (4)
Indeed, as far as ϕ(i) 6= pi	(i) for some i ∈ N	, it can be verified (the same argument
given below (2) can be applied) that there is a weak arc from node (Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) to node
(Bpi	(i), ypi	(i)).
The bijection pi	 : N	 −→ ϕ(N	) and the numbers {vj}j∈ϕ(N	) are used to construct a
new allocation for the agents in N	. For all i ∈ N	 we define bpi	(i) := e−vpi	(i) . Then
agent i ∈ N	 receives the bundle
(Bpi	(i) , xpi	(i)) with xpi	(i) := ypi	(i) − δ ·bpi	(i).
Here, we select, for the moment, δ > 0 such that:
(P4) For all i ∈ N and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label	, the function fiBk is
linear on the interval [yk − δ ·bk , yk],
(P5) For all i ∈ N	 and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label , δ > 0 satisfies
Ui(Bpi	(i), ypi	(i) − δ ·bpi	(i)) ≥ Ui(Bk, yk),
(P6) For all i ∈ N	 and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label 	, δ > 0 satisfies
Ui(Bpi	(i), ypi	(i) − δ ·bpi	(i)) ≥ Ui(Bk, yk)
whenever Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bk, yk).
According to Property (P4) the amounts of money may at most decrease until they reach a
kink point. A similar reasoning as for Property (P1) can be applied to verify that δ > 0 can
be selected such that Property (P4) holds. Note that this property implies for all i ∈ N that
Ui(Bk, yk − δ ·bk) = Ui(Bk, yk) − δ ·bk ·d
−fiBk (yk) whenever Bk has label 	.
Property (P5) states that no weak arc arises from a node with label 	 to a node with label .
Similarly as for Property (P2), the definitions of the labels, the continuity in money and (4)
guarantee that δ > 0 can be selected such that Property (P5) holds.
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Finally, if i ∈ N	 and Bk has label	 such that Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) > Ui(Bk, yk), Property (P6)
implies that
Ui(Bpi	(i), xpi	(i)) ≥ Ui(Bk, yk) > Ui(Bk, xk).
So, this property implies that whenever agent i ∈ N	 disliked the bundle (Bk, yk) with
label	 in the original situation, he also will dislike or equally appreciate the bundle (Bk, xk)
in the new situation. Note that, again by continuity in money and by (4), δ > 0 can be
selected such that Property (P3) is satisfied.
Given these new allocations for the agents in N⊕ and in N	, respectively, we now construct
the new allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N with the bijection pi ∈ Π as follows:
pi(i) :=


pi⊕(i) if i ∈ N⊕,
pi	(i) if i ∈ N	,
ϕ(i) if i ∈ N
and the money-distribution x ∈ M as follows:
xpi(i) :=


ypi(i) + ε·api(i) if i ∈ N⊕,
ypi(i) − δ ·bpi(i) if i ∈ N	,
yϕ(i) if i ∈ N.
The numbers δ > 0 and ε > 0 need to be selected such that they satisfy, next to the Properties
(P1)–(P6), the following two additional properties:
(P7) For all i ∈ N	 and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕, select δ > 0 and
ε > 0 such that
Ui(Bk, yk + ε·ak) ≤ Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i) − δ ·bpi(i)),
(P8) ε ·
∑
i∈N⊕
api(i) = δ ·
∑
i∈N	
bpi(i).
Property (P7) states that no strong arc will arise from a node with label 	 to a node with
label ⊕, when the amounts of money are increased for the agents in N⊕ and decreased for
the agents in N	. Note that by definition of the labels and by (4), we have for all i ∈ N	
and every 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕ the strict inequality
Ui(Bk, yk) < Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) = Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i)).
So, again from the continuity in money δ > 0 and ε > 0 can be selected such that Prop-
erty (P7) is satisfied.
Property (P8) guarantees that
∑n
k=1 xk = 0. After one has selected δ > 0 and ε > 0, satis-
fying the Properties (P1)–(P7), one can adjust them such that Property (P8) is also satisfied.
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Knowing how the new allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is constructed and which properties δ > 0
and ε > 0 satisfy, we now prove that the envy-measure of this new allocation is strictly less
than the envy-measure of the initial allocation (Bϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N . To do so, we need to distinct
four cases:
Case (1). First we show that Ei has not increased for all agents i ∈ N. Take i ∈ N.
(i) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label . Then, because Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) =
Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)), it follows that∑
k:Bk label 
Eki (pi, x) =
∑
k:Bk label 
Eki (ϕ, y). (5)
(ii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label 	. Then
Ui(Bk, xk)− Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) = Ui(Bk, yk − δ ·bk)− Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i))
< Ui(Bk, yk)− Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)).
Hence, ∑
k:Bk label 	
Eki (pi, x) ≤
∑
k:Bk label 	
Eki (ϕ, y). (6)
(iii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕. Then, by Property (P2) of ε, it follows
that ∑
k:Bk label ⊕
Eki (pi, x) = 0 =
∑
k:Bk label ⊕
Eki (ϕ, y). (7)
By combining equations (5), (6) and (7) it follows that
Ei(pi, x) ≤ Ei(ϕ, y) for all agents i ∈ N.
Case (2). Next, we show that Ei has not increased for all agents i ∈ N	. Take i ∈ N	.
(i) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label . Then, by Property (P5) of δ, it follows
that ∑
k:Bk label 
Eki (pi, x) = 0 =
∑
k:Bk label 
Eki (ϕ, y). (8)
(ii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label 	. If Ui(Bk, yk) < Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)), then
according to Property (P6) of δ we obtain that
Ui(Bk, xk) < Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)).
On the other hand, if Ui(Bk, yk) ≥ Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) then the definition of bpi(i) plays
an important role. Recall from (3) that
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D	ik − vk ≥ D
	
ipi(i) − vpi(i).
Recall that bk = e−vk , bpi(i) = e−vpi(i) and D	ipi(i) = log(d−fiBpi(i)(ypi(i))) (since
D	ipi(i) ∈ R). But since Ui(Bk , yk) ≥ Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)), we also have, by definition
of D	, that D	ik = log(d−fiBk (yk)). Hence, the inequality above yields that
bk · d
−fiBk (yk) ≥ bpi(i) · d
−fiBpi(i) (ypi(i)).
From this inequality it can be derived that
Ui(Bk, xk) − Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk − δ ·bk) − Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i) − δ ·bpi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk) − δ ·bk · d
−fiBk(yk)
−
[
Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))− δ ·bpi(i) · d
−fiBpi(i) (ypi(i))
]
= Ui(Bk, yk) − Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))
+ δ ·
[
bpi(i) · d
−fiBpi(i) (ypi(i))− bk · d
−fiBk (yk)
]
≤ Ui(Bk, yk) − Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk) − Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)).
The last equality follows from (4). Hence, we can conclude that∑
k:Bk label 	
Eki (pi, x) ≤
∑
k:Bk label 	
Eki (ϕ, y). (9)
(iii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕. Then, by Property (P7) of δ and ε, it
follows that ∑
k:Bk label ⊕
Eki (pi, x) = 0 =
∑
k:Bk label ⊕
Eki (ϕ, y). (10)
By combining equations (8), (9) and (10) it follows that
Ei(pi, x) ≤ Ei(ϕ, y) for all agents i ∈ N	.
Case (3). Now, it is shown that Ei has not increased for all agents i ∈ N⊕. Take i ∈ N⊕.
(i) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label . Then, since xk = yk and xpi(i) > ypi(i),
we have that
Ui(Bk, xk)− Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) < Ui(Bk, yk)− Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk)− Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)).
The last equality follows from (2). Hence,∑
k:Bk label 
Eki (pi, x) ≤
∑
k:Bk label 
Eki (ϕ, y). (11)
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(ii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label 	. Then, since xk < yk and xpi(i) > ypi(i),
we have that
Ui(Bk, xk)− Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)) < Ui(Bk, yk)− Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk)− Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)).
Again, the last equality follows from (2). Hence,∑
k:Bk label 	
Eki (pi, x) ≤
∑
k:Bk label 	
Eki (ϕ, y). (12)
(iii) Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that node Bk has label ⊕. If Ui(Bk, yk) < Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)), then
according to Property (P3) of ε we obtain that
Ui(Bk, xk) < Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i)).
On the other hand, if Ui(Bk, yk) ≥ Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)) then the definition of api(i) plays
an important role. Recall from (1) that
D⊕ik − vk ≤ D
⊕
ipi(i) − vpi(i).
Recall that ak = e−vk , api(i) = e−vpi(i) and D⊕ipi(i) = log(d+fiBpi(i)(ypi(i))) (since
D⊕ipi(i) ∈ R). But since Ui(Bk , yk) ≥ Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)), we also have, by definition
of D⊕, that D⊕ik = log(d+fiBk (yk)). Hence, the inequality above yields that
ak · d
+fiBk (yk) ≤ api(i) · d
+fiBpi(i)(ypi(i)).
From this inequality it can be derived that
Ui(Bk, xk) − Ui(Bpi(i), xpi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk + ε·ak)− Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i) + ε·api(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk)− Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))
+ ε ·
[
ak · d
+fiBk (yk)− api(i) · d
+fiBpi(i) (ypi(i))
]
≤ Ui(Bk, yk) − Ui(Bpi(i), ypi(i))
= Ui(Bk, yk) − Ui(Bϕ(i), yϕ(i)).
The last equality follows from (2). Hence, we can conclude that∑
k:Bk label ⊕
Eki (pi, x) ≤
∑
k:Bk label ⊕
Eki (ϕ, y). (13)
By combining equations (11), (12) and (13) it follows that
Ei(pi, x) ≤ Ei(ϕ, y) for all agents i ∈ N⊕.
Case (4). Finally, we show that Ei∗ has strictly decreased for the agent i∗ ∈ N⊕ to whom
the bundle (Bk∗ , yk∗) is assigned by ϕ.
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(i) Recall that in the envy-graph there was a strong arc from node Bk∗ to node B`∗ . This
means that
Ui∗(Bϕ(i∗), yϕ(i∗)) = Ui∗(Bk∗ , yk∗) < Ui∗(B`∗ , y`∗)
and thus E`∗i∗ (ϕ, y) > 0. Furthermore,
Ui∗(B`∗ , x`∗) − Ui∗(Bpi(i∗), xpi(i∗))
= Ui∗(B`∗ , y`∗ − δ ·b`∗) − Ui∗(Bpi(i∗), ypi(i∗) + ε·api(i∗))
< Ui∗(B`∗ , y`∗) − Ui∗(Bpi(i∗), ypi(i∗))
= Ui∗(B`∗ , y`∗) − Ui∗(Bϕ(i∗), yϕ(i∗)).
The last equality follows from (2) since i∗ ∈ N⊕. Combining the strict inequality
above with the observation that E`∗i∗ (ϕ, y) > 0 yields,
E`
∗
i∗ (pi, x) = [Ui∗(B`∗ , x`∗)− Ui∗(Bpi(i∗), xpi(i∗))]+
< Ui∗(B`∗ , y`∗)− Ui∗(Bϕ(i∗), yϕ(i∗))
= E`
∗
i∗ (ϕ, y). (14)
(ii) We have already shown (Case (3)) that
Eki∗(pi, x) ≤ E
k
i∗(ϕ, y) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n with k 6= `∗. (15)
By combining equations (14) and (15) it follows that
Ei∗(pi, x) < Ei∗(ϕ, y) for agent i∗ ∈ N⊕.
Hence, we can conclude that
E(pi, x) =
∑
i∈N
Ei(pi, x) +
∑
i∈N	
Ei(pi, x) +
∑
i∈N⊕\i∗
Ei(pi, x) + Ei∗(pi, x)
<
∑
i∈N
Ei(ϕ, y) +
∑
i∈N	
Ei(ϕ, y) +
∑
i∈N⊕\i∗
Ei(ϕ, y) + Ei∗(ϕ, y)
= E(ϕ, y).
So, the envy-measure of the new allocation (Bpi(i), xpi(i))i∈N is strictly less than the envy-
measure of the initial allocation (Bϕ(i), yϕ(i))i∈N . 2
Remark. In case the utility functions are quasi-linear, the method described in the proof
of Proposition 4.10 leads to the algorithm given in Klijn (2000). This algorithm constructs
from every initial n-partition a bijection and a money-distribution such that the associated
allocation is envy-free. ◦
Given the results of Proposition 4.2 and Proposition 4.10, the proof of Theorem 4.3K is now
straightforward.
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Proof of Theorem 4.3K. Let {Bk}1≤k≤n be any n-partition of Ω. Take pi ∈ Π and x ∈ M
and define ε := E(pi, x). Then the set Api(ε) = {y ∈ M | E(pi, y) ≤ ε} is non-empty.
Moreover, Proposition 4.2 tells us that it is compact and therefore there exists a money-
distribution xpi ∈ Api(ε) such that E(pi, xpi) ≤ E(pi, y) for all y ∈ Api(ε). Observe that this
latter inequality is also true for y /∈ Api(ε). Hence, we can conclude that for every pi ∈ Π
there exists a money-distribution xpi ∈ M such that
E(pi, xpi) ≤ E(pi, y) for all y ∈ M.
Suppose E(pi, xpi) > 0 for all pi ∈ Π. Then E(ϕ, xϕ) := min{E(pi, xpi) | pi ∈ Π} > 0. By
Proposition 4.10 there exists a bijection σ ∈ Π and a money-distribution z ∈ M such that
E(σ, z) < E(ϕ, xϕ) ≤ E(pi, xpi) for all pi ∈ Π.
So, in particular E(σ, z) < E(σ, xσ). This contradicts the definition of xσ.
Hence, there exists a bijection pi ∈ Π such that E(pi, xpi) = 0 and this means that the
allocation (Bpi(i), xpipi(i))i∈N is envy-free. This completes the proof. 2
5
The Nucleolus of Trees with Revenues
5.1 Introduction
The chapter studies the nucleolus of a tree with revenues. Trees with revenues generalize
standard cost trees. Here, players do not only pay for their connections to the root, but a
player can also earn some revenue from being connected to the root. The results of this
chapter can also be found in Meertens and Potters (2004) and in Meertens and Potters (2005).
Certain cost allocation problems can be modeled adequately by standard tree networks,i.e., a rooted tree with non-negative costs on the edges and a number of players in each
node. A typical example is a cable network connecting several villages (the nodes of the tree)
with a central supplier (the root). Some of the villages are directly connected to the supplier
and others indirectly. The cables have certain maintenance costs which have to be allocated
among the users of the network (the inhabitants of the villages). The cost allocation problem
that arises, is to determine which amount each of the inhabitants should contribute to the total
maintenance costs.
A natural approach to solve this problem is to model it as a cooperative TU-game and use
a solution concept to derive a cost allocation. In Littlechild (1974) and in Littlechild and
Thompson (1977) this is done in the case that the underlying tree is a line graph. They
study these so-called airport problems in a cooperative game theory framework and derive
a simple algorithm for calculating its nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)). The first algorithm for
calculating the nucleolus of an arbitrary tree, a so-called standard tree, is due to Megiddo
(1978). It was modified by Galil in 1980. Maschler, Reijnierse and Potters (1995) introduced
yet another algorithm and Granot, Maschler, Owen and Zhu (1996) provide a characterization
of the nucleolus of a standard tree game.
Meanwhile, Littlechild and Owen (1977) introduced the idea of revenues in an airport prob-
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lem. Their motivation is that cost-games derived from airport problems form only a partial
representation of the actual situation. They do not take into account the revenues or other
benefits generated by aircraft movements. Consequently, the authors introduce airport profit
games by defining the value of a coalition to be the maximal net benefit this coalition can
generate by connecting (some of) its members. It is also possible for a coalition to refrain
from connecting anybody. Littlechild and Owen claim that Littlechild’s algorithm (1974) for
the nucleolus of airport cost-games remains valid for computing the nucleolus of an airport
profit game. However, this statement is incorrect (unless the revenue of a player is at least as
much as his individual costs). This observation is made in Braˆnzei, In˜arra, Tijs and Zarzuelo
(2003). The authors demonstrate, by means of an example, that Littlechild’s algorithm is no
longer suitable for calculating the nucleolus of airport profit games. In addition they provide
a new polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for these type of games.
This chapter follows the approach taken by Braˆnzei et al. (2003) to study trees with revenues.
Here, a rooted tree with non-negative costs is given in which players can earn a (non-negative)
revenue from being connected to the root. For example, one can think of the root as an
internet-provider and the players as inhabitants of villages who can earn some money via the
internet, if they have a connection. A cooperating coalition of players is assumed to connect
those members to the root who together yield the highest net profit (i.e., the maximum of
their total revenues minus the construction costs). Again, it is also possible for a coalition
to refrain from connecting anybody to the root. By assigning to each coalition the maximal
profit as its value, we obtain the TU-game corresponding to the tree with revenues.
The focus is on the nucleolus of this TU-game and we present in Subsection 5.3.2 a poly-
nomial time algorithm to compute it. The algorithm considers a finite sequence of trees,
starting with the original tree and where each tree is obtained of the preceding one, either by
a transformation or by Davis and Maschler reduction (Davis and Maschler (1965)). These
transformations as well as the effects on the nucleolus are discussed in Subsection 5.2.4.
They provide us standard trees with revenues. Given such a standard tree, the maximal ex-
cess at the nucleolus is determined by four different types of numbers, each defined by the
revenues and/or costs of the tree. The minimum among these numbers provides us those
coalitions with maximal excess and these coalitions help us to compute the nucleolus payoff
of some players. Reducing these players from the tree and using the result that the nucleo-
lus of a (standard) tree with revenues satisfies the reduced game property (Sobolev (1975)),
yields that the nucleoli of the trees in the sequence can be converted into the nucleolus of the
original tree.
In this chapter we also give some monotonicity properties satisfied by the nucleolus and we
give a characterization for the nucleolus as a solution rule for trees with revenues. Usually,
the nucleolus is not too good in following monotonicity rules. It may happen, for example,
that by increasing the value of a single coalition, some members of that coalition receive
less as nucleolus payoff. This lack of monotonicity is demonstrated, by means of a convex
TU-game with four players, in Hokari (2000) (see also Megiddo (1974) and Maschler (1992)
for examples and a discussion on this issue). However, Maschler et al. (1995) prove that the
nucleolus of a standard cost tree is cost-monotonic (i.e., no player benefits whenever the costs
of an edge increases). Furthermore, they prove that the nucleoli of all subgames of a standard
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cost tree form a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas), a concept introduced by
Thomson (1983) (see also Sprumont (1990)). Roughly speaking, a pmas is a table which
contains for each coalition a payoff vector such that every player gets a weakly higher payoff
in larger coalitions. In Subsection 5.3.3 we show that also for the nucleolus of a tree with
revenues these two monotonicity properties apply. Since, we consider in this chapter trees in
which players may earn some revenue, it seems also natural to ask whether the nucleolus is
revenue-monotonic (i.e., the nucleolus payoff for each player weakly increases whenever the
revenue of a player increases). In Subsection 5.3.3 this question is answered affirmatively.
In Subsection 5.3.4 we give a characterization of the nucleolus as a solution rule for trees with
revenues via seven properties, among which reasonableness (Sudho¨lter (1997)), consistency
(Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999) call this property ν-consistency) and cost-monotonicity are
the more important ones. Reasonableness (on both sides) states that each player makes a
non-negative contribution to the costs of the tree and it states that this contribution does not
exceed the total costs of the path connecting him with the root, a player’s stand-alone costs
(Moulin and Shenker (1992)). A solution rule is consistent when a player leaves the tree with
a reasonable payoff and contributes to the costs accordingly (by diminishing the costs of his
path to the root), then the payoff according the solution for the remaining players remains
the same. It turns out that two solution rules satisfying reasonableness, consistency and cost-
monotonicity coincide whenever they coincide for trees with two players. So, due to these
three properties of a solution rule we may restrict our attention to trees with two inhabitants.
To characterize the nucleolus of a tree with two inhabitants we need four additional properties.
Profit-making states that whenever the inhabitants of a leaf generate a non-positive net benefit,
they will receive no payoff and the payoff to the other players is indifferent whether this leaf is
present or not. So, in this property it is assumed that the players will refrain from connecting
such a leaf with the root, since it does not generate any profit. Therefore, the inhabitants are
not entitled to any part of the total profit, nor are they willing to contribute anything to the
costs. According to the property of minimal obligation, each player should at least pay his
marginal costs. This means that if a player is the only inhabitant of a leaf, he should at least
pay the costs connecting him to its predecessor, before he is entitled to receive any payoff. On
the other hand, the property of minimal rights first states that whenever the revenue of a player
exceeds his stand-alone costs, he is entitled to receive at least the positive difference. Finally,
the property of indispensability states that an inhabitant of a leaf with a revenue exceeding the
net benefit of the leaf should at least receive as much payoff as the other inhabitants. Such
a player can be seen as indispensable, in the sense that without him the leaf would have a
net benefit less than or equal to zero. The main result of Subsection 5.3.4 is that these seven
properties characterize the nucleolus as a solution rule for trees with revenues.
Finally in Subsection 5.3.5, we consider an example of a tree with revenues and use the
algorithm, as presented in Subsection 5.3.2, to compute its nucleolus. But, let us start by
fixing the terminology used in this chapter.
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5.2 The tree with revenues and the associated game
5.2.1 Definitions and notations
In this chapter we consider trees with revenues Γ := 〈{V, E, r}, {Np, cp}p∈V0 , (bi)i∈N 〉
which have the following features:
• {V, E, r} is a tree with a root, in which V is a finite set of nodes and E is the set of edges.
We denote the root by r and write V0 := V \{r}. If p ∈ V0, then there is a unique path
p0 = r, p1, . . . , pk−1, pk = p (with (p`−1, p`) ∈ E for all 0 ≤ ` ≤ k) from the root to p.
The predecessor of p, denoted by pi(p), is by definition pk−1 and the children of p, denoted
by Ch(p), are the nodes q ∈ V0 with pi(q) = p. Furthermore, we denote q  p if node q is
on this path, i.e., q = p` for a certain number 0 ≤ ` ≤ k.
• Each edge has a cost defined by the map c : E −→ R+. We write cp ∈ R+ for the cost of
the edge ep := (pi(p), p) ∈ E (with the convention that cr := 0),
• In every node p ∈ V there is a finite set of players (or inhabitants) Np. The collection of
sets {Np}p∈V , with the assumption that Np ∩Nq = ∅ whenever p 6= q, is the population
distribution. We denote N :=
⋃
p∈V Np,
• Each player i ∈ N has a non-negative revenue bi.
Given a tree with root {V, E, r}, a node p ∈ V0 is a leaf if there exist no nodes q ∈ V0 with
p = pi(q). A non-empty set T ⊆ V is a trunk if q ∈ T whenever p ∈ T and q  p. This
means, in particular, that r ∈ T . Moreover, a connected set of nodes B ⊆ V is a branch if
q ∈ B whenever p ∈ B and q  p. Observe that a branch contains a node p ∈ V such that
B = {q ∈ V | q  p}. We call this branch Bp. The children Ch(T ) of a trunk T are those
nodes p /∈ T such that pi(p) ∈ T . If a trunk has exactly one child p, we call it a maximal
trunk and use the notation Tp. Observe that a maximal trunk Tp does not contain node p and
furthermore, note that
T = V \
⋃
p∈Ch(T )
Bp =
⋂
p∈Ch(T )
Tp.
With every tree with revenues Γ we associate a cooperative TU-game. Let S ⊆ N be any
coalition of players. Then this coalition can generate the total revenues b(S) :=
∑
i∈S bi
when all members are connected to the root. The minimal costs to connect all players in S to
the root are the costs of the trunk T (S) defined by
T (S) := {q ∈ V | there is a node p ∈ V with q  p and Np ∩ S 6= ∅}.
So, the trunk T (S) is the smallest trunk containing all nodes with at least one member of S.
Observe that the trunk T ({i}) for a certain player i ∈ Np consists of all nodes on the path
from node p to the root. Given the trunk T (S) of coalition S ⊆ N , the costs are
cΓ(S) := c(T (S)) =
∑
p∈T (S)
cp.
Hence, a coalition S ⊆ N may earn
5.2 The tree with revenues and the associated game 99
wΓ(S) := b(S) − cΓ(S).
However, it may happen that a coalition can generate a higher profit, by not connecting
everybody to the root. Therefore, it seems reasonable that a coalition connects those members
to the root which yield the highest profit. Consequently, we define for a tree with revenues Γ
the corresponding TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉 by
vΓ(S) := max
R⊆S
wΓ(R) for all S ⊆ N.
So, the value vΓ(S) for coalition S ⊆ N represents the maximal profit coalition S may
attain. If a coalition S attains this profit by connecting all members, i.e., vΓ(S) = wΓ(S),
then coalition S is called effective. Since it is also possible for a coalition to connect nobody,
the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉 is non-negative. The following proposition states that it is convex (see
Section 2.2 for the definition).
Proposition 5.1. The TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉 is convex.
Proof. Let S1, S2 ⊆ N , then
cΓ(S1) + cΓ(S2) = c(T (S1)) + c(T (S2))
= c(T (S1) ∪ T (S2)) + c(T (S1) ∩ T (S2))
≥ c(T (S1 ∪ S2)) + c(T (S1 ∩ S2)) = cΓ(S1 ∪ S2) + cΓ(S1 ∩ S2).
The inequality can be derived from the fact that T (S1 ∪ S2) = T (S1) ∪ T (S2) and that
T (S1 ∩ S2) ⊆ T (S1) ∩ T (S2). From this inequality above, it immediately follows that
the TU-game 〈N, wΓ〉 is convex. Since, vΓ(S) = maxR⊆S wΓ(R) for all S ⊆ N , it is
straightforward to verify that the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉 is also convex. 2
Since convexity of a TU-game implies (total) balancedness, Proposition 5.1 yields in partic-
ular for the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉 to have a non-empty core C(vΓ) (see Section 2.2 for all the
definitions). The main goal of this chapter is to study for this class of TU-games a particular
core element, namely, the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)). Before we do so, we first state
the formal definition of the nucleolus and repeat several results regarding the nucleolus of a
convex TU-game which will turn out to be useful in our analysis. This is done in the next
subsection.
5.2.2 The nucleolus of a TU-game
In Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 several set-valued solution concepts for TU-games are dis-
cussed. In this subsection we repeat an other well-known solution concept, the nucleolus.
Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU-game with a non-empty imputation set I(v). Denote B := {S ⊆
N | ∅ 6= S ⊂ N} for the collection of proper subsets of N . Given x ∈ I(v), the vector
(Exc(S, x))S∈B ∈ RB denotes for every coalition S ∈ B its excess in imputation x ∈ I(v),
i.e., Exc(S, x) := v(S) − x(S).
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The excess of a coalition in an imputation can be understood as the dissatisfaction of this
coalition with the proposed payoff vector. The nucleolus is obtained by performing the fol-
lowing sequence of minimizations. First, identify the imputations at which the excess of the
most dissatisfied coalition is the smallest. Then among the minimizers, identify the imputa-
tions at which the excess of the second most dissatisfied coalition is the smallest, and so on.
The following definition gives a more formal statement on the notion of the nucleolus.
Definition (Schmeidler (1969)). The nucleolus of 〈N, v〉 is defined as,
ν(v) := {x ∈ I(v) | θ ◦ Exc(S, x)S∈B  θ ◦ Exc(S, y)S∈B for all y ∈ I(v)},
in which the map θ : RB−→ R|B| orders the coordinates of a vector in a weakly decreasing
order and in which  denotes the lexicographic order on R|B|. ◦
For a TU-game 〈N, v〉 with a non-empty imputation set the nucleolus is proven to be a sin-
gleton. Moreover, it is contained in the union of the kernel with the core (Schmeidler (1969)).
Observe that the latter statement in particular implies that the nucleolus is contained in the
reactive bargaining set (Theorem 2.3). So, the nucleolus is the unique imputation that lexico-
graphically minimizes the vector of non-increasingly ordered excesses over the set of impu-
tations. For simplicity, we write ν instead of ν(v) and we denote
D1(ν) := {S ∈ B | Exc(S, ν) ≥ Exc(R, ν) for all R ∈ B},
i.e., the set of proper subsets of N with maximal excess in ν. Note that if the TU-game 〈N, v〉
has a non-empty core, the maximal excess in the nucleolus is at most zero. Therefore, we
write
E(ν) := −max
S∈B
Exc(S, ν).
A drawback of the nucleolus is that for most TU-games it is difficult to compute. It requires an
exponential number of computations since the solution must adhere to coalitional conditions.
Thus, if one attempts to compute the nucleolus by simply following its definition, it would
take an exponential amount of time. In the literature, several algorithms can be found for
computing the nucleolus (see e.g., Kopelowitz (1967), Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979)
and Potters, Reijnierse and Ansing (1995)). They all require solutions of a series of linear
programs. In several cases one can nonetheless bypass all the computational complexity and
compute the nucleolus more easily, i.e., there are several classes of games for which one
can compute the nucleolus in polynomial time (see Granot, Granot and Zhu (1998) for an
overview). One of these classes is the class of TU-games derived from trees with revenues
as described in the previous subsection. This is demonstrated in the forthcoming sections of
this chapter.
In the remainder of this subsection we repeat two results regarding the nucleolus of a convex
TU-game. The first result states that if the TU-game is also non-negative, then a player
receives zero under the nucleolus if and only if he is a null-player (i.e., he does not have any
contribution in a coalition).
Lemma 5.2. If 〈N, v〉 is a non-negative, convex TU-game and ν is the nucleolus, then νi = 0
if and only if v(N) = v(N \{i}).
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Proof. ⇒) Since the TU-game 〈N, v〉 is convex, the nucleolus is contained in the core. Thus,
since 〈N, v〉 is non-negative, νi = 0 for a certain player i ∈ N implies that v({i}) = 0.
Hence, sij(ν) = 0 for all j ∈ N \{i} (see Section 2.3 for the definition). Since ν is also an
element of the kernel, it holds that sji(ν) = 0 for all j ∈ N \{i}. This means that for every
j ∈ N \{i} there exists a coalition Sj ⊆ N \{i}with j ∈ Sj such that
v(Sj) − ν(Sj) = 0.
Let S ⊆ N \ {i} be a coalition with v(S) = ν(S) such that |S| is maximal. Suppose
S 6= N \{i}. Then there exists a player j ∈ N \S with j 6= i. Convexity of 〈N, v〉 tells us
that
0 = v(Sj)− ν(Sj) + v(S)− ν(S)
≤ v(Sj ∪ S)− ν(Sj ∪ S) + v(Sj ∩ S)− ν(Sj ∩ S) ≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that ν ∈ C(v). So, we can conclude that v(Sj∪S) =
ν(Sj ∪ S). But this contradicts the maximality of |S|.
Hence, v(N\{i}) = ν(N\{i}). By using the efficiency of ν and the assumption that νi = 0,
it follows that v(N) = v(N \{i}).
⇐) The converse is straightforward and left to the reader. 2
The following result is taken from Arin and In˜arra (1998) and is stated here without a proof.
It characterizes which coalitions attain the maximal excess in the nucleolus of a convex game.
Their result will be very useful in our analysis. If {S1, . . . , Sk} is a partition of N , then the
family {N \S1, . . . , N \Sk} formed by its complements is an antipartition of N .
Theorem 5.3 (Arin and In˜arra (1998)). If ν is the nucleolus of a convex TU-game, then
D1(ν) contains a partition or an antipartition of N . 2
5.2.3 The reduced tree with revenues and the associated game
Let Γ be a tree with revenues. This subsection describes the reduced tree with revenues with
respect to a player and a reasonable payoff.
Assume that the players in the grand coalition N have decided that some inhabitant of node
p ∈ V , say player i ∈ Np, receives a payoff z ∈ R+. It is reasonable to assume that z ≤ bi
as player i uses the edges in the tree to obtain his revenue bi. The difference bi − z can be
understood as player i ’s contribution to the total costs of the tree. However, it is equally
reasonable to assume that this contribution should not exceed the total costs cΓ({i}) of the
path T ({i}), the set of edges needed to connect him with the root (player i ’s stand-alone
costs). In case z equals the payoff of player i in a core allocation of 〈N, vΓ〉, these two
assumptions will be satisfied. This results from the following lemma. Recall that [a]+ is an
abbreviation for max{a, 0}.
Lemma 5.4. If x ∈ C(vΓ), then [bi − cΓ({i})]+ ≤ xi ≤ bi for all i ∈ N .
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Proof. Take x ∈ C(vΓ) and let i ∈ N . Since, xi ≥ vΓ({i}), we have by definition,
xi ≥ [bi − cΓ({i})]+. Furthermore, note that for all R ⊆ N \{i},
wΓ(R ∪ {i}) = b(R) + bi − cΓ(R ∪ {i}) ≤ b(R) + bi − cΓ(R) = wΓ(R) + bi.
Hence,
vΓ(N) = max
{
max
R⊆N\{i}
wΓ(R ∪ {i}) , max
R⊆N\{i}
wΓ(R)
}
≤ max
R⊆N\{i}
wΓ(R) + bi = vΓ(N \{i}) + bi.
Since, xi ≤ vΓ(N)− vΓ(N \{i}), the inequality above yields that xi ≤ bi. 2
From Lemma 5.4 we can conclude that 0 ≤ bi − xi ≤ cΓ({i}) for all i ∈ N , whenever
x ∈ C(vΓ). So, there exist imputations x ∈ I(vΓ) for which 0 ≤ bi − xi ≤ cΓ({i}) for all
i ∈ N . Since, in such an imputation the contribution of player i is non-negative and it does
not exceed the costs of the path from node p to the root, the difference bi − xi can be used to
cover a part of the costs of this path T ({i}). The question which part of these costs should
be covered, allows for different answers and each of them leads to a different kind of reduced
tree (see e.g., Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999)). Here, we assume that the amount bi−xi is used
to reduce the costs of the path T ({i}) starting with the edge ep, i.e., player i first contributes
to the costs cp and if this contribution exceeds cp even to the costs cpi(p) and so on.
Knowing how to reduce the costs, we can formalize the idea of a reduced tree with respect to
a player and his payoff. Take i ∈ N , say i ∈ Np for a certain node p ∈ V and let x ∈ I(vΓ)
such that 0 ≤ bi − xi ≤ cΓ({i}) for all i ∈ N (e.g., x ∈ C(vΓ)). The reduced tree with
revenues of Γ with respect to i and his payoff xi is the tree with revenues
Γ−ix := 〈{V, E, r}, {N
′
q, c
′
q}q∈V0 , (bj)j∈N\{i}〉.
Here, N ′p := Np\{i}, N ′q := Nq for all q 6= p and the costs {c′q}q∈V0 are defined by:
c′q := cq for all q /∈ T ({i}),
c′q := [ min{cq , c(Bq ∩ T ({i})) − (bi − xi)}]+ for all q ∈ T ({i}).
Since, Γ−ix is again a tree with revenues it generates a TU-game. Next, we show that when-
ever x ∈ C(vΓ) this TU-game is in fact the Davis and Maschler reduced game (Davis and
Maschler (1965)) of 〈N, vΓ〉 with respect to i and x. This reduced game of 〈N, vΓ〉, with
respect to i and x, is the TU-game 〈N \{i}, v−i,xΓ 〉 defined by
v−i,xΓ (S) :=


vΓ(N)− xi if S = N \{i},
max{vΓ(S), vΓ(S ∪ {i})− xi} if S 6= ∅, N \{i},
0 if S = ∅.
The following proposition states that the TU-game of a reduced tree is the reduced game of
the original tree. A proof can be found in Section 5.4.
Proposition 5.5. Let i ∈ N and x ∈ C(vΓ), then
vΓ−ix (S) = v
−i,x
Γ (S) for all S ⊆ N \{i}. 2
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Remark. The nucleolus of a convex TU-game satisfies the reduced game property (Sobolev
(1975), see also Peleg (1986)). Because the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉 is convex (Proposition 5.1),
this means that if ν is the nucleolus of 〈N, vΓ〉, then (νj)j 6=i is the nucleolus of the reduced
game with respect to i and ν. Furthermore, this (reduced) nucleolus is a core allocation of
the reduced game (because this reduced game is again convex, due to Proposition 5.1 and
Proposition 5.5). Hence, according to Lemma 5.4, we can reduce an other player with his
nucleolus payoff from the tree. By doing so (in any order), we obtain the reduced tree with
respect to a coalition and the nucleolus. Also the Davis and Maschler reduced game can be
extended to a reduction of a coalition of players. Hence, although the reductions stated in this
subsection are only specified with respect to a single player, Proposition 5.5 remains valid in
case one reduces with respect to a coalition of players and their nucleolus payoff. ◦
5.2.4 Standard trees
The definition of a tree with revenues, given in Subsection 5.2.1, is quite general. It allows for
certain phenomena which complicate the analysis. Although, we will compute the nucleolus
for these trees too, this subsection transforms trees with revenues into, what will be called,
standard trees. Furthermore, we discuss the effects of these transformations on the nucleolus.
Henceforth, we refer to the nucleolus of a tree with revenues and mean the nucleolus of the
corresponding game.
Property (P1). Each edge has strictly positive costs.
In a tree with revenues Γ we have, by definition, non-negative costs. If the cost of edge ep is
zero, there is no reason to consider pi(p) and p as two different nodes. Therefore, we contract
these nodes to one node. Differently, we define the tree with revenues Γ′ which is different
from Γ only in as far as,
V ′0 := V0\{p} and N ′pi(p) := Np ∪ Npi(p).










p Np
0
pi(p) Npi(p) 







pi(p) Np ∪Npi(p)
Figure 9. Contraction in a tree with revenues.
It is straightforward to verify that this operation does not effect the TU-game 〈N, wΓ〉 and
thus neither the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉. Hence, the nucleolus of Γ′ equals the nucleolus of Γ. ◦
Property (P2). If a node, not the root, has at most one child, then it is not vacant.
In case a leaf p ∈ V0 is vacant, one may delete the edge ep as well as node p from the
tree. Because the costs of a coalition equal the costs of a smallest trunk containing the nodes
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which inhabit members of the coalition, deletion of a vacant leaf and the connected edge does
not effect the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉. Hence, this operation does not effect the nucleolus either.
Furthermore, a node without inhabitants and one incoming and one outgoing edge does not
model anything. Therefore, if p ∈ V0 is a node such that there is exactly one node q ∈ V0
with p = pi(q) and Np = ∅, we delete this node from V0 and add the costs cp to the costs
of the edge eq. To be more formal, we construct a new tree with revenues Γ′ which differs
from Γ only in
V ′0 := V0\{p} and c′q := cp + cq .
Also this operation does not effect the corresponding TU-game and thus neither the nucleolus.




s∅ = Ns




q
cq
p Np =∅
cp
pi(p)




q
cp + cq
pi(p)
Figure 10. Deletion of vacant nodes in a tree with revenues.
Note that deletion of a vacant node is not allowed if it has more than one child. ◦
Property (P3). Each player has a strictly positive revenue.
By definition we have non-negative revenues. If a player has revenue zero, there is no reason
for him to be connected to the root, nor is he entitled to attain some part of the total profit.
Therefore, one may expect that his payoff in the nucleolus will be zero. This turns out to be
true. If bi = 0 for a certain i ∈ N , we obtain according to Lemma 5.4 that xi = 0 for all
x ∈ C(vΓ) and thus in particular for the nucleolus, νi = 0. By reducing the tree with respect
to this player i and his payoff νi = 0, we obtain the reduced tree which almost equals Γ,
only player i is missing (see Subsection 5.2.3). According to Proposition 5.5 the nucleolus
restricted to N\{i} of the original tree Γ is the nucleolus of the reduced tree (without player i).
Differently, in case one encounters a tree in which some players have revenue zero, one may
delete these players from the tree (their payoff is zero in the nucleolus) and calculate the
nucleolus for the remaining players. Completing this nucleolus with zeroes, provides us with
the nucleolus of the original tree. ◦
Property (P4). The grand coalition is strictly effective, i.e., wΓ(N) > wΓ(S) for all S ⊂ N .
According to this property, the grand coalition can only generate the highest profit by con-
necting all members of N . For an arbitrary tree this may not be the case. However, if the
grand coalition attains the maximal profit by connecting only some of its members, one can
expect that these members are not willing to share the profit with the remaining players. So, it
seems reasonable that these latter players receive zero in the nucleolus. Indeed, this turns out
to be the case. Let Γ be a tree with revenues and let S ⊆ N be the smallest coalition which
yields the highest profit of vΓ(N), i.e., wΓ(S) = vΓ(N) and wΓ(S) > wΓ(R) whenever
R ⊂ S. Due to the convexity of 〈N, wΓ〉 this coalition S is unique. Let ν be the nucleolus
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of Γ. Then ν(N \S) ≤ vΓ(N) − vΓ(S) = 0 and thus, by individual rationality, νi = 0 for
all i ∈ N \S. To obtain a tree in which the largest coalition is strictly effective, we reduce
all players in N \S with their payoff zero from the tree Γ. This will result in a tree Γ′ in
which vΓ′(S) = wΓ′(S) > wΓ′(R) for all R ⊂ S. Note that the reduced TU-game 〈N, vΓ′〉
is, in fact, the subgame 〈S, vS〉 (i.e., the TU-game of Γ restricted to coalition S). Again, the
reduced game property and Proposition 5.5 yield that the nucleolus of Γ′ can be completed
(with zeroes) to obtain the nucleolus of the original tree. Hence, we may restrict our analysis
for the class of trees with wΓ(N) > wΓ(S) for all proper subsets S of N . ◦
Remark. Property (P4) implies in particular that b(N(Bp))−c(Bp) > 0 for all branches Bp.
In words, within a branch there is a strictly positive net benefit and therefore it is profitable
to connect the inhabitants to the root. Conversely, if all branches have a strictly positive net
benefit and Property (P3) holds, then the grand coalition is strictly effective. ◦
The next property is useful from a game theoretical point of view. It gives the zero-normali-
zation of a tree with revenues.
Property (P5). The revenue of a player is less than or equal to the total costs of his path to
the root.
If in Γ there are certain players i ∈ N with bi > cΓ({i}), we define its zero-normalization Γ′
which is different from Γ only in as far as,
b′i := min{bi, cΓ({i})} for all i ∈ N.
Observe that if Γ is a tree with revenues which satisfies Property (P1) and Property (P3), these
properties will remain for the new tree Γ′. Furthermore, the TU-game derived from Γ′ is the
zero-normalization of the TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉, as we will demonstrate.
Claim. vΓ′(S) = vΓ(S) −
∑
j∈S
vΓ({j}) for all S ⊆ N .
Proof. Let I := {i ∈ N | bi ≥ cΓ({i})}. Take i ∈ I and let R ⊆ N \{i}. Then,
wΓ(R) + vΓ({i}) = b(R)− cΓ(R) + bi − cΓ({i})
≤ b(R ∪ {i})− cΓ(R ∪ {i})
= wΓ(R ∪ {i}).
Hence, we can conclude that in the tree Γ it is profitable for a coalition to connect all its
members who are in I . Differently, for all S ⊆ N we have that
vΓ(S) = max
I∩S⊆R⊆S
wΓ(R).
But since in the tree Γ′ we have b′i = cΓ({i}) for the players i ∈ I , the same statement also
holds in the tree Γ′. Hence,
vΓ′(S) = max
I∩S⊆R⊆S
wΓ′(R)
= max
I∩S⊆R⊆S
wΓ(R) −
∑
j∈I∩S
vΓ({j}) = vΓ(S) −
∑
j∈S
vΓ({j}).
The last equality follows from the fact that vΓ({j}) = 0 whenever j /∈ I .
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Hence, the operation on the tree with revenues, as described above, provides us the zero-
normalization of the corresponding TU-game. Since, the nucleolus is covariant (see e.g.,
Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003)), the nucleolus ν of Γ is equal to (ν ′i + vΓ({i}))i∈N in which ν′
denotes the nucleolus of the zero-normalized tree Γ′. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to
trees with revenues in which vΓ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . ◦
Remark. Property (P3) and Property (P5) imply that there are no players in the root. Indeed,
if there are players i ∈ Nr in Γ, in the zero-normalized tree Γ′ their revenues equal b′i =
min{bi, cΓ({i})} = 0. Hence, according to Property (P3) their payoff in the nucleolus of Γ′
equals zero. Note that in the nucleolus of the original tree Γ their payoffs will be equal to bi.
So, in case one encounters a tree in which there are players in the root, one may delete these
players from the tree and give them their revenues as nucleolus payoff. ◦
Property (P6). Every leaf contains at least two players.
Property (P2) tells us that every leaf contains at least one player. In case p ∈ V0 is a leaf
such that Np = {i} for a certain player i ∈ N , then we contract this lonely leaf p with
its predecessor pi(p) and decrease the revenue of player i with cp. To be more formal, we
construct the tree with revenues Γ′ which is different from Γ only in
V ′ := V \{p} , N ′pi(p) := Npi(p) ∪ {i} and b′i := bi − cp.










p Np = {i}
[bi]
pi(p) Npi(p)
[b]
cp








pi(p)
Npi(p) ∪ {i}
[b, bi − cp]
Figure 11. Contraction of a lonely leaf.
Observe that b′i := bi− cp is the net benefit of the branch Bp. So, if Γ satisfies Property (P4),
we have that b′i > 0. Hence, within the new tree Γ′ we keep strictly positive revenues.
Furthermore, this operation does not effect the corresponding TU-game 〈N, vΓ〉. Hence, the
nucleolus of Γ′ will be equal to the nucleolus of Γ. ◦
Property (P7). Only one edge leaves the root.
Let Γ be a tree with revenues in which the root r has more than one child, i.e., |Ch(r)| ≥ 2,
and let ν be its nucleolus. Since,
∑
p∈Ch(r) vΓ(N(Bp)) = vΓ(N) and {N(Bp)}p∈Ch(r)
is a partition of N , it follows that ν(N(Bp)) = vΓ(N(Bp)) for all p ∈ Ch(r). Because,
vΓ(N) = vΓ(N(Tp)) + vΓ(N(Bp)) for all p ∈ Ch(r) this yields that
ν(N(Tp)) = vΓ(N(Tp)) for all p ∈ Ch(r).
Take p ∈ Ch(r), then by reducing Γ with respect to the players in N(Tp) and the nucleolus ν,
we obtain the reduced tree Γ−N(Tp)ν (see Subsection 5.2.3). Since ν(N(Tp)) = vΓ(N(Tp))
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this reduced tree is in fact the tree Γ(p) in which the set of players equals N(Bp) and the
set of nodes equals Bp ∪ {r}. Since, the nucleolus satisfies the reduced game property,
Proposition 5.5 implies that the nucleolus ν(p) of Γ(p) equals the nucleolus ν restricted to
the players in N(Bp). In other words, if the root r has more than one child, then the tree
with revenues can be decomposed to branches rooted in r, and within each of these subtrees,
the root has exactly one child. The nucleolus of the original tree can be calculated by taking
the Cartesian product of the nucleoli of the subtrees. So, henceforth it can be assumed that
the root has exactly one child. This observation is already made in Megiddo (1978) for trees
without revenues. ◦
If a tree with revenues satisfies the Properties (P1)–(P7), we call it a standard tree with rev-
enues. Note that a standard tree with revenues is also standard in the sense of Granot et al.
(1996). Henceforth, we refer to a standard tree, meaning a tree with revenues that satisfies
the Properties (P1)–(P7).
5.3 The nucleolus of trees with revenues
5.3.1 Excesses at the nucleolus
In this subsection we consider all trees with revenues to be standard (i.e., they satisfy Prop-
erties (P1)–(P7) mentioned in the previous section). Here, we study the set of coalitions with
maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus and we specify the nucleolus payoff for some
players. Let us start with the following three lemmas. The proofs are rather technical and are
therefore postponed until Section 5.4.
Lemma 5.6. Let ν be the nucleolus of Γ. If S ∈ D1(ν), then |S| = 1 or S is effective. 2
The next lemma states that the maximal excess in the nucleolus is strictly less than zero.
Lemma 5.7. If ν is the nucleolus of Γ, then E(ν) > 0. 2
The next lemma can be derived from the previous one. It states that in the nucleolus no player
receives all his revenue and that the inhabitants of a branch together receive strictly less than
the net benefit of the branch (i.e., their total revenues minus the total costs of the branch).
Lemma 5.8. If ν is the nucleolus of Γ, then:
(i) 0 < νi < bi for all i ∈ N ,
(ii) ν(N(Bp)) < b(N(Bp))− c(Bp) for all p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r. 2
Armed with Lemma 5.6, Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.8 one can find those coalitions which
determine the nucleolus of a standard tree.
Proposition 5.9. If ν is the nucleolus of a standard tree Γ, then
D1(ν) ⊆
{
{i}i∈N , {N \{i}}i∈N , {N(Tp)}p∈V0
}
.
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Proof. Let ν be the nucleolus of the standard tree Γ. Take S ∈ D1(ν) such that |S| ≥ 2. This
implies in particular that S is effective (Lemma 5.6). We distinguish between two cases:
Case (1). If N(T (S)) 6= N , then
vΓ(S)− ν(S)
= b(S)− c(T (S)) − ν(S)
= b(N(T (S))− c(T (S)) − ν(N(T (S))) − [b(N(T (S))\S)− ν(N(T (S))\S)]
≤ vΓ(N(T (S))− ν(N(T (S))) − [b(N(T (S))\S)− ν(N(T (S))\S)].
If N(T (S)) 6= S, then Lemma 5.8(i) tells us that b(N(T (S))\S) > ν(N(T (S))\S). Hence,
Exc(S, ν) = vΓ(S)− ν(S) < vΓ(N(T (S))− ν(N(T (S))) = Exc(N(T (S)), ν).
Because N(T (S)) 6= N , this strict inequality contradicts the assumption that S ∈ D1(ν). As
a result S = N(T (S)). Next, suppose T (S) is not a maximal trunk. Then there exists a node
p ∈ Ch(T (S)) such that T (S) ⊆ Tp. Due to Lemma 5.8(ii) we obtain,
vΓ(N(T (S))) − ν(N(T (S)))
< vΓ(N(T (S)))− ν(N(T (S))) + [b(N(Bp))− c(Bp)− ν(N(Bp))]
≤ vΓ(N(T (S)) ∪Bp))− ν(N(T (S)) ∪Bp)).
This inequality contradicts the fact that N(T (S)) ∈ D1(ν). Hence, if S ∈ D1(ν) and
N(T (S)) 6= N , then S = N(Tp) for some node p ∈ V0.
Case (2). On the other hand, if N(T (S)) = N , then we define U := N \S. Take i ∈ U and
suppose S 6= N \{i}. Then we obtain (recall that cΓ(N) = cΓ(N \{i}))
vΓ(N \{i})− vΓ(S) ≥ b(N \{i})− cΓ(N) − [b(S)− cΓ(N(T (S)))]
= b(N \{i}) − b(S) = b(U \{i})
> ν(U \{i}) = ν(N \{i})− ν(S).
The strict inequality follows from Lemma 5.8(i). So, we can conclude that vΓ(S)− ν(S) <
vΓ(N \{i}) − ν(N \{i}). But this contradicts again the assumption that S ∈ D1(ν). As a
result, S = N \{i} for a player i ∈ N . Hence, if S ∈ D1(ν) and N(T (S)) = N , then
S = N \{i} for some player i ∈ N . 2
According to Theorem 5.3, the set of coalitions D1(ν) with maximal excess in ν contains
a partition or an antipartition. Combining this result with Proposition 5.9 yields that an
(anti)partition contained in D1(ν) is exactly one of the following four types:
(i) {N(Tp) , {i}i∈N(Bp)} for a certain node p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r,
(ii) {{N(Tp)}p∈Ch(T ), {N \{i}}i∈N(T )} for a certain trunk T ⊆ V ,
(iii) {{N \{i}}, {i}} for some player i ∈ N ,
(iv) {{i}i∈N}.
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Remark. Because V is in particular also a trunk, the antipartitions given in (ii) include the
antipartition {N \{i}}i∈N. Indeed, if T = V , then Ch(T ) = ∅ and N(T ) = N . ◦
Each of the (anti)partitions stated in the Cases (i)–(iv) will provide us with information on
the maximal excess of the nucleolus and mostly even the nucleolus payoff for some players.
To make this statement more formal, we first define the following numbers which will turn
out to be the basic tool for calculating the nucleolus:
αp :=
b(N(Bp))− c(Bp)
|N(Bp)|+ 1
for all p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r,
βT :=
c(T )
|N(T )|+ |Ch(T )|
for all trunks T ⊆ V,
γi :=
bi
2
for all i ∈ N,
δ :=
vΓ(N)
n
.
These numbers are inspired by the numbers defined in Braˆnzei et al. (2003) for computing
the nucleolus of airport profit games. The numbers of type α compute the net benefit of a
branch divided by the number of its inhabitants plus one. The numbers of type β deal with
the costs of trunks, i.e., the total costs of a trunk are divided by the number of its inhabitants
plus the number of its children. Observe that βT = cΓ(N)n whenever T = V , since in this
case N(T ) = N and Ch(T ) = ∅. The vector γ ∈ RN+ corresponds with half of the revenues
and the number δ ≥ 0 equals the total net benefit of the tree divided by the number of all
inhabitants. Observe that δ is in some sense also of type α. Indeed, since V0 is in particular
also a branch, δ corresponds to αp where pi(p) = r (and thus Bp = V0), but now one only
divides by the number of inhabitants in Bp (instead of |N(Bp)|+ 1).
Similar as in setting of Braˆnzei et al., these numbers will help us to determine which of the
Cases (i)–(iv) occurs and more importantly, they will help us to compute the nucleolus payoff
for some players. This is stated in Theorem 5.11. The proof of this theorem boils down to
the following proposition. A proof for this proposition is given in Section 5.4.
Proposition 5.10. Let Γ be a standard tree and ν be its nucleolus. Let P be the collection of
coalitions:
(i) P := {N(Tp) , {i}i∈N(Bp)} for a certain node p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r. Then P ⊆
D1(ν) if and only if E(ν) = αp and P ⊆ D1(ν) implies νi = αp for all i ∈ N(Bp).
(ii) P := {{N(Tp)}p∈Ch(T ), {N \{i}}i∈N(T )} for a certain trunk T ⊆ V . Then P ⊆
D1(ν) if and only if E(ν) = βT andP ⊆ D1(ν) implies νi = bi−βT for all i ∈ N(T ).
(iii) P := {{N \{i}}, {i}} for a certain player i ∈ N . Then P ⊆ D1(ν) if and only if
E(ν) = γi and P ⊆ D1(ν) implies νi = γi.
(iv) P := {{i}i∈N}. Then P ⊆ D1(ν) if and only if E(ν) = δ and P ⊆ D1(ν) implies
νi = δ for all i ∈ N . 2
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Since, the only possible (anti)partitions contained in D1(ν) are the collections P given in the
Cases (i)–(iv) of the proposition above, we can immediately deduce the following theorem.
Theorem 5.11. Let Γ be a standard tree and ν its nucleolus. Then
E(ν) = min
{
{αp | p ∈ V0, pi(p) 6= r} , {βT | trunk T ⊆ V } , {γi | i ∈ N} , δ
}
and furthermore:
(A) If E(ν) = αp for a certain p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r, then νi = αp for all i ∈ N(Bp),
(B) If E(ν) = βT for a certain trunk T ⊆ V , then νi = bi − βT for all i ∈ N(T ),
(C) If E(ν) = γi for some player i ∈ N , then νi = γi,
(D) If E(ν) = δ, then νi = δ for all i ∈ N . 2
Observe that each of the Cases (A)–(D) in Theorem 5.11 provides us with the nucleolus
payoff of at least one player, except in Case (B) when N(T ) = ∅. The remaining part of this
subsection tackles this problem.
Let ν be the nucleolus of Γ. Assume that there exists a trunk T ⊆ V such that N(T ) = ∅ and
D1(ν) = {N(Tp)}p∈Ch(T ). Note that this implies in particular that |Ch(T )| ≥ 2. Because
N(T ) = ∅, the collection D1(ν) does not allow us to calculate the payoff in ν of any of
the players. The idea to tackle this problem is to construct a new tree which yields the same
nucleolus. This is done as follows. The costs of the edges from the children of trunk T are
increased by βT and all costs within the trunk become zero (note that since N(T ) = ∅, we
have by definition that |Ch(T )| ·βT = c(T )). Then, according to Property (P1), we may
contract the nodes within the trunk T with the root r. Note that Nr remains empty. As a
result, we obtain a tree in which the root has several children (i.e., the children of trunk T
in the original tree). According to Property (P7) the nucleolus of this tree is the Cartesian
product of the nucleoli of the subtrees which are obtained by decomposing to branches Bp
rooted in r. In addition we prove that this nucleolus is in fact the nucleolus ν of the original
standard tree Γ. Let us make this idea more formal.
First, we construct the tree 〈{V, E, r}, {Np, c′q}q∈V0 , (bi)i∈N 〉 in which
c′q :=


0 if q ∈ T,
cq + βT if q ∈ Ch(T ),
cq otherwise.
Then according to Property (P1) we may contract the nodes within the trunk T with the root r
which yields the intended tree Γ′.
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Figure 12. The construction of Γ′ out of Γ. Nodes contained in the trunk T with N(T ) = ∅ are depicted in black
and node p ∈ Ch(T ) is one of its children. First, we decrease all costs within T to zero and increase the costs of all
children of T by βT . Finally, we contract the edges with cost zero.
Lemma 5.12. The nucleoli of Γ and of Γ′ are equal.
Proof. Take p ∈ Ch(T ). We reduce the standard tree Γ with respect the players in N(Tp)
and ν (recall that due to Property (P2) we have that N(Tp) 6= ∅). So, each player i ∈ N(Tp)
makes a payment of bi − νi to decrease the costs of the path connecting him to the root (see
Subsection 5.2.3). Because D1(ν) = {N(Tq)}q∈Ch(T ), Proposition 5.10 yields,
E(ν) = βT = ν(N(Tp)) − vΓ(N(Tp)).
So, the total payment made by all the inhabitants of the trunk Tp, to decrease the costs of the
trunk Tp, equals,
b(N(Tp)) − ν(N(Tp)) = b(N(Tp)) − vΓ(N(Tp))− βT = c(Tp)− βT . (1)
The last equality follows from the fact that coalition N(Tp) is effective (Lemma 5.6). Hence,
the contribution made by all the players in N(Tp) covers the costs of the trunk Tp minus βT .
Next, we prove that the contribution made by the inhabitants of a branch contained in the
trunk Tp, exceeds the costs of this branch. This means that the costs of all edges in Tp are
paid (and therefore become zero), except for the costs of (some) edges on the path from p to
the root.
Let q be a node on the path from p to the root (note that Bq ⊆ Tp). Lemma 5.8(ii) tells us
that
b(N(Bq))− ν(N(Bq)) > c(Bq). (2)
So, according to inequality (2), all the costs of the branches within the trunk Tp are covered by
the payments made by the players in N(Tp). Recall from equation (1) that in total c(Tp)−βT
is paid. Hence, in the reduced tree with respect to the players in N(Tp) and payoff ν, the costs
of all branches within Tp become zero and there remain only some costs on the path from p
to the root which in total equals βT . Then after contracting all the nodes within Tp with
costs zero (Property (P1)) and deleting all the empty nodes on the path from p to the root
(Property (P2)), we obtain the tree Γ′ restricted to the branch Bp in which the costs of the
edge (r, p) equals cp + βT . Since, the nucleolus of Γ satisfies the reduced game property, the
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nucleolus ν restricted to the players in N(Bp) equals the nucleolus of the tree Γ′ restricted
to this branch Bp. Repeating this argument for each p ∈ Ch(T ), yields for the nucleoli of Γ
and Γ′ to coincide. 2
To conclude, Case (B) in which N(T ) = ∅ does not allow us to calculate the nucleolus
payoff of any of the players. However, we can construct a new tree which yields the same
nucleolus (Lemma 5.12). This tree can be decomposed in standard trees and, according to
Theorem 5.11, within each of these standard trees at least one of the Cases (A)–(D) occurs
again. Property (P7) states that the nucleolus is the Cartesian product of the nucleoli of these
standard trees.
Knowing how we can solve this problem in Case (B), we have in fact an algorithm for com-
puting the nucleolus of a tree with revenues. The formal description of this algorithm as well
as a statement on its complexity are given in the following subsection.
5.3.2 Computing the nucleolus
From Theorem 5.11 and the reduced game property, one can derive an algorithm for com-
puting the nucleolus of a tree with revenues. The algorithm can be described as follows (the
algorithm does not require a standard tree as input).
We construct a finite sequence of trees, starting with the original tree, where each tree is
generated by the preceding one, either via reducing some players, as described in Subsec-
tion 5.2.3, or via a transformation, as described above Lemma 5.12. If a tree within this
sequence does not satisfy one of the properties (P1)–(P7), we transform it as described in
Subsection 5.2.4 into a standard tree. Let Γ be a standard tree within this sequence of trees.
We calculate
λ := min
{
{αp | p ∈ V0, pi(p) 6= r} , {βT | trunk T ⊆ V } , {γi | i ∈ N} , δ
}
and define xi according to:
(i) If λ = αp, then xi := λ for all i ∈ N(Bp),
(ii) If λ = βT , then xi := bi − λ for all i ∈ N(T ),
(iii) If λ = γi, then xi := λ,
(iv) If λ = δ, then xi := λ for all i ∈ N .
Let N be the set of players, for which xi is defined according to these Conditions (i)–(iv):
• If N = ∅, then we are in Case (B) of Theorem 5.11, with N(T ) = ∅. Then we
transform the tree Γ into a tree Γ′, according to the transformation described above
Lemma 5.12,
• Otherwise, we reduce the players in N , as described in Subsection 5.2.3, and obtain a
new tree with less players,
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• If there are no more players left, the algorithm stops.
Remark. Let Γ be a tree with revenues. To obtain a tree satisfying Property (P4) and to
compute the numbers αp for all p ∈ V0 and to compute δ, one can proceed as follows.
First, delete all players from the tree who’s revenue equals zero. Their nucleolus payoff
is zero (Property (P3)). Second, compute the net benefit b(Np) − cp for every leaf p. If
b(Np) ≤ cp, then we delete the players in Np from the tree, their nucleolus payoff is also
zero (Property (P4)). Given the strictly positive net benefits of the remaining leafs, the net
benefit of a branch Bq , where q is a predecessor of a leaf, can be computed by adding these net
benefits of all its children to b(Nq)−cq . If this number is less than or equal to zero, we delete
all players in the branch Bq. Continuing in this way, one can compute for each branch Bp
its (strictly positive) net benefit and thus also the corresponding αp. Furthermore, we obtain
a tree satisfying Property (P4) and thus we can also compute δ. Hence, one needs O(v)
calculations (where v equals the number of nodes in the tree) to compute the αp’s and δ.
Clearly, one needs O(n) calculations for computing the numbers γ (here n := |N |). To
compute the βT ’s in a sophisticated way, we refer to Galil (1980) (see also Maschler et al.
(1995)). Both methods need O(v log v) calculations.
Note that the algorithm needs at most n + v ∼ O(n) iterations, since in each step at least
one player leaves the tree or at least one node is contracted. Hence, the algorithm can be
performed in O(n·v log v) calculations. ◦
Combining the results of Lemma 5.12 and Theorem 5.11 with the reduced game property of
the nucleolus of a tree with revenues (see Subsection 5.2.3), the following result is immediate.
Corollary 5.13. The algorithm, as described above, computes the nucleolus of a tree with
revenues. 2
In Subsection 5.3.5 we present a tree with revenues with twelve inhabitants and use the al-
gorithm to compute its nucleolus. In the two forthcoming subsections we study some mono-
tonicity properties satisfied by the nucleolus and we give a characterization for the nucleolus
as a solution rule for trees with revenues.
5.3.3 Monotonicity properties
This subsection shows that the nucleolus of a (standard) tree with revenues is monotonic in
three senses:
(i) If the costs of an edge become larger, none of the players receives more,
(ii) If the revenue of a player increases, none of the players receives less,
(iii) If some of the players are omitted from the nodes, none of the remaining players re-
ceives more than before.
To prove these three monotonicity properties of the nucleolus, Theorem 5.11 as well as the
reduced game property of the nucleolus of a tree with revenues will play an important role.
Let us start by proving that the nucleolus satisfies the cost-monotonicity property stated in (i).
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Proposition 5.14. Let Γ be a tree with revenues. If we increase the costs of a certain edge,
the nucleolus payoff weakly decreases.
Proof. By induction on the number of players. Due to efficiency of the nucleolus, the state-
ment holds in case of a tree with one player.
Let Γ be a tree with n players. Let p∗ ∈ V0 and increase only the costs of the edge ep∗
gradually, i.e., for every t ≥ 0, define the cost map c(t) : V −→ R+ by
cp∗(t) := cp∗ + t and cp(t) := cp for all nodes p ∈ V0 with p 6= p∗.
Given t ≥ 0, we write Γ(t) for the tree with cost function c(t) : V −→ R+ and we de-
note ν(t) ∈ RN+ for its nucleolus. Note that Γ(0) = Γ.
Suppose Γ is an example of a tree with revenues such that νi(0) < νi(t) for some i ∈ N and
all t ∈ (0, ∆) for some ∆ > 0. Let t ∈ [0, ∆). After we standardized the tree Γ(t), it follows
that:
αp(t) =
{
αp(0)−
t
|N(Bp)|+1
if p∗ ∈ Bq ,
αp(0) otherwise,
βT (t) =
{
βT (0) +
t
|N(T )|+|Ch(T )| if p
∗ ∈ T,
βT (0) otherwise,
γi(t) = γi(0),
δ(t) = δ(0)− t
n
.
Define for every t ∈ [0, ∆):
λ⊕(t) := min{βT (t) | trunkT ⊆ V, p∗ ∈ T},
λ(t) := min
{
{αp(t) | branchBp, p∗ /∈ Bp} {βT (t) | trunk T, p∗ /∈ T}, {γi(t) | i ∈ N}
}
,
λ	(t) := min
{
{αp(t) | branchBp, p∗ ∈ Bp}, δ(t)
}
.
Furthermore, for every t ∈ [0, ∆) we denote λ(t) := min{λ⊕(t), λ(t), λ	(t)}. Observe
that λ⊕(t) is increasing, λ(t) remains constant and λ	(t) is decreasing whenever t in-
creases.
By continuity, we can assume that the argument of λ(0) contains the argument of λ(t) for all
t ∈ [0, ∆). We distinguish between the following cases:
• If λ(0) = λ	(0), then Theorem 5.11 tells us that for all t ∈ [0, ∆),
νj(t) = λ
	(t) for inhabitants j of a certain branch Bp.
Since, λ	(t) is decreasing on the interval [0, ∆), the nucleolus payoff to the inhabitants
of Bp is clearly decreasing. If Bp = V0, then νj(t) = δ(t) for all players j ∈ N .
Hence, in this case the nucleolus payoff is decreasing for all players.
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In case Bp 6= V0, there are some players left. For these remaining players we can
state the following. The contribution of the inhabitants of the branch Bp exceeds, by
definition, the costs of the branch. More precisely, for t ∈ [0, ∆) their contribution
equals the costs of Bp plus αp(t). The latter amount is used to diminish the costs of
the trunk Tp. Hence, the costs in the reduced tree, with respect to the players in Bp and
their payoff, are increasing on the interval [0, ∆). Then, by the induction hypothesis
and the reduced game property, the nucleolus payoff to the players in N(Tp) is also
decreasing on the interval [0, ∆).
Both observations contradict the assumption of the existence of a player who’s nucle-
olus payoff is increasing on (0, ∆).
• If λ(0) = λ⊕(0) < min{λ	(0), λ(0)}, then Theorem 5.11 tells us that for all t ∈
[0, ∆),
νj(t) = bj − λ
⊕(t) for inhabitants j of a certain trunk T .
Since, λ⊕(t) is increasing on the interval [0, ∆), the nucleolus payoff to the inhabitants
of the trunk T is clearly decreasing, if there are any inhabitants in the trunk. However,
for every t ∈ [0, ∆), in the reduced situation, with respect to the players j ∈ N(T )
and their nucleolus payoff, the total costs of the trunk T become zero and the costs of
all its children increase with λ⊕(t) (Lemma 5.12). So, again the costs in the reduced
tree are increasing on the interval [0, ∆). Hence, the induction hypothesis and the
reduced game property tells us that the nucleolus payoff for players not in N(T ) is
also decreasing on the interval [0, ∆). Again, this contradicts the assumption of the
existence of a player who’s nucleolus payoff is increasing on (0, ∆).
• Finally, if λ(0) = λ(0) < λ	(0), then for at least one player, say player j ∈ N ,
the nucleolus payoff νj(t) remains constant for all t ∈ [0, ∆). Again, the induction
hypothesis and the reduced game property of the nucleolus, yields that the nucleolus
payoff for the remaining players is during the interval [0, ∆) decreasing. This excludes
the existence of a player who’s nucleolus payoff is increasing on (0, ∆). 2
Next, we prove that no player receives less under the nucleolus whenever the revenue of a
player increases. Differently, the nucleolus of a tree with revenues is revenue-monotonic. The
proof of this statement uses a similar reasoning as the previous proof. However, we also use
Proposition 5.14.
Proposition 5.15. Let Γ be a tree with revenues. If we increase the revenue of a certain
player, the nucleolus payoff weakly increases.
Proof. By induction on the number of players. Due to efficiency of the nucleolus, the state-
ment holds in case of a tree with one player.
Let Γ be a tree with n players. Let i∗ ∈ N and increase the revenue of player i∗ gradually,
i.e., for every t ≥ 0, we define bi∗(t) := bi∗ + t. Given t ≥ 0, we write Γ(t) for the tree in
which player i∗ has revenue bi∗(t) = bi∗ + t and we write ν(t) ∈ RN+ for its nucleolus.
Suppose on the contrary that Γ is an example of a tree with revenues such that νi(0) > νi(t)
for some i ∈ N and all t ∈ (0, ∆) for some ∆ > 0.
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Let t ∈ [0, ∆). After we standardized the tree Γ(t), it follows that:
αp(t) =
{
αp(0) +
t
|N(Bp)|+1
if i∗ ∈ N(Bp),
αq(0) otherwise,
βT (t) = βT (0) for all trunks T ⊆ V,
γj(t) =
{
γi∗(0) +
t
2 if j = i
∗,
γj(0) otherwise,
δ(t) = δ(0) + t
n
.
Define for every t ∈ [0, ∆),
λ(t) = min
{
{αp(t) | p ∈ V0, pi(p) 6= r}, {βT (t) | trunkT ⊆ V }, {γi(t) | i ∈ N}, δ(t)
}
.
By continuity, we can assume that the argument of λ(0) contains the argument of λ(t) for all
t ∈ [0, ∆). Similarly, as in the proof of Proposition 5.14, one needs to distinguish between
several cases. However, the result of Proposition 5.14 is also used.
• Assume that the minimum λ(0) = αp(0) for a certain node p ∈ V0, pi(p) 6= r and this
minimum is not attained at a number of type β, γ or δ. Then, due to Theorem 5.11, we
have for all t ∈ [0, ∆)
νj(t) = αp(t) for all j ∈ N(Bp).
Since, αp(t) is (weakly) increasing on the interval [0, ∆), the nucleolus payoff to the
inhabitants of the branch Bp is also increasing on this interval. Using a similar rea-
soning as in the proof of Proposition 5.14, it follows that the costs in the reduced tree,
with respect to the players in N(Bp) and their nucleolus payoff, are decreasing. Hence,
Proposition 5.14, the induction hypothesis and the reduced game property of the nucle-
olus tell us that the nucleolus payoff for all remaining players is also increasing. This
contradicts the existence of a player who’s nucleolus payoff is strictly decreasing.
• In a similar way one can obtain the desired contradiction whenever λ(0) equals βT (0),
γj(0) or δ(0). The proofs are left to the reader. 2
In the next monotonicity property of the nucleolus Proposition 5.14 plays also an important
role. This property states that the nucleolus is population-monotonic.
Proposition 5.16. Let Γ be a tree with revenues. If we decrease the number of inhabitants in
a certain node, the nucleolus payoff of any remaining player weakly decreases.
Proof. Let Γ be a tree with revenues. Let p ∈ V0 and take i ∈ Np. We denote Γ−i for the
tree with revenues in which player i is left out. Note that the costs in the reduced tree Γ−i
νi(Γ)
,
with respect to player i and the nucleolus payoff νi(Γ), are less than or equal to the costs in
the tree Γ−i. This follows from the fact that bi − νi(Γ) ≥ 0 (Lemma 5.4) and thus the costs
of the path T ({i}) in the reduced tree have decreased. Hence, Proposition 5.14 tells us that
for all j ∈ N \{i} we have
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νj(Γ
−i
νi(Γ)
) ≥ νj(Γ
−i).
Using the reduced game property, the inequality above yields that νj(Γ) ≥ νj(Γ−i) for all
j ∈ N \{i}. Hence, the nucleolus payoff of the remaining players has weakly decreased. 2
A direct consequence of Proposition 5.16 is that the nucleoli of all subgames of a tree with
revenues form a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) (Thomson (1983), Spru-
mont (1990)). A pmas of a TU-game 〈N, v〉 gives a core element for every subgame 〈S, vS〉
such that every player i ∈ N gets a weakly higher payoff in larger coalitions. To be more
formal, a pmas is a table {xSi}[S⊆N,i∈N ] with the following properties:
(i) xSi = 0 for all S ⊆ N whenever i /∈ S,
(ii) ∑
i∈S
xSi = v(S) for all S ⊆ N ,
(iii) xRi ≤ xSi for all i ∈ N whenever R ⊆ S.
The result of Proposition 5.16 implies that the nucleolus of a tree with revenues can be ex-
tended into a pmas, in the following way.
Corollary 5.17. The nucleoli of all subgames of a tree with revenues form a population
monotonic allocation scheme. 2
5.3.4 A characterization
This section is devoted to provide a characterization for the nucleolus as a solution rule for
a tree with revenues. A single valued solution rule τ assigns a vector τ(Γ) ∈ RN to each
tree with revenues Γ. The number τi(Γ) denotes the payoff to player i ∈ N . Let us start by
providing some desirable properties for an (arbitrary) solution rule for trees with revenues.
Reasonableness. A solution rule τ is reasonable if
0 ≤ bi − τi(Γ) ≤ c(T ({i})) for all i ∈ N. ◦
The difference bi− τi(Γ) can be understood as player’s i contribution to the total costs of the
tree. In Subsection 5.2.3 we already discussed that it is reasonable in a non-technical meaning
of the word for this difference to be positive as well as less than total costs c(T ({i})) of the
path T ({i}), connecting player i with the root. The name reasonableness (on both sides) for
this property is due to Sudho¨lter (1997).
Consistency. A solution rule τ is consistent if for every tree with revenues Γ and for each
player i ∈ N with z := τi(Γ) satisfying 0 ≤ bi − z ≤ c(T ({i})) it holds that τj(Γ−iz ) =
τj(Γ) for all j ∈ N \{i}. ◦
This notion of consistency is what Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999) call ν-consistency. It means
that whenever a player i ∈ N receives a payoff τi(Γ) which is reasonable and the (non-
negative) difference bi − τi(Γ) is used to diminish the costs of the tree as described in Sub-
section 5.2.3, the payoff according to the solution rule to the remaining players in the reduced
tree equals the payoff in the original tree.
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Cost-monotonicity. A solution rule τ is cost-monotonic if
τi(Γ
′) ≤ τi(Γ) for all i ∈ N whenever c′q ≥ cq for all nodes q ∈ V0. ◦
Cost-monotonicity states that no player receives a higher payoff whenever the costs of the
edges are increased.
Our first result in this subsection states that if two solution rules assign equal solutions for
trees with less than three players and if they both satisfy reasonableness, consistency and
cost-monotonicity, then they coincide for every tree with revenues.
Proposition 5.18. If τ and σ are two solution rules both satisfying reasonableness, consis-
tency and cost-monotonicity and moreover they coincide whenever |N | = 2, then τ = σ.
Proof. Let τ and σ be two solution rules satisfying the conditions mentioned in the propo-
sition and suppose τ 6= σ. Let Γ be a tree with revenues, with a minimal number of players
such that τ(Γ) 6= σ(Γ).
If there is a player i ∈ N such that τi(Γ) > σi(Γ), then, due to reasonableness, we can
reduce this player with either the payoff τi(Γ) or σi(Γ) from the tree. Note that bi − τi(Γ) <
bi−σi(Γ) and thus the costs in the reduced tree Γ−iτi(Γ) are larger than the costs in the reduced
tree Γ−i
σi(Γ)
. Hence, by cost-monotonicity, we have that
τ(Γ−i
τi(Γ)
) ≤ τ(Γ−i
σi(Γ)
) and σ(Γ−i
τi(Γ)
) ≤ σ(Γ−i
σi(Γ)
).
Recall that Γ is a tree with the smallest number of players for which τ and σ differ. Therefore,
by consistency it follows that for all k 6= i,
τk(Γ) = τk(Γ
−i
τi(Γ)
) = σk(Γ
−i
τi(Γ)
) ≤ σk(Γ
−i
σi(Γ)
) = σk(Γ).
If there exists a player j 6= i with τj(Γ) < σj(Γ), one can prove in exactly the same manner
that for all k 6= j,
τk(Γ) ≥ σk(Γ).
Hence, there exists a player k ∈ N with τk(Γ) = σk(Γ). By reducing this player and use
again the fact that Γ is a tree with the smallest number of players for which τ and σ differ,
we obtain, again by consistency, that τ`(Γ) = σ`(Γ) for all ` 6= k. Hence, τ(Γ) = σ(Γ). 2
Due to Proposition 5.18, we may restrict our attention to trees with two inhabitants. Although,
this observation seems to simplify the analysis quite a lot, it is far from evident to characterize
the nucleolus of a tree with two players. This is mainly due to the fact that the combinatorial
structure of a tree with two players may still be quite complicated. To achieve our goal of
characterizing the nucleolus of a tree with revenues, we introduce four additional properties
of a solution rule.
Profit-making. A solution rule τ satisfies profit-making whenever b(Np) ≤ cp for a leaf
p ∈ V0 implies
τi(Γ) = 0 for all i ∈ Np and τi(Γ) = τi(Γ′) for all i /∈ Np
in which Γ′ differs from Γ only as far as, V ′ := V \{p} and N ′ := N \Np. ◦
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Profit-making states that inhabitants of a leaf generating a non-positive net benefit receive
zero as payoff. If in a leaf there is no strictly positive net benefit, there is no reason for the
inhabitants to be connected to the root. Therefore, it seems reasonable that these players will
refrain from contributing to the costs and thus they cannot earn their revenues. On the other
hand, it is equally reasonable for the remaining players not to share their total profit with
these players. Therefore, the remaining players are indifferent whether this leaf is present or
not.
Minimal obligation. A solution rule τ satisfies minimal obligation whenever Np = {i} for
a leaf p ∈ V0 and bi > cp implies τi(Γ) = τi(Γ′) in which the tree with revenues Γ′ is
different from Γ only in as far as, N ′p := ∅, b′i := bi − cp and N ′pi(p) := Npi(p) ∪ {i}. ◦
Minimal obligation states that whenever a leaf contains a single player, this player may move
to its predecessor if he has paid the costs of the edge connecting him to his predecessor.
Differently, minimal obligation states that if such a ‘lonely’ player wants to receive some
payoff, he at least has to pay his marginal costs.
Minimal rights first. A solution rule τ satisfies minimal rights first whenever bi > c(T ({i}))
for a certain player i ∈ N implies
τi(Γ) = τi(Γ
′) + [bi − c(T ({i}))]
in which the tree with revenues Γ′ is different from Γ only in as far as, b′i := c(T ({i})). ◦
Minimal rights first states that whenever a player may earn more (from being connected to
the root) than his stand-alone costs (the total costs of the path to the root), he may receive
already his (individual) profit and participate in the tree as if he has an (individual) profit of
zero.
Indispensability. A solution rule τ satisfies indispensability whenever the existence of an
inhabitant i ∈ Np of a leaf p ∈ V0 with bi ≥ b(Np) − cp, implies τi(Γ) ≥ τj(Γ) for all
j ∈ Np. ◦
If the revenue of an inhabitant of a leaf exceeds the net benefit of this leaf, this player can be
seen as an indispensable player, since without him the net benefit would be less than or equal
to zero. Indispensability states that such a player should receive at least as much payoff as
any other inhabitant of the leaf.
Next, we prove that if a solution rule τ satisfies consistency, cost-monotonicity, profit-making
and minimal rights first, then τ satisfies one part of reasonableness, namely, bi − τi(Γ) ≤
c(T ({i})) for all i ∈ N . Therefore, we weaken the property of reasonableness, to reason-
ableness on one side (i.e., each player has a non-negative contribution to the costs).
Reasonableness on one side. A solution rule τ is reasonable on one side if
bi − τi(Γ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N. ◦
The other part of reasonableness can be derived from consistency, cost-monotonicity, profit-
making and minimal rights first.
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Lemma 5.19. Let τ be a solution rule which satisfies consistency, cost-monotonicity, profit-
making, minimal rights first and reasonableness on one side, then τ is reasonable (on both
sides).
Proof. Let τ be a solution rule, satisfying the five properties mentioned in the lemma. We
first prove, using consistency, cost-monotonicity and profit-making, that τi(Γ) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N and for every tree with revenues Γ.
Let p ∈ V0 be a leaf of Γ such that b(Np) > cp. Let Γ′ be the tree in which only the costs of
the edge ep has increased by b(Np)− cp. Then, due to profit-making and cost-monotonicity,
it follows that τi(Γ) ≥ τi(Γ′) = 0 for all i ∈ Np. Furthermore,
0 ≤ bi − τi(Γ
′) = bi ≤ b(Np) ≤ c
′(T ({i})) for all i ∈ Np.
Thus, we can reduce the inhabitants of Np from the tree Γ′ with their payoff zero. Hence,
consistency and again cost-monotonicity tells us that
τj(Γ) ≥ τj(Γ
′) = τj
(
(Γ′)
−Np
0
)
for all players j /∈ Np.
In the reduced tree (Γ′)−Np0 we can take an other leaf q, with a strictly positive net benefit,
and increase again only the costs on the edge eq until q generates a net profit of zero. Using
again profit-making and cost-monotonicity, it follows that τj(Γ) ≥ τj(Γ′) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Nq.
Continuing in this way, one can derive that τi(Γ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Now, we are able to prove that
bi − τi(Γ) ≤ c(T ({i})) for all i ∈ N.
Take i ∈ N . If bi ≤ c(T ({i}), then bi − τi(Γ) ≤ c(T ({i})) since τi(Γ) ≥ 0. On the other
hand, if bi ≥ c(T ({i}), then due to minimal rights first it follows that
bi − τi(Γ) = bi −
(
τi(Γ
′) + bi − c(T ({i}))
)
= c(T ({i})) − τi(Γ
′).
Here, Γ′ differs from Γ only as far as, the revenue of player i equals b′i := c(T ({i})). Hence,
again since τi(Γ′) ≥ 0 it follows that bi − τi(Γ) ≤ c(T ({i})). 2
The main result of this section is that the properties stated in this section characterize the
nucleolus of a tree with revenues.
Theorem 5.20. The nucleolus is the only solution rule for trees with revenues that satisfies,
reasonableness on one side, consistency, cost-monotonicity, profit-making, minimal obliga-
tion, minimal rights first and indispensability.
Proof. Existence-part) Since, on the level of TU-games, consistency is the reduced game
property, the nucleolus satisfies consistency (see Subsection 5.2.3). The nucleolus of a tree
with revenues also satisfies profit-making and reasonableness on one side, since it is a core
element of the corresponding TU-game (see Subsection 5.2.4 and Lemma 5.4, respectively).
Proposition 5.14 tells us that the nucleolus satisfies cost-monotonicity. Because the trans-
formation on the tree described in minimal obligation does not affect the corresponding TU-
game and since the transformation on the tree described in minimal rights first provides the
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zero-normalization of the corresponding TU-game, also these two properties are satisfied by
the nucleolus (see again Subsection 5.2.4). To prove that the nucleolus also satisfies indis-
pensability, we need to do some work.
Let p ∈ V0 be a leaf with b(Np) ≥ cp. We reduce all players in N \Np with their nucleolus
payoff from the tree. Note that the players in the reduced tree
Γ′ := Γ
−N\Np
ν(Γ)
are inhabitants of node p ∈ V0. Furthermore, in this reduced tree, the costs of the path from
this node p to the root r equal cp plus some costs which have not been covered by the players
in N \Np who left the tree. Define U ⊆ Np by
i ∈ U ⇐⇒ bi ≥ b(Np)− cp.
Then b(Np\{i}) − cp ≤ 0 for all i ∈ U . Hence, in the (Davis and Maschler) reduced game
〈Np, vΓ′〉 corresponding to the reduced tree Γ′ it holds that vΓ′(S) = 0 whenever U * S.
It is not difficult to verify that for all i ∈ U it holds that νi(Γ′) ≥ νj(Γ′) whenever j /∈ U .
Furthermore, using a symmetry argument (players in U are interchangeable), it follows that
νi(Γ
′) = νj(Γ
′) for all i, j ∈ U . Using the reduced game property of the nucleolus of a
tree with revenues, it follows that the nucleolus satisfies indispensability. This completes the
‘Existence-part’ of the proof.
Uniqueness-part) Let τ be a solution rule for tree with revenues, satisfying the seven proper-
ties mentioned in the theorem. Let us first investigate how this solution rule τ behaves on the
following three simple trees with revenues:
x


b
c
ΓSingle(b, c)




x
ΓFork(b1, b2)
b1
c1
b2
c2 x


b1b2
c
ΓAirport(b1, b2)
Figure 13. Three simple trees with revenues. The root is depicted in black.
Let us start by analyzing the left tree in Figure 13, denoted by ΓSingle(b, c). If b ≤ c, then due
to profit-making, it follows that τ(ΓSingle(b, c)) = 0. If b > c, then due to minimal rights
first, it follows that τ(ΓSingle(b, c)) = τ1(ΓSingle(c, c))+ [b− c] = b− c. The last equality
follows again from profit-making. Hence, as a result we obtain, τ(ΓSingle(b, c)) = [b− c]+.
To analyze the middle tree in Figure 13, denoted by ΓFork(b1, b2), we can proceed as in the
previous tree. If b1 ≤ c1, then due to profit-making it follows that τ1(ΓFork(b1, b2)) = 0.
On the other hand, if b1 > c1, then minimal rights first states that τ1(ΓFork(b1, b2)) =
τ1(ΓFork(c1, b2))+ [b1− c1] = b1− c1. Hence, τ1(ΓFork(b1, b2)) = [b1− c1]+. A similar
statement can be proved for player 2.
If in the right tree in Figure 13, denoted by ΓAirport(b1, b2), it holds that b1+b2 ≤ c, then due
to profit-making it follows that τ1(ΓAirport(b1, b2)) = τ2(ΓAirport(b1, b2)) = 0. So, we can
assume that b1 +b2 > c. If b1 ≥ c or b2 ≥ c, we first apply minimal rights first. Thus, we can
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assume that b1 ≤ c and b2 ≤ c. This means that b1 ≥ b1+b2−c and b2 ≥ b1+b2−c. Hence,
both players are indispensable which results in τ1(ΓAirport(b1, b2)) = τ2(ΓAirport(b1, b2)).
Denote z := τ2(ΓAirport(b1, b2)). Due to Lemma 5.19, τ satisfies reasonableness on both
sides. So, we can reduce player 2 from the tree with his payoff z. By doing so, we obtain
the reduced tree, ΓSingle(b1, c− (b2 − z)). Hence, consistency combined with our previous
results, tells us that z = [b1−(c−(b2−z))]+ = [b1+b2−c−z]+, and thus z = 12 (b1+b2−c).
So far, we can conclude that for the two trees in Figure 13 with two players the payoff
according to the solution rule τ equals for i = 1, 2,
[bi − c(T ({i}))]+ +
1
2 ·
(
[b1 + b2 − c(T ({1, 2}))]+ −
2∑
j=1
[bj − c(T ({j}))]+
)
.
This coincides with the standard solution (Aumann and Maschler (1985)) of the correspond-
ing TU-game and thus τ coincides with the nucleolus for the trees in Figure 13, with two
players.
Consider now an arbitrary tree with two players. Due to profit-making, we may assume that
there are no branches without any inhabitants. If the two players use at least one common
edge, to be connected to the root, then after using the properties of profit-making and minimal
obligation of τ recursively, one can transform this tree into the right tree in Figure 13. If the
paths from both players are disjoint, one can proceed in a similar way to transform the tree
into the middle tree in Figure 13. As a result, we can conclude that τ equals the nucleolus for
a tree with two inhabitants.
Due to Lemma 5.19, τ satisfies reasonableness on both sides and thus, according to Proposi-
tion 5.18, it follows that this solution rule τ coincides with the nucleolus, since it coincides
with the nucleolus for trees with two players. This completes the ‘uniqueness-part’ and the
proof. 2
We end this section, by discussing the logic independence of the properties used in our char-
acterization for the nucleolus. Unfortunately, we were not able for each property to prove its
logical independence from the remaining ones, nor to prove a dependence relation. However,
for two of the properties, mentioned in Theorem 5.20, we have been able to devise examples
which illustrate their logic independence from the other six properties. The examples are
listed below.
The first example shows the logic independence of consistency with respect to the other
properties mentioned in Theorem 5.20.
Example (Consistency). Consider the solution rule τ which assigns to each tree with rev-
enues Γ the following payoff to player i ∈ N ,
τi(Γ) := [bi − c(T ({i}))]+.
Then τ clearly satisfies reasonableness on one side and cost-monotonicity. If Γ is a tree with
revenues in which there exists a leaf p ∈ V0 such that b(Np) ≤ cp, then bi ≤ cp ≤ c(T ({i}))
for all i ∈ Np. Hence, τi(Γ) = 0 for all i ∈ Np. Furthermore, by definition it follows that
τj(Γ) = τj(Γ
′) for all j /∈ Np, in which V ′ := V\{p}. Hence, τ satisfies profit-making. Note
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that minimal obligation and minimal rights first are also satisfied by τ . Next, we show that τ
also satisfies indispensability. Let p ∈ V0 be a leaf such that b(Np) ≥ cp and bi ≥ b(Np)−cp
for a certain player i ∈ Np. Take j ∈ Np with j 6= i. Then bi ≥ b(Np)− cp ≥ bi + bj − cp.
Hence, bj ≤ cp ≤ c(T ({j})) and thus τj(Γ) = 0. Hence, τi(Γ) ≥ τj(Γ) for all inhabitants
j ∈ Np. Finally, since τ does not coincide with the nucleolus, we can conclude that it does
not satisfy consistency. ◦
Also minimal rights first cannot be proven from the other six properties.
Example (Minimal rights first). Consider the solution rule τ which assigns to each tree
with revenues Γ the following payoff to player i ∈ N ,
τi(Γ) := 0.
Then it is straightforward that this solution rule satisfies reasonableness on one side, consis-
tency, cost-monotonicity, profit-making, minimal obligation and indispensability. However,
it clearly does not satisfy minimal rights first. ◦
5.3.5 Example
In this subsection we present an example of a tree with revenues and use the algorithm, given
in Subsection 5.3.2, to compute its nucleolus.
Example. Consider the tree with revenues Γ with 12 players as depicted in Figure 14. The
revenues of the players are written between brackets and the costs are given next to the edges.
There are three vacant nodes, including the root.
xr
hs [8]
x
x
hv [28] hw [30, 40]
ht[32, 27] hu[31, 34]
hp[24, 30] hq[20, 34]
24
5
7
24
24 17
16
25 22
Figure 14. The tree with revenues Γ. The three black nodes, including the root, are vacant. Node s and node v have
exactly one inhabitant and the remaining nodes two. The revenues of the players are written between brackets.
The nucleolus of Γ equals:
Player i in node s t u v w p q
Revenue bi 8 (32, 27) (31, 34) 28 (30, 40) (24, 30) (20, 34)
Nucleolus νi 4 (13,13) (16,19) 17 (18,28) (10,10) (10,16)
Payment bi − νi 4 (19,14) (15,15) 11 (12,12) (14,20) (10,18)
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Observe that the payments on the total costs of the tree by players in the same node can be
different. Furthermore, although v ≺ q, there is an inhabitant of node q, who contributes 10
to the costs of the tree which is strictly less than the payment made by the player in node v.
Let us now use the algorithm of Subsection 5.3.2 to compute the nucleolus, stated above.
Step 1. The tree in Figure 14 is standard. Among the numbers α, the minimum is taken in
αp =
1
3 · (54 − 24) = 10. Among the numbers β, the minimum is taken at the trunk T
containing the tree black nodes and node s, yielding βT = 11+4 ·(24 + 7 + 5) = 7
1
5 . The
minimum among the γ’s is clearly attained by the player j in node s, yielding γj = 4. Finally,
δ = 112 · (338 − 164) = 14
1
2 . Hence, νj = γj = 4. Reducing the tree with respect to this
player j ∈ Ns and his payoff νj = 4, yields the following standard tree.
x
x
x
x
hv [28] hw [30, 40]
ht[32, 27] hu[31, 34]
hp[24, 30] hq[20, 34]
20 = 24− 4
5
7
24
24 17
16
25 22
Figure 14(i). The reduced tree with revenues. The nucleolus payoff, so far, equals:
Player in node s t u v w p q
Nucleolus 4 (–,–) (–,–) – (–,–) (–,–) (–,–)
Step 2. The numbers α remain the same and thus their minimum equals 10. The minimum
among the γ’s has increased to 202 = 10. Also δ has increased. However, the β’s have
changed and the minimum is taken in the trunk T containing the four black nodes, yielding
βT =
1
4 · (20 + 7 + 5) = 8. Since, N(T ) = ∅, we obtain the following tree.
x
hw [30, 40]
hp[24, 30] hq[20, 34]
hv [28]
32
24 17
24 = 16 + 83025 + 8 = 33
hu[31, 34]ht[32, 27]
Figure 14(ii). Increasing the costs of the children with 8 and contracting the vacant nodes.
Step 3. The tree in Figure 14(ii) is not standard. First, we decompose this tree into the rooted
branches Bt, Bu, Bv and Bw (Property (P7)). The tree restricted to the branch Bt is standard
and the minimum occurs at δ = 13. Hence, the nucleolus payoff for both inhabitants of node t
equals 13. The tree restricted to Bu is not standard, since it does not satisfy Property (P5).
After zero-normalization (i.e., the revenues become (30, 30) and the inhabitants of node u
already receive (31 − 30, 34 − 30) in the nucleolus), the minimum is attained at δ = 15.
So, the nucleolus of the zero-normalized tree is (15, 15). Hence, the nucleolus payoff for the
players in u is 1 + 15 = 16 and 4 + 15 = 19, respectively. Similarly, one can compute the
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nucleolus for the tree restricted to Bw which equals (6+12, 16+12) = (18, 28). This leaves
us with the tree restricted to Bv . Here, the minimum is attained at αp = 10, yielding for the
players in node p to receive (10, 10) in the nucleolus. Hence, by reducing all these players
with their payoff from the tree, we obtain the following reduced tree and its corresponding
standard tree.
x
hq [20, 34]
hv [28]
22 = 32 − 10
17
x
hq [20, 34]
hv [22]
22
17
(P5)
Figure 14(iii). The reduction with respect to the players in the nodes t, u, p and w and the zero-normalization. So
far, the nucleolus equals (the player in node v already receives 28− 22 = 6 and is therefore marked):
Player in node s t u v w p q
Nucleolus 4 (13,13) (16,19) 6∗ (18,28) (10,10) (–,–)
Step 4. The minimum in the standard tree of Figure 14(iii) is taken in γj = 10 for the
player j in node q with bj = 20. This yields a payoff in the nucleolus for this player to be 10.
Reducing this player from the standard tree in Figure 14(iii) yields the following tree.
x
hq [34]
hv [22]
22
7 = 17 − 10
x
hq [29]
hv [22]
22
7
x
hv [29− 7, 22]
22
(P5) (P6)
Figure 14(iv). The reduction with respect to the player in node q and its standard tree. So far, the nucleolus equals
(the player in node q already receives 34− (7 + 22) = 5 and is therefore marked):
Player in node s t u v w p q
Nucleolus 4 (13,13) (16,19) 6∗ (18,28) (10,10) (10, 5∗)
Step 5. Finally, the minimum within the standard tree in Figure 14(iv), is taken in δ = 11.
This yields for this tree, the nucleolus payoff for both players to be 11. Hence, the inhabitant
of node v of the original tree receives 6 + 11 = 17 as nucleolus payoff and the player in
node q, who already received 5, receives now in total 5 + 11 = 16 as nucleolus payoff. ◦
5.4 Proofs
This section provides a proof for Proposition 5.5, for the Lemmas 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 and for
Proposition 5.10.
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Take i ∈ N , say i ∈ Np for a certain node p ∈ V0 and let
x ∈ C(vΓ).
Claim. cΓ−ix (S) = min{cΓ(S ∪ {i})− (bi − xi) , cΓ(S)} for all S ⊆ N \{i}.
Proof. Take S ⊆ N \ {i}, we distinguish between two cases. In case p ∈ T (S), then
T (S ∪ {i}) = T (S) and furthermore,
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cΓ−ix (S) = c(T (S))− (bi − xi)
= c(T (S ∪ {i}))− (bi − xi) = cΓ(S ∪ {i})− (bi − xi).
Observe that in this case we have cΓ(S ∪ {i}) = cΓ(S) and therefore, because bi − xi ≥ 0
(Lemma 5.4), this yields cΓ−ix (S) = cΓ(S ∪ {i})− (bi − xi) ≤ cΓ(S).
In case p /∈ T (S), then
cΓ−ix (S) = c(T (S))−
[
(bi − xi)− c
(
T ({i})\{T ({i})∩ T (S)}
)]
+
= min{c(T (S)) + c
(
T ({i})\{T ({i})∩ T (S)}
)
− (bi − xi) , c(T (S))}
= min{c(T (S ∪ {i})− (bi − xi) , c(T (S))}.
Hence, both cases yield, cΓ−ix (S) = min{cΓ(S ∪ {i})− (bi − xi) , cΓ(S)}.
According to the claim above, we have for all S ⊆ N \{i},
wΓ−ix (S) = b(S)− cΓ−ix (S)
= b(S)−min{cΓ(S ∪ {i})− (bi − xi) , cΓ(S)}
= max{b(S ∪ {i})− cΓ(S ∪ {i})− xi , b(S)− cΓ(S)}
= max{wΓ(S ∪ {i})− xi , wΓ(S)}.
As a result, we obtain for all S ⊆ N \{i},
vΓ−ix (S) := maxR⊆S
wΓ−ix (R) = maxR⊆S
{max{wΓ(R ∪ {i})− xi , wΓ(R)}}
= max{max
R⊆S
wΓ(R ∪ {i})− xi , max
R⊆S
wΓ(R)}
= max{vΓ(S ∪ {i})− xi , vΓ(S)}
Finally, since x ∈ C(vΓ) is a core allocation, we have that vΓ(N)−xi ≥ vΓ(N\{i}). Hence,
the equality above yields, vΓ−ix (N \{i}) = vΓ(N)− xi. This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Take S ∈ D1(ν) such that |S| ≥ 2 and suppose that S is not effective.
Take R ⊆ S such that vΓ(S) = wΓ(R). Then
Exc(S, ν) = vΓ(S)− ν(S) = wΓ(R)− ν(R)− ν(S\R)
= vΓ(R)− ν(R)− ν(S\R) = Exc(R, ν)− ν(S\R).
Note that ν(S\R) ≥ 0, since νi ≥ vΓ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N (Property (P5)). Because 〈N, vΓ〉
is in particular non-negative and convex, νi = 0 implies vΓ(N) = vΓ(N \{i}) (Lemma 5.2).
But, in a standard tree we have vΓ(N) > vΓ(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N (Property (P4)). Therefore,
we have that ν(S\R) > 0, but then the equation above yields,
Exc(S, ν) = Exc(R, ν)− ν(S\R) < Exc(R, ν).
This contradicts S ∈ D1(ν). 2
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Proof of Lemma 5.7. Because 〈N, vΓ〉 is convex, it has a non-empty core and as a result
E(ν) ≥ 0. Suppose E(ν) = 0, then vΓ(S) = ν(S) for all S ∈ D1(ν). Because D1(ν) con-
tains an (anti)partition (Theorem 5.3), say P ⊆ D1(ν), there exists a non-negative solution
(ΛS)S∈P of the equation
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·eS = eN . Hence, for this solution (ΛS)S∈P it holds that
vΓ(N) = ν(N) =
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·ν(S) =
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·vΓ(S). (3)
Observe that if {i} ∈ P ⊆ D1(ν) then νi = vΓ({i}) = 0 which contradicts Property (P4)
(see also the proof of Lemma 5.6). Thus, according to Lemma 5.6, it follows that every S ∈ P
is effective. Combining this result with the fact that vΓ(N) = b(N)− cΓ(N) (Property (P4)),
it is straightforward to verify that equation (3) yields,
cΓ(N) =
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·cΓ(S). (4)
It is not difficult to verify (see e.g., Proposition 3.1 in Borm, Hamers and Hendrickx (2001))
that cΓ(S) =
∑
p∈V0
cp ·u∗N(Bp)(S) for all S ⊆ N , in which for all p ∈ V0,
u∗N(Bp)(S) :=
{
1 if S ∩N(Bp) 6= ∅,
0 else,
i.e., {u∗N(Bp)}p∈V0 are the duals of the unanimity games {uN(Bp)}p∈V0 . This yields,∑
S∈P
ΛS ·cΓ(S) =
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·
∑
p∈V0
cp ·u
∗
N(Bp)
(S) =
∑
p∈V0
cp
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·u
∗
N(Bp)
(S).
Because for each p ∈ V0 the unanimity game uN(Bp) has a non-empty core, we obtain for
their duals, ∑
S∈P
ΛS ·u
∗
N(Bp)
(S) ≥ u∗N(Bp)(N) for all p ∈ V0. (5)
Take s ∈ V0 such that pi(s) = r. Then, due to Property (P7), we have that N(Bs) = N and
therefore, ∑
S∈P
ΛS ·u
∗
N(Bs)
(S) =
∑
S∈P
ΛS > 1 = u
∗
N(Bs)
(N).
Hence, one of the inequalities described in (5) is strict. Because in addition cp > 0 for all
p ∈ V0 (Property (P1)) we obtain,∑
S∈P
ΛS ·cΓ(S) =
∑
p∈V0
cp
∑
S∈P
ΛS ·u
∗
N(Bp)
(S) >
∑
p∈V0
cp ·u
∗
N(Bp)
(N) = cΓ(N).
This contradicts equation (4) and completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.8. Let ν be the nucleolus of Γ. Since vΓ({i}) = 0 (Property (P5)) and
E(ν) > 0 (Lemma 5.7) it follows that νi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, Lemma 5.7 also
implies that ν(N \{i}) > vΓ(N \{i}) for all i ∈ N . Hence, for all i ∈ N ,
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νi = vΓ(N)− ν(N \{i}) < vΓ(N)− vΓ(N \{i})
≤ b(N)− cΓ(N)− [b(N \{i})− cΓ(N \{i})] = bi.
The last equality uses the fact that cΓ(N) = cΓ(N \{i}) for all i ∈ N (Property (P6)).
Lemma 5.7 also implies that ν(N(Tp)) > vΓ(N(Tp)) for all p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r. As a
result, we obtain,
vΓ(N) = ν(N) = ν(N(Bp)) + ν(N(Tp)) > ν(N(Bp)) + vΓ(N(Tp)).
Hence,
ν(N(Bp)) < vΓ(N)− vΓ(N(Tp))
≤ b(N)− cΓ(N) − [b(N(Tp))− c(Tp)] = b(N(Bp))− c(Bp). 2
Proof of Proposition 5.10. Let Γ be a standard tree with revenues and let ν be the nucleolus.
(i) Take p ∈ V0 with pi(p) 6= r. Note that by definition of E(ν),
ν(N(Tp)) ≥ vΓ(N(Tp)) + E(ν) and νi ≥ E(ν) for all i ∈ N(Bp).
Here we used vΓ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N (Property (P5)). Hence,
vΓ(N) = ν(N(Tp)) + ν(N(Bp)) ≥ vΓ(N(Tp)) + (|N(Bp)|+ 1)·E(ν).
This yields,
(|N(Bp)|+ 1)·E(ν) ≤ vΓ(N)− vΓ(N(Tp))
≤ b(N)− cΓ(N)− b(N(Tp)) + c(Tp)
= b(N(Bp))− c(Bp).
Hence, E(ν) ≤ αp. Furthermore, if {N(Tp) , {i}i∈N(Bp)} ⊆ D1(ν), then ν(N(Tp)) =
vΓ(N(Tp)) + E(ν) and νi = E(ν) for all i ∈ N(Bp). Combining this with the fact that
coalition N(Tp) is effective (Lemma 5.6), yields all inequalities to be equalities. Hence,
E(ν) = αp and thus νi = αp for all i ∈ N(Bp). Conversely, if E(ν) = αp, then the
inequalities above imply that {N(Tp) , {i}i∈N(Bp)} ⊆ D1(ν).
(ii) Take a trunk T ⊆ V . Again, by definition of E(ν),
vΓ(N)− ν(N(Bp)) = ν(N(Tp)) ≥ vΓ(N(Tp)) + E(ν) for all p ∈ Ch(T ) and
vΓ(N)− νi = ν(N \{i}) ≥ vΓ(N \{i}) + E(ν) for all i ∈ N(T ).
Hence, by taking the sum over p ∈ Ch(T ) and the sum over i ∈ N(T ) we obtain,
(|N(T )|+ |Ch(T )|)·E(ν)
≤
∑
i∈N(T )
[vΓ(N)− vΓ(N \{i})] +
∑
p∈Ch(T )
[vΓ(N)− vΓ(N(Tp))] − vΓ(N)
≤ b(N(T )) +
∑
p∈Ch(T )
[b(N(Bp))− c(Bp)] − b(N) + cΓ(N)
= cΓ(N)−
∑
p∈Ch(T )
c(Bp) = c(T ).
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Hence, E(ν) ≤ βT . If {{N(Tp)}p∈Ch(T ), {N \ {i}}i∈N(T )} ⊆ D1(ν), then again all
inequalities above are equalities and thus E(ν) = βT (recall that in this case the coalitions in
{{N(Tp)}p∈Ch(T ) and in {N \{i}}i∈N(T ) are effective (Lemma 5.6)). Observe that in this
case, we also have for all i ∈ N(T ),
νi = vΓ(N)− vΓ(N \{i})− βT = bi − βT .
Finally, if E(ν) = βT , the above inequalities imply that
{{N(Tp)}p∈Ch(T ), {N \{i}}i∈N(T )} ⊆ D1(ν).
(iii) Take i ∈ N . Then ν(N \{i}) ≥ vΓ(N \{i}) + E(ν) and νi ≥ E(ν). Hence,
2·E(ν) ≤ vΓ(N)− vΓ(N \{i}) ≤ bi + cΓ(N \{i})− cΓ(N) = bi.
The last equality follows from Property (P6). As a result, E(ν) ≤ γi. Furthermore, if
{{N\{i}}, {i}} ⊆ D1(ν), then coalition {N\{i}} is effective and thus E(ν) = γi which on
its turn implies that νi = γi. Conversely, if E(ν) = γi, then the inequalities above imply that
{{N \{i}}, {i}} ⊆ D1(ν).
(iv) Observe that E(ν) ≤ νi for all i ∈ N and therefore, n·E(ν) ≤ ν(N) = vΓ(N). Hence,
E(ν) ≤ δ. From this it immediately follows that {{i}}i∈N ⊆ D1(ν) if and only if E(ν) = δ.
Moreover, E(ν) = δ implies νi = δ for all i ∈ N . 2
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6
Processing Games
6.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes processing problems and related cooperative games. It focuses on the
non-emptiness of the core of these cooperative TU-games. The chapter is based on Meertens,
Borm, Reijnierse and Quant (2004).
Consider the situation in which a number of jobs have to be completed, each requiringits own amount of effort and in which there is a capacity constraint to process jobs.
The terminology has been chosen very general in order to allow several interpretations. For
instance, jobs can involve maintenance tasks, the manufacturing of products, computational
tasks or investments under periodic budget raises. Capacity constraints can be induced by
limited availability of labor and/or engine power, by periodic supplies of raw material, by
maximum computational speed of a computer facility or by budget. In these examples, effort
represents performance of men and/or machinery, volumes of raw material, calculations or
money. In all cases, capacity means the maximum effort per time unit. It is assumed that
for each time unit that a job is uncompleted, a fixed cost (called the cost-coeff icient of the
job) has to be paid. There are no restrictions on the processing schedule with respect to,
for instance, pre-emption, semi-active, or serial vs. parallel planning. Given the capacity
constraint, the objective is to find a schedule for completing all jobs in such a way that the
total costs are minimal. We have baptized this problem as a processing problem.
In the first part of the chapter, we prove that in order to minimize the total costs in a processing
problem, the jobs have to be completed one by one. So, until all jobs have been completed,
all capacity should be used for one job at a time. As a result, it suffices to find an optimal
order of the jobs. This can be done by applying Smith’s rule (Smith (1956)), i.e., the jobs are
handled in the order of decreasing urgencies. The urgency of a job is defined to be its cost-
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coefficient divided by its processing demand. From this observation it follows that processing
problems and sequencing problems with one machine and aggregated weighted completion
times (see e.g., French (1982)) are equivalent. The main characteristics of such a sequencing
problem is that a number of jobs have to be processed in some order on exactly one machine
in such a way that the aggregated weighted completion-times are minimal.
However, the problems diverge when analyzed in a cooperative game theory framework.
Problems are extended to situations in which each job belongs to a (different) player and
each player has a personal capacity to handle jobs. Besides minimizing total costs, costs have
to be allocated to each player individually. In order to find fair allocations a cooperative game
is constructed. Sequencing problems with one machine have also been analyzed from a game-
theoretical point of view in several ways, starting from the basic paper by Curiel, Pederzoli
and Tijs (1989) (see Curiel, Hamers and Klijn (2002) for an overview). In the present chapter
we associate cooperative games to processing situations. These games are called processing
games and differ from sequencing games. This diversion is due to two main differences
between a processing and a sequencing situation. The first difference is that in a processing
situation the players have individual, and generally speaking, different capacities to handle
jobs (not necessarily their own), while in a sequencing situation with one machine there are
no individual capacities. In fact, the machine processes all jobs with a constant capacity.
The second difference is that in a processing situation there is no fixed initial order in which
the jobs stand in line in front of a machine. So, in a processing situation there are no initial
restrictions nor rights on the order in which players may process their jobs. Here, we should
also mention the work of Maniquet (2003), who studies a model in between. He considers
queueing problems in which there is also no fixed initial order on the jobs. However, unlike
our model, the capacity to process jobs is fixed.
Let us elaborate on the way players can cooperate in processing situations. If a coalition
is formed, costs savings can be made by helping each other by means of using a player’s
capacity to speed up the completion of a job of another coalition member. To put it differently,
the members of the coalition have to their disposal the sum of their individual capacities for
completing all jobs of the coalition. This situation can be modeled as a processing problem
and as a result one can determine an optimal schedule and its costs. However, the problem of
minimizing the total costs is supplemented with the problem of dividing these costs among
the players involved. The latter is of a typical game theoretical nature and in order to solve it,
we analyze the complete processing game with respect to core elements. Here, a processing
game is a cooperative cost-game, in which the costs of a coalition equals the costs of an
optimal schedule of its corresponding processing problem.
The main result of this chapter, presented in Section 6.3, states that every processing game is
totally balanced, i.e., every subgame of a processing game has a non-empty core. Intuitively,
this means that if a group of players decides to cooperate, their total minimal costs can be
divided in a fair way with respect to a core allocation. To prove this statement, we construct
from a given processing situation an exchange economy with land. In this Debreu-type (De-
breu (1959)) of exchange economy each player initially owns a part of a perfectly divisible
two dimensional commodity, referred to as land. One dimension is time and the other one
is effort per time unit. In the context of processing situations, one can interpreted this com-
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modity as an agenda. In order to complete their jobs, players must make reservations in the
agenda, i.e., a player must book a block of time and effort per time unit which is sufficiently
large to complete his job. An interpretation is that during this reserved period of time, he has
the booked effort per time unit to his disposal for completing his job. A price is introduced
such that the market clears, i.e., no part of the agenda is booked by more than one player.
Clearing the market will, as usual, lead to a price equilibrium (Walras Law). From this price
equilibrium we construct an allocation contained in the core of the processing game.
So, we explicitly provide a core allocation for every processing game. Since a subgame of
a processing game is another processing game, we obtain total balancedness. Furthermore,
an interpretation of this core allocation is included along with a proof that it is independent
of which optimal schedule is chosen by a coalition to process their jobs. Differently, if for a
coalition of players there are several optimal schedules, the contribution a player has in the
total costs is equal in any of the optimal orders.
Finally, in Section 6.5, we briefly discuss a generalization of processing situations, as can be
found in Quant, Meertens and Reijnierse (2004).
6.2 Processing problems
A processing problem P can be described in a formal way by the tuple
〈J, (pj)j∈J , (αj)j∈J , β〉.
Here, J is a finite set of jobs that need to be completed. Each job j ∈ J has a processing
demand pj ∈ R+. Furthermore, α ∈ RJ+ is the vector of cost-coeff icients and β > 0 is a
strictly positive real number denoting the maximum effort per time unit, or shortly capacity.
During a period of time t that a job j ∈ J is uncompleted its costs equal αj ·t. A feasible
schedule to process the jobs in J can be described by a map
F : J × R+ −→ R+
with the following properties:
(i) F (j, ·) : R+ −→ R+ is continuous and weakly increasing for all j ∈ J ,
(ii) ∑
j∈J
[
F (j, t)− F (j, s)
]
≤ β ·(t− s) for every s, t ∈ R+ with s ≤ t.
The value F (j, t) for job j ∈ J at time t ∈ R+ can be interpreted as the cumulative amount of
effort which has been used for job j ∈ J up to time t. Observe that a job j ∈ J is completed
as soon as the value F (j, t) exceeds the processing demand pj . Property (ii) states that for
each segment [s, t] of time, the total effort spend on all jobs together is restricted linearly in
the length of the segment by the capacity constraint. We denoteF as the family of all feasible
schedules.
Given a feasible schedule F ∈ F , we define Tj(F ) as the completion-time of job j ∈ J , i.e.,
Tj(F ) := inf{t ∈ R+ | F (j, t) ≥ pj}.
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We allow Tj(F ) to be infinity. The objective is to complete all jobs such that the sum of their
costs is minimized. This minimum is expressed by
c(P) := inf
F∈F
∑
j∈J
αj ·Tj(F ).
Example. Suppose a farmer has to harvest three acres with different types of crop, say types
1, 2 and 3. The tasks require 20, 30 and 10 days of work for one man, respectively. His
available workforce consists of himself and five more employees. He has contracts with
distributors to deliver the types of crop, but he is already over time. Every extra day of delay
results in penalties of size 24, 30 and 6, respectively. The farmer wants to harvest the acres
in such a way that the total sum of penalties will be minimal. This problem can be modeled
as the processing problem P := 〈J, p, α, β〉, in which J := {1, 2, 3}, p := (20, 30, 10),
α := (24, 30, 6) and β := 6.
One approach to complete the jobs is by dividing the capacity β over the jobs, for instance,
proportionally to their processing demands. Then after 10 days all jobs are finished simulta-
neously.
100 t
β
2
5
6
1
2
3
Figure 15(i). Completion of the jobs 1–3 with capacities proportionally to their processing demands.
This approach corresponds with the schedule F ∈ F defined by
F (1, t) := 2·t, F (2, t) := 3·t and F (3, t) := t for all t ∈ R+.
It yields a total cost of 10·(24+ 30+ 6) = 600. Another approach is to use the total capacity
on exactly one job and finish the jobs one after another, for instance, first job 1, then job 2
and finally job 3. This approach is depicted in the following figure.
1 2 3
20
6
50
6
100 t
β
6
Figure 15(ii). Completion of the jobs 1–3 with full capacity on each job, in the order 1, 2, 3.
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In this second approach, the corresponding schedule F ′ ∈ F equals
F ′(1, t) :=
{
6·t if 6·t ∈ [0, 20],
20 if 6·t ≥ 20,
F ′(2, t) :=


0 if 6·t ∈ [0, 20],
6·t− 20 if 6·t ∈ [20, 50],
30 if 6·t ≥ 50,
F ′(3, t) :=


0 if 6·t ∈ [0, 50],
6·t− 50 if 6·t ∈ [50, 60],
10 if 6·t ≥ 60.
The schedule F ′ induces completion times T (F ′) = ( 206 ,
50
6 , 10) which yield a total cost of
20
6 ·24 +
50
6 ·30 + 10 ·6 = 390. Hence, the latter approach is more profitable for the farmer
than the previous one. ◦
In the previous example it is already stressed out that it may be profitable to use the total
capacity for exactly one job and finish the jobs one after another. We start by demonstrating
that in order to minimize the total costs in an arbitrary processing problem, one should indeed
choose this approach. To do so, we first need some notational conventions.
Let σ : {1, . . . , |J |} −→ J be a bijection. It can be seen as the order in which the jobs in J
are completed, i.e., the job at position i in the order σ is denoted by σ(i). We write Π(J) for
the family of all bijections from {1, . . . , |J |} to J . If the jobs in J are completed in the order
σ ∈ Π, then we get as corresponding schedule F σ : J × R+ −→ R+ defined by
F σ(σ(j), t) :=


0 if β ·t ≤
∑
k<j
pσ(k),
β ·t−
∑
k<j
pσ(k) if
∑
k<j
pσ(k) ≤ β ·t ≤
∑
k≤j
pσ(k),
pσ(j) if
∑
k≤j
pσ(k) ≤ β ·t.
It is straightforward to verify that F σ is a feasible schedule. Furthermore, given a feasible
schedule F σ ∈ F , the completion time for every job is finite. The following lemma states
that there exists an order σ ∈ Π(J) such that F σ is an optimal schedule.
Lemma 6.1. There exists a bijection σ ∈ Π(J) such that ∑
j∈J
αj ·Tj(F
σ) = c(P).
Proof. Let F ∈ F be a feasible schedule such that Tj(F ) < ∞ for all j ∈ J . Let σ ∈ Π(J)
be a bijection such that
Tσ(1)(F ) ≤ Tσ(2)(F ) ≤ . . . ≤ Tσ(|J|)(F ).
Take 1 ≤ i ≤ |J |, then we have,
Tσ(i)(F ) ≥
1
β
i∑
k=1
pσ(k) = Tσ(i)(F
σ).
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This yields,
|J|∑
i=1
ασ(i) ·Tσ(i)(F ) ≥
|J|∑
i=1
ασ(i) ·Tσ(i)(F
σ). (1)
So, for every feasible schedule F ∈ F , there exists a feasible schedule F σ ∈ F such that
inequality (1) holds. Hence, c(P) = min
σ∈Π(J)
∑
i∈J
αi ·Ti(F σ). 2
Lemma 6.1 shows that if the above cost criterion is considered, a processing problem boils
down to a sequencing problem with one machine and aggregated weighted completion times
(see e.g., French (1982)). In this problem, a finite number of jobs with certain processing
times need to be completed on one machine such that the aggregated weighted completion-
times are minimal. By defining the processing time of a job j ∈ J as its processing demand pj
divided by the capacity constraint β, one can transform a processing problem into such a
sequencing problem. Therefore, the optimal schedule for a processing problem can be found
by applying Smith’s rule (Smith (1956)), i.e., process the jobs in the order of decreasing
urgencies, in which the urgency of job j ∈ J is given by αj
pj
. For the sake of completeness
we give a proof of this statement.
Proposition 6.2 (Smith (1956)). Let P be a processing problem in which the jobs J =
{1, . . . , m} are numbered such that α1
p1
≥ · · · ≥ αm
pm
. Then it is optimal to process the jobs
in increasing order and
c(P) = 1
β
m∑
k=1
αk ·(p1 + . . . + pk).
Proof. According to Lemma 6.1 there exists a bijection σ ∈ Π(J) such that
c(P) =
∑
j∈J
αj ·Tj(F
σ) = 1
β
m∑
k=1
ασ(k) ·
∑
`≤k
pσ(`).
We have to show that σ can be chosen to be the identity. Let us first assume that even
α1
p1
> · · · > αm
pm
. Suppose that ασ(k+1)
pσ(k+1)
>
ασ(k)
pσ(k)
for a certain number k with 1 ≤ k < m.
Let τ ∈ Π(J) be the bijection such that
τ(k) = σ(k + 1), τ(k + 1) = σ(k) and τ(`) = σ(`) for all ` 6= k, k + 1.
By the optimality of σ we have that
0 ≥
∑
j∈J
αj ·Tj(F
σ)−
∑
j∈J
αj ·Tj(F
τ )
=
ασ(k)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pσ(`) + pσ(k)) +
ασ(k+1)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pσ(`) + pσ(k) + pσ(k+1))
−
ατ(k)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pτ(`) + pτ(k)) −
ατ(k+1)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pτ(`) + pτ(k) + pτ(k+1))
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=
ασ(k)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pσ(`) + pσ(k)) +
ασ(k+1)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pσ(`) + pσ(k) + pσ(k+1))
−
ασ(k+1)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pσ(`) + pσ(k+1)) −
ασ(k)
β
·(
k−1∑
`=1
pσ(`) + pσ(k) + pσ(k+1))
= 1
β
·(ασ(k+1) ·pσ(k) − ασ(k) ·pσ(k+1)) > 0.
This contradiction shows that ασ(k+1)
pσ(k+1)
≤
ασ(k)
pσ(k)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m. By the assumption that
α1
p1
> · · · > αm
pm
, the bijection σ ∈ Π(J) must be the identity. A continuity argument shows
that σ still can be chosen to be the identity if we weaken this assumption to α1
p1
≥ · · · ≥ αm
pm
.
2
So, Proposition 6.2 provides a method to find for every processing problem an optimal sched-
ule. In the next section we look at processing problems from a game-theoretical point of view.
Processing problems are extended to situations in which a player, endowed with a personal
capacity, is obliged to complete a job. In this case, the problem of minimizing the total costs
is supplemented with the problem of dividing these costs among the players in a fair way.
6.3 Processing games
In a processing situation 〈N, J, (pj)j∈J , (αj)j∈J , (βi)i∈N 〉 there is a finite set of players N ,
in which each player i ∈ N is equipped with a strictly positive (individual) capacity βi
to perform jobs in J . Again, each job j ∈ J has processing demand pj ∈ R+ and cost-
coefficient αj ∈ R+. As long as a job j is uncompleted, it generates a cost of size αj per
time unit. Each player has to complete one specific job in J . Since, each player is obliged to
a different job, there is a one-one correspondence between players and jobs. Therefore, for
simplicity, we denote the processing demand and cost-coefficient of the job of player i, by pi
and αi, respectively.
Let S ⊆ N be a coalition which decides to cooperate. This coalition has the disposal of the
individual capacities of all of its members to perform jobs, i.e., coalition S can maximally
generate an amount of effort of size β(S) :=
∑
i∈S βi per time unit. The aim of coalition S
is to complete all jobs of its members such that the aggregate costs are minimized. This gives
rise to a processing problem
P(S) := 〈J(S), (pi)i∈S , (αi)i∈S , β(S)〉,
in which J(S) denotes the set of jobs to be completed by the players in S. Proposition 6.2
provides a method to calculate an optimal schedule such that the aggregate costs of coalition S
are minimized. However, constructing such a schedule is only a part of the problem. That is,
in addition to minimizing total costs, the problem remains how to allocate in a fair way these
costs among the players in S. To analyze this problem, we construct the processing game
〈N, cP 〉 with cP : 2N −→ R+ defined by
cP(S) := c(P(S)) for all S ⊆ N.
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The processing game 〈N, cP〉 is a so-called cost-game. A cost-game is a TU-game like we
studied in Chapter 2, but instead of profits it considers costs to coalitions. So, the main goal of
a coalition, when it forms, is to minimize its total costs. Because of the different interpretation
many of the definitions of solution concepts for TU-games as well as properties on TU-games
have to be adjusted to this context (see Section 2.2). For instance, the core of a cost-game
〈N, c〉 is defined by
C(c) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = c(N) and x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
In a similar way the definition of the imputation set I(c) is altered. A cost-game 〈N, c〉 is
said to be balanced, or equivalently has a non-empty core (Theorem 2.1) if for every non-
negative solution (ΛS)S⊆N of
∑
S⊆N ΛS ·eS = eN the inequality
∑
S⊆N ΛS ·c(S) ≥ c(N)
holds. Recall from Section 2.2, that a TU-game is said to be totally balanced whenever every
subgame has a non-empty core. Finally, we mention the alternative definitions of superaddi-
tivity and convexity for cost-games. The counterpart of superadditivity is subadditivity, i.e.,
a cost-game 〈N, c〉 is said to be subadditive if c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) whenever S, T ⊆ N
and S ∩T = ∅. The counterpart of convexity is concavity, i.e., a cost-game 〈N, c〉 is concave
if c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪T ) + c(S ∩T ) for all S, T ⊆ N . Similarly, like in case of TU-games
with rewards, concavity of a cost-game implies (total) balancedness.
The main goal of this chapter is to prove that a processing game is totally balanced. This
means, we consider the core as a normative concept for an allocation of the total costs to be
fair, i.e., no coalition can improve with respect to this allocation. Before we do so, subaddi-
tivity is shown firstly.
Proposition 6.3. Processing games are subadditive.
Proof. Let 〈N, J, p, α, β〉 be a processing situation and let S and T be two disjoint coali-
tions. Let FS and FT be optimal schedules for the processing problems P(S) and P(T ),
respectively. It is straightforward to check that FS∪T : J × R+ −→ R+ defined by
FS∪T (j, t) :=
{
FS(j, t) if j ∈ J(S),
FT (j, t) if j ∈ J(T ),
is a feasible schedule for coalition S ∪ T . Therefore,
cP(S ∪ T ) ≤
∑
j∈J(S∪T )
αj ·Tj(FS∪T )
=
∑
j∈J(S)
αj ·Tj(FS) +
∑
j∈J(T )
αj ·Tj(FT )
= cP(S) + cP(T ).
Hence, the processing game 〈N, cP〉 is subadditive. 2
Next, we revisit the example of the previous subsection to show a processing game. The ex-
ample points out that a processing game is in general not concave and that there can be players
that are attained a negative cost (i.e., a reward) in any core allocation. As a result, solutions
based on a proportional type of costs allocation with respect to, for instance, processing times
and/or capacities will not generate core allocations in general.
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Example. This time the three acres of the previous example are owned by three different
farmers. Farmers 1 and 2 have small farms and no employees. Farmer 3 has three employees.
If the farmers decide to join forces, a processing game can help to share the costs savings
fairly.
In the processing situation comporting with the story, the player set N consists of the players
1, 2 and 3 of which the respective jobs j1, j2 and j3 form J . The processing demands of the
jobs are given by p := (20, 30, 10), the cost-coefficients are given by α := (24, 30, 6) and
the individual capacities of the players are β := (1, 1, 4). Observe that the players are num-
bered in such a way that α1
p1
≥ α2
p2
≥ α3
p3
. According to Proposition 6.2, the corresponding
processing game 〈N, cP 〉 is given by:
cP(N) =
1
6 ·
(
24·20 + 30·(20 + 30) + 6·(20 + 30 + 10)
)
= 390,
cP({1, 2}) =
1
2 ·
(
24·20 + 30·50
)
= 990, cP({1, 3}) = 132, cP({2, 3}) = 228,
cP({1}) = 480, cP({2}) = 900 and cP({3}) = 15.
Observe that cP(N) + cP({2}) = 1290 > 1218 = cP({1, 2}) + cP({2, 3}). So, the cost-
game 〈N, cP〉 is not concave. Furthermore, if x ∈ C(cP), then x3 < 0. Indeed, if x ∈ C(cP),
then in particular we have the following inequalities:
x1 + x3 ≤ 132,
x2 + x3 ≤ 228,
x1 + x2 + x3 = 390.
Hence, 390 + x3 = x1 + x2 + 2 ·x3 ≤ 360. As a result, this yields x3 ≤ −30. Note that
player 3 is rewarded for his participation in every core allocation because of his relatively
large capacity.
It is left to the reader to verify that the allocation (195, 310,−115) is contained in the
core C(cP). ◦
The core allocation of the example above has been found by applying the following theorem
which is the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 6.4. Processing games are totally balanced. 2
A proof for Theorem 6.4 can be found in Section 6.4. In fact, there it is demonstrated that the
vector X ∈ RN defined for all i ∈ N by
Xi :=
αi
β(N)
i∑
k=1
pk +
pi
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi +
n∑
k=i+1
αk) −
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
pk
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αk +
n∑
`=k+1
α`)
is a core allocation of the processing game 〈N, cP〉, provided that N := {1, . . . , n} and
α1
p1
≥ . . . ≥ αn
pn
.
Let us give an interpretation of the described core allocation. Because of the assumption that
urgencies are ordered in the way described above, it is optimal for the grand coalition N to
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work all together on the job of player 1, then on the job of player 2 and so on (Proposition 6.2).
According to this schedule player i has to wait for a period of time with length 1
β(N)
∑i
k=1 pk
until his job has been completed. As a result, his individual direct costs will be
Di := αi ·
1
β(N)
i∑
k=1
pk. (2)
If each player i ∈ N would pay this amount, the costs are divided in an efficient way. It
would not be very fair though. A player whose job is placed at the end of the line should
be compensated. Furthermore, players who have a relatively large capacity βi should be
rewarded. This can be done as follows. Besides the direct costs (2), a tax is introduced on the
jobs. The tax proceeds will then be used to subsidize the players with large capacities. More
particularly, the sum of the tax deposits is redivided proportionally to the capacities of the
players. Let us explain the reasoning behind the explicit format of the tax deposits. At each
moment of time t, a cost-rate is introduced. The player whose job is in process must pay this
rate. The cost-rate at time t equals∑
k∈N
αk · (the proportion of job jk that has not been finished yet at time t).
During a period of time with length pi
β(N) all players are working on the job of player i.
Player i must pay αk · piβ(N) for each player k whose job is still waiting to be processed. This
is exactly the loss of player k, because of the fact that the job of player i is processed before
his own job. Additionally, player i has to pay 12 · αi · piβ(N) , since the mean proportion of his
own job that has not been finished yet during its processing time equals 12 . The sum of these
amounts make the tax deposit of player i to be
Ti :=
pi
β(N) ·
(
1
2 ·αi +
n∑
k=i+1
αk
)
. (3)
Finally, the total amount of collected tax money is returned to the players, proportional to
their individual capacities. This yields a subsidy for player i of
Si :=
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
Tk =
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
pk
β(N) ·
(
1
2 ·αk +
n∑
`=k+1
α`
)
. (4)
Subtracting expression (4) from the sum of the expressions (2) and (3), yields the amount
player i ∈ N has to pay according to the core allocation X , i.e.,
Xi := Di + Ti −
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
Tk for all i ∈ N. (5)
Let us return once more to the processing situation arising from the example with the three
farmers.
Example. Let 〈N, J, p, α, β〉 be the processing situation with N := {1, 2, 3}, J := {j1, j2,
j3}, p := (20, 30, 10), α := (24, 30, 6) and β := (1, 1, 4).
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We already stressed out that the allocation (195, 310,−115) is a core allocation of the cor-
responding processing game. This allocation arises as follows. It consists of the individual
direct costs (expression (2))
D1 = 24·
1
6 ·20 = 80, D2 = 30·
1
6 ·50 = 250 and D3 = 6·
1
6 ·60 = 60.
Observe that the allocation (D1,D2,D3) is indeed efficient, but clearly not a core element of
the processing game 〈N, cP〉.
The tax that the players have to pay is (expression (3))
T1 =
20
6 ·(
1
2 ·24 + 30 + 6) = 160, T2 =
30
6 ·(
1
2 ·30 + 6) = 105 and T3 =
10
6 ·(
1
2 ·6) = 5.
According to expression (4) the players are subsidized with
S1 =
1
6 ·270 = 45, S2 =
1
6 ·270 = 45 and S3 =
4
6 ·270 = 180,
respectively. Hence, according to expression (5), the allocation(
D1 + T1 − S1 , D2 + T2 − S2 , D3 + T3 − S3
)
= (195 , 310 , −115)
is contained in the core C(cP). ◦
Observe that the direct costs as well as the tax deposits are based on the given optimal order
of decreasing urgencies. At first sight, the core allocation given in (5) depends therefore on
the optimal order chosen. The following proposition shows that this is an optical illusion.
Proposition 6.5. Let 〈N, J, p, α, β〉 be a processing situation. The core allocation X , given
in (5), does not depend on the choice of which optimal order is used to process the jobs.
Proof. Two optimal orders can be obtained from each other by a series of switches of two
adjacent jobs with equal urgencies (Proposition 6.2). It is sufficient to show that X does
not change at each of these switches. Assume that one optimal order is (1, . . . , n) and that
players i and i + 1 have equal urgencies, i.e., αi
pi
= αi+1
pi+1
. We have to show that X and
X ′ coincide, with X and X ′ denoting the costs allocations which correspond to the order
(1, . . . , n) and to the order (1, . . . , i− 1, i + 1, i, i + 2, . . . , n), where i and i + 1 have been
switched, respectively. The vectors of tax deposits corresponding to these orders are denoted
by T and T ′, respectively.
We first show that the total amount of taxes paid in both orders is the same. Note that for
players k unequal to i and i + 1 the taxes Tk and T ′k coincide. It is shown below that the sum
of the taxes paid by i and i + 1 does not change either.
Ti + Ti+1 =
pi
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi +
n∑
`=i+1
α`) +
pi+1
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi+1 +
n∑
`=i+2
α`)
= pi
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi +
n∑
`=i+2
α`) +
pi
β(N) ·αi+1 +
pi+1
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi+1 +
n∑
`=i+2
α`)
= pi
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi +
n∑
`=i+2
α`) +
pi+1
β(N) ·αi +
pi+1
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi+1 +
n∑
`=i+2
α`)
= T ′i + T
′
i+1.
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The third equality follows from the fact that the job of player i and the job of player i + 1
have equal urgencies. So, the total sum of amount of taxes is equal in both orders. Since, the
taxes for players unequal to i and i + 1 in both orders coincide, it is immediately clear that
Xk = X
′
k for all k 6= i, i + 1. We now prove that Xi = X ′i .
Xi =
αi
β(N)
i∑
k=1
pk + Ti −
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
Tk
= αi
β(N)
i∑
k=1
pk +
pi
β(N) ·αi+1 +
pi
β(N) ·(
1
2αi +
n∑
k=i+2
αk) −
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
T ′k
= αi
β(N)
i∑
k=1
pk +
pi+1
β(N) ·αi + T
′
i −
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
T ′k
= αi
β(N)(
i∑
k=1
pk + pi+1) + T
′
i −
βi
β(N)
n∑
k=1
T ′k = X
′
i .
The third equality uses the fact that the job of player i and the job of player i + 1 have the
same urgency. In the same way it can be proved that Xi+1 and X ′i+1 coincide. 2
So, in case a processing situation admits more than one optimal order, the contribution to
the total costs by the players, according to the core allocation given in (5), is independent of
which optimal schedule is chosen. Because of this result, the allocation X , given in (5), can
be considered to be continuous in α, β and p. It is clear that it is continuous at points with just
one optimal order. Proposition 6.5 shows that it is also continuous in points (α, β, p) which
generate more than one optimal order. As a result, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6.6. The core allocation X , given in (5), is continuous in α, β and p. 2
6.4 Proof of Theorem 6.4
Let us first give an outline of the proof. The idea is to construct from a given processing
situation, a Debreu-type of exchange economy with land (Debreu (1959), see also Debreu
(1983)) and find a price equilibrium. Similarly as in Chapter 3, we derive a TU-game from
this economy. This TU-game will be proven to be equivalent to the cost-game of the pro-
cessing situation and as a result, the price equilibrium of the economy can be converted into
a core allocation of the processing game. A similar technique has been used in Klijn, Tijs
and Hamers (2000) to construct core elements of permutation games. Let us make this more
formal.
An (initially) empty agenda is given. It will be a two-dimensional commodity. Of course
time is one dimension, the other one is effort per time unit. In principle, there is no time
restriction. The amount of effort per time unit is bounded by the capacity β(N) of the grand
coalition. At each moment of time, each player can buy any (measurable) part of the capacity
available. Because of the two dimensions, it is customary to speak of land rather than of an
agenda. Therefore, we are in fact dealing with exchange economies with land (see e.g., Legut,
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Potters and Tijs (1994)). In order to complete their jobs, players must make reservations in
the agenda. Only if a player books a block of time and effort per time unit sufficiently
large to process his job, it will be completed. A price is chosen such that the market clears,
i.e., no part of the agenda is booked by more than one player. This gives rise to a feasible
schedule F ∈ F . Players are endowed with a part of the agenda proportionally to their
capacities. Each player receives the revenues of his endowment. Clearing the market will
lead to a price equilibrium. This Walrasian equilibrium can be converted into a core element
of the processing game which will end the proof. The core allocation is stated right after
Theorem 6.4. We have not found a direct proof (by plugging it into the core inequalities).
Let P be a processing situation. Throughout this section we assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that N = {1, . . . , n} such that α1
p1
≥ · · · ≥ αn
pn
. Consider the exchange economy with
land E(P) := 〈N, {L,B, λ}, (Ai, Vi)i∈N 〉 in which:
• A commodity modeled by a measured space {L,B, λ} has to be reallocated among the
group of players N . Here, L := [0, β(N)]×R+ denotes a piece of land, B is the Borel-σ-
algebra of L and λ : B −→ R+ denotes the Lebesgue-measure on L,
• Each player i ∈ N has an initial endowment Ai := [βi] × R+ in which [βi] denotes the
interval [
∑
k<i βi,
∑
k≤i βi]. Observe that
⋃
i∈NAi = L and λ(Ai ∩ Ak) = 0 whenever
i 6= k,
• Each player i ∈ N has a reservation value Vi(B) for all sets B ∈ B defined by
Vi(B) := −αi · Ti(B).
Here, Ti(B) := inf{t ∈ R+ |
∫ t
0
∫ β(N)
0 1B(x, τ) dxdτ ≥ pi} in which 1B : L −→ {0, 1}
is the indicator-function of set B ∈ B (i.e., 1B(x, τ) = 1 if and only if (x, τ) ∈ B).
So, Ti(B) denotes the moment of time at which the job of player i will be finished (the
completion-time) in the case part B of the land (or agenda) is booked to work on his job.
In case subset B is not sufficient, Ti(B) equals infinity,
• Player i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function Ui : B × R −→ R that denotes his valua-
tion for bundles consisting of (pieces) of land and an amount of money. It is defined by
Ui(B, x) := Vi(B) + x for all B ∈ B and x ∈ R.
Similarly, as in Section 3.2, we define an S-reallocation, a (strong) improvement and we
associate a TU-game with the exchange economy E(P).
Let S ⊆ N . An S-redistribution is a list (Bi)i∈S of λ-measurable subsets of L with⋃
i∈SBi ⊆
⋃
i∈SAi and λ(Bi∩Bk) = 0 whenever i 6= k. Let (Bi)i∈S be an S-redistribution
and x ∈ RS a vector such that
∑
i∈S xi = 0. Then (Bi, xi)i∈S is an S-reallocation.
Let (Bi, xi)i∈N be an N -reallocation and let S ⊆ N be non-empty. Then an S-reallocation
(Ci, yi)i∈S is an improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N if Vi(Ci) + yi > Vi(Bi) + xi for all i ∈ S.
An N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N is a core reallocation if no coalition S has an improvement
upon (Bi, xi)i∈N .
Given an exchange economy with land E(P) we define the TU-game 〈N, vE(P)〉 by
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vE(P)(S) := sup{
∑
i∈S
Vi(Ci) | (Ci)i∈S is an S-redistribution} for all S ⊆ N.
The TU-game 〈N, vE(P)〉 is in fact the TU-game 〈N,−cP〉, as the following lemma demon-
strates.
Lemma 6.7. vE(P)(S) = −cP(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Proof. Take S ⊆ N , say S := {i(1), . . . , i(s)} with i(1) < . . . < i(s). Define for all k with
1 ≤ k ≤ s,
Bk :=
⋃
i∈S
[βi] ×
1
β(S) ·[pi(k)],
in which [pi(k)] denotes the interval [
∑
`<k pi(`),
∑
`≤k pi(`)] with length pi(k). Clearly,
(Bk)1≤k≤s is an S-redistribution. It can be interpreted as a feasible schedule for the play-
ers in S to complete their jobs, i.e., during the interval [pi(k)] the capacity β(S) is used to
complete the job of player i(k). In fact, we have,
vE(P)(S) ≥
s∑
k=1
Vi(k)(Bk) = −
s∑
k=1
αi(k) ·Ti(k)(Bk)
= −
s∑
k=1
αi(k)
β(S) ·(pi(1) + . . . + pi(k)) = − cP(S).
So, cP(S) ≥ −vE(P)(S). However, due to the optimality of cP(S), the converse of this
inequality also holds. Hence, cP(S) = −vE(P)(S). 2
Next, we recall the concept of a price equilibrium (see also Section 3.4).
Definition. An N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N is a price equilibrium if there exists a price den-
sity function, i.e., a measurable function pi : L −→ R (pi 6= 0) such that
(i) Ppi(Bi) + xi = Ppi(Ai) for all i ∈ N , (budget constraints)
(ii) If Vi(C) + y > Vi(Bi) + xi for a certain C ⊆ L, y ∈ R and i ∈ N ,
then Ppi(C) + y > Ppi(Ai), (maximality conditions)
in which Ppi(B) :=
∫∞
0
∫ β(N)
0 1B(x, t)·pi(x, t) dxdt for all B ⊆ L. ◦
In this definition of a price equilibrium, the price density function can be understood as the
map which assigns to each point (x, t) in L its price. Therefore, the price of a piece of
land B ⊆ L equals the total price of all points contained in this land B which results in the
definition of Ppi(B) above.
The following lemma gives us a relation between the existence of a price equilibrium in the
exchange economy E(P) and the non-emptiness of the core of the TU-game 〈N,−cP〉.
Lemma 6.8. If (Bi, xi)i∈N is a price equilibrium in E(P) , then (Vi(Bi) + xi)i∈N ∈ RN
is a core allocation of the TU-game 〈N,−cP〉.
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Proof. Let (Bi, xi)i∈N be a price equilibrium supported by the price density function pi :
L −→ R. We prove that the vector (Vi(Bi) + xi)i∈N is contained in the core C(−cP) of the
TU-game 〈N,−cP〉.
Suppose there exists a coalition S ⊆ N such that∑
i∈S
(Vi(Bi) + xi) < −cP(S).
Let (Ci)i∈S be an S-redistribution such that vE(P)(S) =
∑
i∈S Vi(Ci). Due to Lemma 6.7,
we have that −cP(S) =
∑
i∈S Vi(Ci). Define ε :=
1
|S|
∑
i∈S(Vi(Ci)− Vi(Bi)− xi), then
ε > 0. Furthermore, define for all i ∈ S,
yi := Vi(Bi) + xi − Vi(Ci) + ε.
Then the S-reallocation (Ci, yi)i∈S is an improvement upon (Bi, xi)i∈N . Therefore, accord-
ing to the maximality conditions, this yields that
Ppi(Ci) + yi > Ppi(Ai) for all i ∈ S.
Taking the sum over all i in S yields the desired contradiction. 2
So, the existence of a price equilibrium in E(P) implies balancedness of the TU-game
〈N,−cP〉 and thus also balancedness of the cost-game 〈N, cP〉. Therefore, the proof of
Theorem 6.4 boils down to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.9. The exchange economy with land E(P) has a price equilibrium.
Proof. Denote [pi] as the interval [
∑
k<i pk,
∑
k≤i pk] with length pi for all i ∈ N and define
µ(t) :=
{ αi
pi
if t ∈ 1
β(N) ·[pi]
0 if t ≥ 1
β(N) ·
∑
k∈N
pk.
Observe that µ : R+ −→ R+ is weakly decreasing. Let (Bi)i∈N be the N -redistribution
defined by
Bi := [0, β(N)] ×
1
β(N) ·[pi] for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore, we define the price density function pi : L −→ R by
pi(x, t) :=
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ)dτ.
We prove that the N -redistribution (Bi)i∈N can be extended to a price equilibrium supported
by this price density function. To do so, we first need to calculate the prices of Ai and Bi,
respectively.
Let us first calculate for every i ∈ N the price of Bi. Take i ∈ N , then
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Ppi(Bi) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ β(N)
0
1Bi(x, t)·pi(x, t) dxdt =
∫
[pi]
β(N)
∫ β(N)
0
pi(x, t) dxdt
=
∫
[pi]
β(N)
∫ β(N)
0
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ) dτdxdt = β(N)
∫
[pi]
β(N)
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ) dτdt.
Note that∫
[pi]
β(N)
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ) dτdt =
∫
[pi]
β(N)
(∫ 1
β(N)
P
k≤i
pk
t
µ(τ) dτ +
n∑
k=i+1
∫
[pk]
β(N)
µ(τ) dτ
)
dt
=
∫
[pi]
β(N)
αi
pi
·
(
1
β(N)
∑
k≤i
pk − t
)
dt +
∫
[pi]
β(N)
n∑
k=i+1
αk
β(N) dt
=
∣∣∣− 12 · αipi ·( 1β(N) ∑
k≤i
pk − t
)2 ∣∣∣
t∈
[pi]
β(N)
+ pi
β(N)
n∑
k=i+1
αk
β(N)
= 12 ·
1
β(N)2 ·
αi
pi
·(pi)
2 + pi
β(N)2 ·(αi+1 + . . . + αn)
= pi
β(N)2 · (
1
2 ·αi + αi+1 + . . . + αn). (6)
Hence, from equation (6) it follows that for all i ∈ N ,
Ppi(Bi) = β(N)
∫
[pi]
β(N)
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ) dτdt = pi
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αi + αi+1 + . . . + αn) = Ti.
So, for every i ∈ N the price of Bi equals the tax deposit Ti. Similarly, it can be derived that
for every i ∈ N the price of Ai equals the subsidy Si of player i. Indeed,
Ppi(Ai) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ β(N)
0
1Ai(x, t)·pi(x, t) dxdt
=
∫ ∞
0
∫
[βi]
pi(x, t) dxdt
= βi
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ) dτdt
= βi
∑
k∈N
∫
[pk]
β(N)
∫ ∞
t
µ(τ) dτdt
= βi
∑
k∈N
pk
β(N)2 ·(
1
2 ·αk + αk+1 + . . . + αn)
= βi
β(N) ·
∑
k∈N
Tk.
The fifth equality can be derived exactly along the lines of equation (6). Define for all i ∈ N ,
xi := Ppi(Ai) − Ppi(Bi) =
βi
β(N) ·
∑
k∈N
Tk − Ti.
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Then (Bi, xi)i∈N is an N -reallocation which clearly satisfies the budget constraints with
respect to the price density pi : L −→ R. Next, we prove that the maximality conditions are
also satisfied. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists C ⊆ L, y ∈ R and i ∈ N such
that
Vi(C) + y > Vi(Bi) + xi and Ppi(C) + y ≤ Ppi(Ai). (7)
The reservation value Vi(C) is, by definition, finite only if there exists a number t > 0 such
that
∫ t
0
∫ β(N)
0 1C(x, τ) dxdτ ≥ pi. Let t > 0 such that Vi(C) = −αi · t. Since the price
density function pi : (x, s) 7−→ pi(x, s) does not depend on x and is decreasing in s, we may
assume without loss of generality that C equals Ct := [0, β(N)] × [t− piβ(N) , t]. Indeed, the
λ-measurable set Ct is the cheapest piece of land with reservation value −αi ·t. In this case,
because Ppi(Ai) = Ppi(Bi) + xi, the two inequalities in (7) yield,
Vi(Ct)− Ppi(Ct) ≥ Vi(Ct) + y − Ppi(Ai)
= Vi(Ct) + y − Ppi(Bi)− xi
> Vi(Bi) + xi − Ppi(Bi)− xi = Vi(Bi)− Ppi(Bi).
Hence,
Vi(Ct)− Ppi(Ct) > Vi(Bi)− Ppi(Bi). (8)
Next, we prove that inequality (8) cannot hold. To do so, we define the function f : R+ −→
R by
f(t) := Vi(Ct)− Ppi(Ct) = −αi ·t − β(N)
∫ t
t−
pi
β(N)
∫ ∞
τ
µ(ζ)dζdτ
and compute its maximum value. Observe that f is differentiable on R+ and
f ′(t) = −αi − β(N)·
(∫ ∞
t
µ(ζ)dζ −
∫ ∞
t−
pi
β(N)
µ(ζ)dζ
)
= −αi + β(N)
∫ t
t−
pi
β(N)
µ(ζ)dζ.
Hence, f ′ is also differentiable on R+ and f ′′(t) = β(N) ·
(
µ(t)−µ(t− pi
β(N))
)
≤ 0. This
inequality follows from the fact that µ : R+ −→ R+ is weakly decreasing. So, f is a concave
function. Therefore, its maximal value is taken in t whenever f ′(t) = 0. If t := 1
β(N)
∑
k≤i
pk,
then
f ′(t) = −αi + β(N)
∫
[pi]
β(N)
µ(ζ)dζ = −αi + β(N) · piβ(N) ·
αi
pi
= 0.
Hence, f takes its maximal value in the point t = 1
β(N)
∑
k≤i
pk and thus
f(t) ≤ f( 1
β(N)
∑
k≤i
pk) = Vi(Bi)− Ppi(Bi) for all t ∈ R+.
This contradicts inequality (8) and thus we conclude that the N -reallocation (Bi, xi)i∈N is a
price equilibrium supported by the price density function pi. 2
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The proof of Theorem 6.4 is now straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. Because the exchange economy with land E(P) has a price equilib-
rium, the TU-game 〈N,−cP〉 has according to Lemma 6.8 a non-empty core. This means
there exists a vector y ∈ RN such that y(N) = −cP(N) and y(S) ≥ −cP(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Equivalently, there exists a vector y′ ∈ RN such that y′(N) = cP(N) and y′(S) ≤ cP(S)
for all S ⊆ N . Hence, the cost-game 〈N, cP〉 is balanced.
The reason for the cost-game 〈N, cP〉 to be totally balanced, is the fact that the processing
game restricted to a coalition S ⊆ N is again a processing game and thus balanced.
According to Lemma 6.8, the vector − (Vi(Bi) + xi)i∈N in which Bi ⊆ L and xi ∈ R are
defined for all i ∈ N as in the proof of Proposition 6.9, is a core allocation in the cost-game
〈N, cP〉. Elaborating this expression provides the core allocation X ∈ C(cP) stated below
Theorem 6.4. 2
6.5 Final remarks
We conclude this chapter with the following three remarks.
Remark. In the previous section it is illustrated that the proposed core allocation X , stated
below Theorem 6.4, is derived from a price equilibrium. In Section 3.4 it is shown that a price
equilibrium is not a game-theoretical solution concept. This seems to imply that our proposed
core allocation X , stated below Theorem 6.4, is also not a game-theoretical solution, i.e., it
is a solution for processing situations, not for processing games. This is indeed the case, as
we now demonstrate.
Let N := {1, 2} and J := {j1, j2}. We construct two processing situations P and P ′,
respectively. The first one is defined by 〈N, J, p, α, β〉 with p := (2, 16), α := (24, 8) and
β := (1, 1) and the second one is defined as 〈N, J, p′, α′, β′〉with p′ := (4, 8), α′ := (24, 16)
and β′ := (2, 1). It is not difficult to verify that both processing situations yield the same
cost-game 〈N, c〉 given by:
c(N) = 12 ·
(
24·2 + 8·18
)
= 13 ·
(
24·4 + 16·12
)
= 96,
c({1}) = 48 and c({2}) = 128.
However, the contribution to the total costs by the players according to the core allocation,
stated just after Theorem 6.4, is different for both processing situations. For P this cost-
allocation equals
X = (24 + 20− 26 , 72 + 32− 26) = (18 , 78)
and for P ′ it equals
X ′ = (32 + 37 13 − 39
1
9 , 64 + 21
1
3 − 19
5
9 ) = (30
2
9 , 65
7
9 ).
Hence, the proposed core allocation below Theorem 6.4 is not a game-theoretical solution.
However, it still has the appealing property that it is independent on which optimal order is
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chosen to process the jobs (Proposition 6.5). A property which is clearly satisfied by every
game-theoretical solution concept, since the costs of a coalition is of course the same in any
optimal order. ◦
Next, we look at two classes of cost-games which can be proven to be totally balanced using
Theorem 6.4.
Remark. The following two classes of cost-games are totally balanced:
(i) Let N be a set of players, with |N | := n, and let β ∈ RN+ . Then the cost-game 〈N, c〉
defined by
c(S) := 1
β(S) ·|S|·(|S|+ 1) for all S ⊆ N
is totally balanced. This statement follows from Theorem 6.4 combined with the fact that
the processing game 〈N, cP 〉 derived from the processing situation P := 〈N, J, p, α, β〉 with
pj = 1 and αj = 1 for all j ∈ J is, according to Proposition 6.2, given by cP(S) := 12 ·c(S)
for all coalitions S ⊆ N . As a result, the allocation X ∈ RN defined by
Xi :=
1
β(N) · ( 2·n + 1 − βi ·
n2
β(N) ) for all i ∈ N
is contained in the core C(c).
(ii) Let N := {1, . . . , n} be a set of players and α ∈ RN+ be a vector such that α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn.
Then the cost-game 〈N, c〉 defined by
c(S) := 1
s
·(1·αi(1) + 2·αi(2) + . . . + s·αi(s)) whenever S = {i(1), . . . , i(s)}
is totally balanced. This statement follows again from Theorem 6.4 in combination with the
fact that, according to Proposition 6.2, this cost-game is the processing game 〈N, cP〉 derived
from the processing situation P := 〈N, J, p, α, β〉 with pi = 1 and βi = 1 for all i ∈ N . As
a result, the allocation X ∈ RN defined by
Xi :=
1
n
·αi ·
i·(i+1)
2 +
1
n
·( 12 ·αi +
n∑
k=i+1
αk)−
1
n2
n∑
i=1
( 12 ·αi +
n∑
k=i+1
αk) for all i ∈ N
is contained in the core C(c). ◦
The final remark discusses a generalization of a processing situation.
Remark. Initially, in a processing situation we assume that each player has to complete
exactly one job. In Quant et al. (2004) a generalization is studied in which each player,
again endowed with an individual capacity, has to complete several jobs. Again, each job
requires a certain processing demand. Moreover, each player now may have interest in the
completion of more than one job and the degrees of interest may vary among the agents.
More particularly, the cost-coefficient does not only depend on the jobs, but also on the
players. Formally, a processing situation with shared interest can be described by a tuple
〈N, J, (pj)j∈J , (αij)[i∈N,j∈J], (βi)i∈N 〉.
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Again N is a finite set of players and J is a finite set of jobs. The cardinalities of N and J
may differ. Player i ∈ N is endowed with a capacity of βi > 0 to complete jobs. Job j ∈ J
has processing demand pj ∈ R+ and during the time job j is uncompleted, it generates a
cost αij ∈ R+ per time unit for player i ∈ N . So, the cost-coefficient does not only depend
on the job, but also on the player. Analogous, to the original setting, a coalition S ⊆ N of
cooperating players faces a processing problem. In this case they face the processing problem
〈J, (pj)j∈J , (αSj)j∈J , β(S)〉,
in which αSj :=
∑
i∈S αij for all j ∈ J and β(S) :=
∑
i∈S βi. As a result, one can
construct a cooperative cost-game, in which the costs for a coalition equal the minimal costs
of its corresponding processing problem. These cost-games are also totally balanced.
Let αNj :=
∑
i∈N αij for all j ∈ J and assume that the jobs in J := {1, . . . , m} are ordered
such that
αN1
p1
≥ · · · ≥ αNm
pm
.
Furthermore, define for each job j ∈ J ,
pij :=
pj
β(N) ·(
1
2 ·αNj +
m∑
k=j+1
αNk).
Then the vector X ∈ RN given by
Xi :=
∑
j∈J
αij ·
( j∑
k=1
pj
β(N) +
pij
αNj
)
− βi
β(N)
∑
j∈J
pij for all i ∈ N,
is a core allocation of the cost-game derived from the processing situation with shared inter-
est. A proof of this statement which uses Theorem 6.4 can be found in Quant et al. (2004).
So, also this class of cost-games is totally balanced. Furthermore, this core allocation turns
out still to be independent from the optimal order chosen (if there are several). So, Corol-
lary 6.6 remains valid for this core allocation.
Observe, that in case the cardinalities of N and J coincide and that for every i ∈ N there
exists exactly one j ∈ J such that αij 6= 0, we are dealing with a processing situation in
the original setting. In this case, the described core element above coincides with the core
element given in Section 6.3 for a processing game in the original setting. ◦
7
Dynamic Selection in Normal-Form Games
7.1 Introduction
The final chapter of this thesis deals with Non-cooperative Game Theory. It investigates
for n-person normal-form games the convergence to Nash-equilibria and stability of Nash-
equilibria for a class of dynamic selection processes which are defined by a set of (ordinary)
differential equations. Most of the results in the chapter can also be found in Meertens, Potters
and Reijnierse (2006a).
The best-known and extensively used solution concept of non-cooperative game theory isthe Nash-equilibrium (Nash (1950)). It is the benchmark theoretical solution for strate-
gic interactions among a number of players in a non-cooperative environment. A Nash-
equilibrium can be seen as an agreement which tells every player, involved in the conflict, ex-
actly what to do, in such a way that none of the players has an incentive to deviate unilaterally
from it. However, it does not give insight on how players come to play a Nash-equilibrium.
Moreover, the multiplicity of Nash-equilibria gives rise to the question which equilibrium is
more likely to be played if a non-cooperative game has more than one Nash-equilibrium. In
an attempt to answer both questions researchers started to investigate alternative foundations
of Nash-equilibria. One of these alternative foundations are evolutionary explanations. This
approach was motivated by the work of biologists in evolutionary game theory (in particular,
the work of Maynard Smith and Price (1973), see also Maynard Smith (1982)). Instead of
asking whether players are rational in some well-defined sense, people ask whether an evolu-
tionary selection process has a tendency towards a Nash-equilibrium. Moreover, if a selection
process has such a tendency, the question ‘towards which Nash-equilibrium’ can be studied.
An approach to formalize the idea above is the following. Each player in the game is replaced
by an uncountable large population. Within every population there are a finite number of
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sets of individuals representing a certain pure strategy of the player, i.e., the individuals in
such a set are ‘programmed’ to use the same pure strategy of the player whose role they
play. Furthermore, the payoff to an individual is assumed to represent fitness, expressed
by the number of offspring. So, more successful individuals get more offspring than less
successful individuals. Because it is assumed that the offspring of an individual inherits
its single parent’s strategy, the measure of each set of individuals, representing a certain
pure strategy of the player, will change within each generation. This means that over time
the relative measure of each set of individuals in every population, and thereby the strategy
distribution in every population, changes according to some dynamic selection process.
In the literature several dynamic selection processes can be found. Let us recall some of
them. One of the dynamics studied most extensively in evolutionary game theory is the
so-called replicator dynamics (see e.g., Taylor (1979), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), Fried-
man (1991), Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Swinkels (1993), Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)).
Other dynamic selection processes closely related to the replicator dynamics are aggregate
monotonic dynamics (Samuelson and Zhang (1992)), sign-preserving dynamics (Ritzberger
and Weibull (1995)) and monotonic dynamics (Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)). Each of these
selection processes are defined by a set of (ordinary) differential equations on the polyhedron
of mixed strategy profiles. They all have the following two properties in common:
(i) Extinct strategies stay extinct forever. If the set of individuals in a population playing a
certain pure strategy has measure zero, it will keep measure zero in the next generations,
(ii) Every Nash-equilibrium is a rest-point of the set of differential equations. If the strat-
egy distribution in each population is according to a Nash-equilibrium, this distribution
will remain the same in the next generations. However, the converse is not true. This
means that the dynamic selection process can get ‘stuck’ in a point which is not a Nash-
equilibrium. In fact, for each of these dynamics every pure strategy profile is a rest-point.
More recently, dynamic selection processes are studied which are based on Nash’s proofs for
the existence of Nash-equilibria (Nash (1950), Nash (1951)). An example of such a dynamic
selection process is the so-called Brown-Von Neumann-Nash dynamics (see e.g., Berger and
Hofbauer (2000), Hofbauer (2000), Sandholm (2001)). Its name is derived from the fact that
this dynamic selection process is based on the iteration map used by Nash (1951) and from
the fact that even earlier Brown and Von Neumann (1950) applied this dynamic selection
process in the case of symmetric zero-sum games, for proving the existence of the value for
such games. In this chapter we investigate a class of dynamics which include the Brown-
Von Neumann-Nash dynamics. This class of dynamics is also defined by a set of (ordinary)
differential equations on the polyhedron of mixed strategy profiles and since they are also
based on Nash’s iteration map, they all have the attractive property that only Nash-equilibria
are rest-points. This implies that if these dynamics converge, the limit is a Nash-equilibrium.
We define these dynamic selection processes by so-called regret-functions. These functions
measure the ‘regret’ of a player of not having played a certain pure strategy. By letting the
measure of a set of individuals, representing a certain pure strategy of a player, grow over time
according to some positive function of its regret, we obtain the dynamics investigated in this
chapter. As the regret of a pure strategy can be positive even if the weight on this pure strategy
is equal to zero, extinct strategies do not have to stay extinct forever. That is, even if the set of
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individuals in a population playing a certain pure strategy has measure zero, it is possible that
in the next generation it has a positive measure. An interpretation could be that ‘mutations’
prosper in the offspring. On the other hand, if the regret of a pure strategy is positive, it
does not imply that the weight on this pure strategy will increase. So, even if a certain pure
strategy is successful in a generation, the relative measure of the set of individuals playing
this pure strategy can become smaller within the next generation. The reason is that there
are already too many individuals in the population playing this (successful) pure strategy. An
interpretation could be that these individuals ‘hamper’ each other, i.e., they ‘suffer’ from their
own success.
Our main goal is to investigate whether these dynamics converge towards the set of Nash-
equilibria only, i.e., if every limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria. In general this
is not the case. This follows from a recent result by Hart and Mas-Colell (2003). However, for
(two-person) zero-sum games (and strategic equivalent games) every limit set of the dynamics
studied in this chapter consists of Nash-equilibria only. Since, this class of dynamics includes
the Brown-Von Neumann-Nash dynamics this result generalizes the classic result by Brown
and Von Neumann (1950) to the asymmetric case. Furthermore, it implies that the (unique)
Nash-component of a zero-sum game is asymptotically stable and that a zero-sum game has
an asymptotically stable Nash-equilibrium if and only if it has a unique Nash-equilibrium.
Furthermore, on the class of (n-person) potential games (Monderer and Shapley (1996))
every limit set of the dynamics is also a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria and the results of
Sandholm (2001) tell us that only strict Nash-equilibria are asymptotically stable.
From the results about stability, it follows that many normal-form games do not possess an
asymptotically stable Nash-equilibrium. Of course, this is due to the fact that an asymptoti-
cally stable strategy profile must be isolated in the space of rest-points. In fact, one can show
that the smallest possible asymptotically stable set of Nash-equilibria is a connected compo-
nent in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). This problem is already pointed out by
Swinkels (1993). Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) even conclude:
“Hence, the connection between evolutionary selection in n-player games and
Nash equilibrium is weaker than it may f irst appear” (page 1372–1373).
Therefore, the attention in evolutionary selection dynamics shifted towards connected compo-
nents of Nash-equilibria (see e.g., Ritzberger and Weibull (1995), Demichelis and Ritzberger
(2000), Demichelis and Germano (2002)). Nevertheless, although such a connected compo-
nent may be asymptotically stable it does not imply that every strategy profile within this
component is contained in the limit set of some (starting) profile outside the component.
Differently, the dynamics may select only a proper subset of this connected component, but
the concept of asymptotic stability is not able to distinguish between this set and the con-
nected component. Hence, it cannot precisely predict which Nash-equilibria will be selected
by the dynamics. Therefore, it seems that the concept of asymptotic stability may be a too
demanding stability concept for evolutionary selection dynamics. To emphasize this point,
we give an example of a potential game for which the (unique) connected component of the
set of Nash-equilibria is asymptotically stable, but for a class of dynamics every limit set of
a strategy profile consists of one and the same Nash-equilibrium.
We start by giving the formal defintion of a normal-form game and of the Nash-equilibrium.
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7.2 Normal-form games
7.2.1 Preliminaries
Non-cooperative game theory has become a standard tool in modeling conflict situations
between rational players. The basic model in non-cooperative game theory is the finite n-
person game in normal-form.
Let Γ be a finite n-person normal-form game with player set N . Each player i ∈ N has
a (non-empty) set Si consisting of Ki pure strategies ski , 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki. We define S :=∏
i∈N Si as the set of pure strategy profiles s = (s
k1
1 , . . . , s
kn
n ). When playing the game,
each player i ∈ N chooses, without telling the other players, a pure strategy ski ∈ Si to his
disposal and by doing so, each player i ∈ N receives a payoff (or utility) Ui : S −→ R.
Furthermore, we allow that players randomize over their pure strategies, meaning that for
each player i ∈ N we extend the set of pure strategies Si to the set of mixed strategies ∆i :=
{σi ∈ R
Ki
+ |
∑Ki
k=1 σ
k
i = 1}, i.e., σki is the weight player i ∈ N puts on the pure strategy ski .
By identifying each pure strategy ski ∈ Si with the corresponding unit vector eki ∈ ∆i for all
i ∈ N , the set of pure strategies Si can be identified with the set of vertices of ∆i. We define
∆ :=
∏
i∈N ∆i as the polyhedron of mixed strategy profiles σ = (σ1, . . . , σn). If σ ∈ ∆ is a
strategy profile, then σ−i ∈ ∆−i is the strategy profile (σj)j 6=i. Furthermore, we extend the
payoff function Ui : S −→ R of player i ∈ N to the multilinear (expected) payoff function
Ui : ∆ −→ R which is defined in the usual manner, i.e.,
Ui(σ) :=
∑
(s
k1
1 ,...,s
kn
n )∈S
( ∏
j∈N
σ
kj
j
)
Ui(s
k1
1 , . . . , s
kn
n ) for all i ∈ N.
Hence, a normal-form game Γ is characterized by the tuple 〈N, (∆i)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N 〉.
Because of the rationality of the players in the normal-form game Γ, a player i ∈ N always
tries to maximize his payoff Ui : ∆ −→ R, given the strategies of the other players. In
other words, given the strategies of the other players, player i tries to find a best reply to the
strategies of his opponents. Let us introduce some notations in this context.
For player i ∈ N a strategy σi ∈ ∆i is a best reply of player i to σ−i ∈ ∆−i if
Ui(σ−i, σi) ≥ Ui(σ−i, σˆi) for all σˆi ∈ ∆i.
The set of best replies of player i ∈ N to σ−i ∈ ∆−i is denoted by βi(σ−i). The correspon-
dence β : ∆− ∆ for all σ ∈ ∆ defined by
β(σ) :=
∏
i∈N
βi(σ−i)
is the best reply correspondence of Γ. For player i ∈ N a pure strategy ski ∈ Si is a pure
best reply of player i to σ−i ∈ ∆−i if ski ∈ βi(σ−i). The set of all pure best replies of player
i ∈ N to σ−i ∈ ∆−i is denoted by PBi(σ−i). For every strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ we define
PB(σ) :=
∏
i∈N
PBi(σ−i) as the set of pure best replies to σ.
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For a player i ∈ N and strategy σi ∈ ∆i the carrier of σi is defined by
C(σi) := {s
k
i ∈ Si | σ
k
i > 0}.
The carrier of σ ∈ ∆ is defined as C(σ) :=
n∏
i=1
C(σi).
7.2.2 The Nash-equilibrium
Probably the most famous and extensively studied solution concept for normal-form games
is introduced by Nash (1950).
Definition (Nash (1950)). Let Γ := 〈N, (∆i)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N 〉 be a normal-form game. A
strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is a Nash-equilibrium, if for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(σ−i, σi) ≥ Ui(σ−i, σˆi) for every σˆi ∈ ∆i.
We denote NE(Γ) as the set of Nash-equilibria of Γ. ◦
So, a Nash-equilibrium is an equilibrium in the sense that it does not allow for an unilat-
eral improvement by any of the players. Nash (1951) proves that normal-form games have
Nash-equilibria. To be complete, we also give a proof for the existence of Nash-equilibria
in normal-form games. To do so, we define so-called regret-functions of pure strategies.
These functions measure the ‘regret’ of a player of not having played a certain pure strategy,
expressed in the player’s payoff.
Definition. Let σ ∈ ∆ be a strategy profile. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N we define the
regret-function of pure strategy ski ∈ Si by
Rki (σ) := [Ui(σ−i, s
k
i )− Ui(σ−i, σi)]+.
Recall that [a]+ denotes max{a, 0}. ◦
Via the regret-functions and the fixed-point theorem of Brouwer (Brouwer (1912)) one can
prove the existence of Nash-equilibria in normal-form games.
Theorem 7.1 (Nash (1951)). For every normal-form game Γ the set of Nash-equilibria
NE(Γ) is non-empty.
Proof. Let Γ be a normal-form game and take σ ∈ ∆. Define for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N ,
Rki (σ) :=
Rki (σ) + σ
k
i∑Ki
`=1 R
`
i (σ) + 1
.
Note that Rki (σ) ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N and note that
∑Ki
k=1R
k
i (σ) = 1 for all
i ∈ N . Define the map R : ∆ −→ ∆ by
σ 7−→
((
Rk1(σ)
)
[1≤k≤K1]
, . . . ,
(
Rkn(σ)
)
[1≤k≤Kn]
)
.
The mapR is a continuous map of a compact and convex set into itself. Therefore, according
to the theorem of Brouwer it has a fixed point. We prove that such a fixed point is a Nash-
equilibrium.
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Let σ ∈ ∆ be a fixed point of the map R, i.e., σki = Rki (σ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N .
Writing out this expression yields,
Rki (σ) = σ
k
i ·
Ki∑
`=1
R`i (σ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N.
Suppose
∑Ki
`=1 R
`
i (σ) > 0 for some i ∈ N . Then
∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
σki ·R
k
i (σ) =
∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
(σki )
2 ·
Ki∑
`=1
R`i (σ) > 0.
But, because σki > 0 ⇔ Rki (σ) > 0, we also have, by the multilinearity of Ui,∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
σki ·R
k
i (σ) =
∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
σki · [Ui(σ−i, s
k
i )− Ui(σ−i, σi)] = 0.
Contradiction. Hence,
∑Ki
`=1 R
`
i (σ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and therefore Rki (σ) = 0 for all
1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N . This means that Ui(σ−i, σi) ≥ Ui(σ−i, ski ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and
i ∈ N . Therefore, by multilinearity of the payoff functions, it follows that for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(σ−i, σi) ≥ Ui(σ−i, σˆi) for every σˆi ∈ ∆i.
Hence, σ is a Nash-equilibrium. 2
The proof of Theorem 7.1 demonstrates that in every fixed point σ of the map R : ∆ −→ ∆
the regret Rki (σ) of pure strategy ski is zero for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N which, in turn,
implies that σ is a Nash-equilibrium. Observe that the converse of this statement is also true.
In fact, it is straightforward to verify the following result.
Corollary 7.2. Let Γ be a normal-form game. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) σ is a Nash-equilibrium of Γ,
(ii) σ ∈ β(σ),
(iii) C(σ) ⊆ PB(σ),
(iv) σ is a fixed point of the map R : ∆ −→ ∆,
(v) Rki (σ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N . 2
So, the set of Nash-equilibria of a normal-form game Γ is non-empty. Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986) prove that the set of Nash-equilibria NE(Γ) is the union of finitely many disjoint,
closed and connected sets, called connected components. Such a connected componentK of
NE(Γ) is maximal in the sense that there is no closed and connected subset of NE(Γ) that
properly contains K.
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7.3 Evolution and the Nash-equilibrium
After a Nash-equilibrium is played, it follows from the rationality of the players that no player
has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from it. Indeed, if a player i ∈ N plays strategy
σi ∈ ∆i as his part of the Nash-equilibrium σ ∈ ∆, then σi is a best reply to σ−i. This
property of Nash-equilibria is known as self-enforcingness. So, looking back, each player
may be content with the Nash-equilibrium as an outcome, since a player cannot improve
from it by himself. However, it does not answer the question:
(i) ‘How players come to play a Nash-equilibrium?’
In applying the concept of the Nash-equilibrium, game theorists became aware of a serious
drawback of the Nash-equilibrium, namely, the multiplicity of Nash-equilibria in a given
normal-form game and the inconsistency of many Nash-equilibria with the intuitive notion
about what an equilibrium of the game should be. For instance, it is possible that in a Nash-
equilibrium players use weakly dominated strategies which from a strategic point of view can
be considered to be unreasonable. Therefore, these Nash-equilibria are not convincing as an
outcome of the game. This observation was in the 1970’s the starting point of the theory of
refinements, i.e., the theory to distinguish between several Nash-equilibria by putting more
requirements on the original concept of this equilibrium. Several results have been obtained
along this line of research and eventually it culminated into the work of Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986), but not before several refinements had been introduced. Here we recall some of
them, the ones which we use later on in this chapter. For a more complete overview of the
refinements of Nash-equilibria, the reader is referred to Van Damme (1991).
The notion of a perfect Nash-equilibrium has been introduced by Selten in 1975 and is one
of the most basic results in the theory of Nash-equilibrium refinements. A strategy profile
σ ∈ ∆ is completely mixed if σki > 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N .
Definition (Selten (1975)). A Nash-equilibrium σ is perfect if there exists a sequence of
completely mixed strategy profiles {σm}m∈N such that
lim
m→∞
σm = σ and σ ∈ β(σm) for all m ∈ N ◦
From the definition it follows immediately that any Nash-equilibrium with completely mixed
strategies is a perfect Nash-equilibrium. Indeed, if σ is completely mixed, one can choose
σm = σ for all m ∈ N. Furthermore, Selten (1975) proves that every normal-from game
has at least one perfect Nash-equilibrium. An other more demanding refinement of the Nash-
equilibrium is the concept of strictness.
Definition. A Nash-equilibrium σ is strict if β(σ) = {σ}, i.e., it is its own unique best reply.
This means that
Ui(σ−i, σi) > Ui(σ−i, σˆi) for every σˆi ∈ ∆i with σˆi 6= σi and all i ∈ N. ◦
Observe that a strict Nash-equilibrium is, by continuity of the payoff function, the unique best
reply to a neighborhood of itself and therefore, by multilinearity of the payoff function, strict
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Nash-equilibria are pure strategy profiles. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that a strict Nash-
equilibrium is in particular perfect. However, since a normal-form game does not always
have pure Nash-equilibria, the existence of a strict Nash-equilibrium cannot be guaranteed.
Finally, we mention the concept of robustness which has been introduced by Okada (1983). A
robust Nash-equilibrium is like the strict Nash-equilibrium also a best reply to a neighborhood
of itself, however it may not be the only one.
Definition (Okada (1983)). A strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is a robust Nash-equilibrium if there
exists a number ε > 0 such that
σ ∈ β(σˆ) for every σˆ ∈ Bε(σ).
The notation Bε(σ) means {σˆ ∈ ∆ | ||σˆ − σ|| < ε}, where || · || : R|S| −→ R+ denotes the
Euclidean metric. ◦
Like strict Nash-equilibria, also robust Nash-equilibria are in particular perfect, but their
existence cannot be guaranteed.
In the literature many more refinements of the Nash-equilibrium can be found and the theory
of refinements has been proven helpful to eliminate inadequate Nash-equilibria. However,
this theory has also its drawbacks. Not only the amount of refinements which have been
developed, became rather large, and therefore it lost its transparency with respect to which
refinement best suited which situation, but the theory of refinements also assumes that players
act according to a high level of rationality. This may be too demanding. So, the following
question remains:
(ii) ‘Which Nash-equilibrium is more likely to be played if a game
has more than one Nash-equilibrium?’
In an attempt to answer the Questions (i) and (ii), game-theorists picked up the idea of evo-
lutionary game theory, introduced by biologists in studying the evolution of populations of
animals and the individual behavior of their members. The paper by Maynard Smith and
Price (1973) is probably the most important in transferring evolutionary thinking into game
theory. This paper directed game theorist’s attention away from their increasingly elaborate
definitions of rationality. Because if evolutionary game theory can somehow predict the be-
havior of animals, rationality cannot be so crucial. So, instead of asking demanding notions
of rationality, one may ask whether an evolutionary selection process between certain popula-
tions of animals converges towards Nash-equilibria. And if an evolutionary selection process
converges one can study which Nash-equilibrium are in the limit set of such processes.
An approach to formalize this idea of evolutionary game theory is by replacing each player
in the game by an uncountable large population of non-rational individuals. Within each of
these populations there are a finite number of sets of individuals representing a certain pure
strategy of the player, i.e., the individuals in such a set are ‘programmed’ to use the same pure
strategy. So, a pure strategy is a behavioral policy which is not controlled by the individual
itself, but it is controlled by his ‘instinct’. Furthermore, it is assumed that these behavior
policies are heritable traits, i.e., if an individual is playing a certain pure strategy, then in the
next generation its offspring will play the same pure strategy. Note that this implies asexual
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reproduction, i.e., individuals have a single parent. Finally, the payoff to an individual is
assumed to represent fitness, expressed by the number of offspring, i.e., within a generation
individuals with a more successful behavior will have more offspring than individuals with
a less successful behavior. So, the relative measure of each set of individuals, representing a
certain pure strategy of the player, will grow or diminish in the next generation. This means
that over time the relative measure of each set of individuals within every population, and
by that the strategy distribution in every population, changes according to some dynamic
selection process.
In the forthcoming section we describe the class of dynamic selection processes investigated
in this chapter. This class of dynamic selection processes is defined by a set of (ordinary) dif-
ferential equations on the polyhedron of mixed strategy profiles. These differential equations
are defined by the regret-functions which we introduced in Subsection 7.2.2.
7.4 The dynamics
Let f := { fki }[1≤k≤Ki,i∈N ] be a collection of Lipschitz continuous functions from R+
to R+ such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N,
fki (0) = 0 and fki (x) > 0 for all x > 0.
We write F as the family of all such collections of functions f .
In Subsection 7.2.2, we introduced for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N the regret-function
Rki : ∆ −→ R+ which measures the ‘regret’ of player i ∈ N of not having played pure
strategy ski ∈ Si, expressed in the payoff Ui. With these regret-functions Rki and a collection
of functions f ∈ F we define a dynamic selection process with n uncountable populations i
and Ki types of individuals within every population i. Let N ki (t) be the measure of the set
of individuals of type 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki in population i at time t ≥ 0 and Ni(t) the measure of
the population i at time t ≥ 0. Furthermore, we define h > 0 as the step-size of the dynamic
selection process. Given a time t ≥ 0 and given the measures N ki (t) and Ni(t) of each type
1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and every population i, the set of individuals of type k in a population i has a
constant growth-rate of ρki (t) on the interval [t , t + h), i.e., within one step. So, given the
measures Nki (t) and Ni(t) of each type 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and every population i at a given time
t ≥ 0, the measure of the set of individuals of type k in population i in the next step, i.e., at
time t + h equals
Nki (t + h) = N
k
i (t) · [ 1 + h·ρ
k
i (t) ].
The measure of population i at time t + h equals
Ni(t + h) =
Ki∑
`=1
N `i (t)·[ 1 + h·ρ
`
i(t) ] = Ni(t) + h·
Ki∑
`=1
N `i (t)·ρ
`
i(t).
Introducing σki (t) := Nki (t)/Ni(t) for each type 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and every population i, yields,
1
h
·[ σki (t + h)− σ
k
i (t) ] =
σki (t)·ρ
k
i (t)− σ
k
i (t)·
∑Ki
`=1 σ
`
i (t)·ρ
`
i(t)
1 + h·
∑Ki
`=1 σ
`
i (t)·ρ
`
i(t)
.
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By defining σki (t) ·ρki (t) := fki ◦Rki (σ(t)) and by letting the step-size h converge to zero we
obtain the dynamics of our interest. Hence, the following set of differential equations (Df ),
defined on the polyhedron ∆, comports to these dynamics (time indices are suppressed):
σ˙ki = f
k
i ◦R
k
i (σ) − σ
k
i · fi ◦Ri(σ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N. (Df )
With abuse of notation we write fi ◦Ri(σ) :=
Ki∑
`=1
f `i ◦R
`
i (σ) for all i ∈ N .
Remark.
(i) If fki : x 7−→ x for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N , then (Df ) yields the Brown-Von
Neumann-Nash dynamics (see e.g., Berger and Hofbauer (2000), Hofbauer (2000),
Sandholm (2001)),
(ii) For all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N , σki = 0 does not imply σ˙ki = 0 and fki ◦ Rki (σ) > 0
(i.e., Ui(σ−i, ski ) > Ui(σ−i, σi)) does not imply σ˙ki > 0,
(iii) For all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N , if σki = 0, then σ˙ki ≥ 0 and furthermore,
∑Ki
k=1 σ˙
k
i = 0.
Therefore,
σ(t) ∈ ∆ for all t ≥ 0 whenever σ(0) ∈ ∆,
(iv) For every f ∈ F , the map σ 7−→ fki ◦Rki (σ) − σki ·fi ◦Ri(σ) is Lipschitz continuous
on ∆ for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N ,
(v) Let a ∈ ∆, then for every f ∈ F there is a unique solution σa : R+ −→ ∆ of (Df )
with σa(0) = a (Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem, see e.g., Hirsch and Smale (1974)),
(vi) There exists a number L ≥ 0 such that for every a, b ∈ ∆ and T ≥ 0,
||σa(T )− σb(T )|| ≤ e
L·T ·||a− b||,
(vii) If σa(T ) := b for some T > 0, then σb(t) = σa(T + t) for all t ≥ 0. ◦
Let f ∈ F . For every a ∈ ∆ we define Oa(f) := {σa(t) | t ≥ 0} as the orbit of a. A set
A ⊆ ∆ is (Df )-invariant, if Oa(f) ⊆ A for every a ∈ A. By Remark (iii) the polyhedron ∆
is (Df )-invariant and by Remark (vii) the orbit Oa(f) is (Df )-invariant for every a ∈ ∆.
Next, we prove that the (relative) interior of ∆, i.e., int(∆) := {σ ∈ ∆ | σki > 0 for all 1 ≤
k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N}, is also (Df )-invariant.
Proposition 7.3. The interior of ∆ is (Df )-invariant for every f ∈ F .
Proof. Let f ∈ F . Take a ∈ int(∆) and let σ(t) be the (unique) solution of (Df ) with
σ(0) = a. Suppose there exist 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki, i ∈ N and a number T > 0 such that σki (T ) = 0
and σki (t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ). Then for all t ∈ [0, T ),
d
dt
σki (t)
σki (t)
=
fki ◦R
k
i (σ(t))
σki (t)
− fi ◦Ri(σ(t)) ≥ − fi ◦Ri(σ(t)).
Therefore,
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∫ T
0
d
dt
σki (t)
σki (t)
dt ≥ −
∫ T
0
fi ◦Ri(σ(t)) dt.
Hence,
lim
t ↑T
log(σki (t))− log(a
k
i ) ≥ −
∫ T
0
fi ◦Ri(σ(t)) dt.
But σki (T ) = 0, aki > 0 and
∫ T
0
fi ◦Ri(σ(t)) dt < ∞. Contradiction. 2
For every f ∈ F , a strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is a rest-point of (Df ), if {σ} is (Df )-invariant.
Because the set of differential equations (Df ) is derived from the map R : ∆ −→ ∆ used in
the proof of Theorem 7.1, it has the property that only Nash-equilibria are rest-points of (Df )
for every f ∈ F . Intuitively, this means that every dynamics defined by (Df ) cannot get
stuck in a strategy profile which is not a Nash-equilibrium. Let us make this more formal.
Proposition 7.4. Let f ∈ F and let σ ∈ ∆ be a strategy profile. Then σ is a rest-point of
(Df ) if and only if σ is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. ⇒) Let σ be a rest-point of (Df ). Then f ki ◦ Rki (σ) = σki ·fi ◦ Ri(σ) for all
1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N . Suppose fi ◦Ri(σ) > 0 for some i ∈ N . Then
σki > 0 ⇔ f
k
i ◦R
k
i (σ) > 0 ⇔ R
k
i (σ) > 0.
Therefore, ∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
σki ·R
k
i (σ) > 0.
But we also have that∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
σki ·R
k
i (σ) =
∑
k: ski ∈C(σi)
σki · [Ui(σ−i, s
k
i )− Ui(σ−i, σi)] = 0.
Contradiction. So, fi ◦ Ri(σ) :=
∑Ki
`=1 f
`
i ◦ R
`
i (σ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and therefore by the
definition of f ∈ F , we have that Rki (σ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N . According to
Corollary 7.2(v) this means that σ is a Nash-equilibrium.
⇐) Conversely, if σ is a Nash-equilibrium, then Rki (σ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N
(Corollary 7.2(v)). By definition of f ∈ F , this yields that σ˙ki = 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and
i ∈ N . 2
7.5 The limit set and stability
This section contains the main results of our analysis. Our first result states that every strategy
profile b ∈ ∆ which is reachable under (Df ) (i.e., lim
t→∞
σa(t) = b for some strategy profile
a ∈ ∆) is a Nash-equilibrium.
Theorem 7.5. Let f ∈ F , if b ∈ ∆ is reachable under (Df ), then b is a Nash-equilibrium.
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Proof. Let f ∈ F and let σa : R+ −→ ∆ be a solution of (Df ) such that lim
t→∞
σa(t) = b.
Take T > 0. We know that for all t ≥ 0,
||σa(T + t)− σb(T )|| ≤ e
L·T ·||σa(t)− b||.
Because σa(t) → b it follows that σa(t) → σb(T ). Thus σb(T ) = b. Hence, b is a rest-point
of (Df ) and therefore, by Proposition 7.4, it is a Nash-equilibrium. 2
Remark. If b ∈ ∆ is a rest-point, it can be verified that ∆\{b} is (Df )-invariant. So, if b is
reachable from a ∈ ∆ with a 6= b, then there exists no number T > 0 such that σa(T ) = b.
In words, although b is reachable, one needs ‘infinite time’ to reach it from an other strategy
profile a 6= b. ◦
So, for every f ∈ F , if σa(t) converges for some a ∈ ∆, then the limit is a Nash-equilibrium.
But what if σa(t) does not converge for some f ∈ F and a ∈ ∆? In this case, we look at the
limit set of the strategy profile a ∈ ∆.
Definition. Let f ∈ F . For every strategy profile a ∈ ∆ we define the limit set of a ∈ ∆ as,
La(f) := {b ∈ ∆ | lim
m→∞
σa(tm) = b with tm ↑ ∞}. ◦
Loosely speaking, the limit set La(f) of a ∈ ∆ contains all strategy profiles that are approx-
imated arbitrarily close and arbitrarily often by the orbit Oa(f). It turns out that a limit set is
non-empty, closed, connected and (Df )-invariant for every f ∈ F .
Proposition 7.6. Let f ∈ F . For every strategy prof ile a ∈ ∆ the limit set La(f) is
(i) Non-empty, (ii) Closed, (iii) Connected, (iv) (Df )-invariant.
Proof. (i) Let f ∈ F . Suppose La(f) = ∅ for some a ∈ ∆. Then for each b ∈ ∆ there is a
number ε(b) > 0 and a number T (b) ≥ 0 such that
t ≥ T (b) ⇒ σa(t) /∈ Bε(b)(b).
Recall that Bε(c) := {σ ∈ ∆ | ||σ − c|| < ε}. The collection {Bε(b)(b)}b∈∆ covers ∆ and
therefore, due to compactness of ∆, there exists b1, . . . , bp ∈ ∆ such that
p⋃
`=1
Bε(b`)(b`) ⊇ ∆.
Define T := max{T (b`) | ` = 1, . . . , p}. Then σa(t) /∈
p⋃
`=1
Bε(b`)(b`) for all t > T . This
contradicts the (Df )-invariance of ∆.
(ii) Let f ∈ F and take a ∈ ∆. Let b1, b2, . . . be a sequence in La(f) with bm → b. Suppose
b /∈ La(f). So, there is no sequence tm ↑ ∞ with σa(tm) → b. Hence, there is a number
ε > 0 and a number T ≥ 0 such that
σa(t) /∈ Bε(b) for all t ≥ T.
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There exists a number ` ∈ N with b` ∈ Bε(b). Choose ε′ < ε such that Bε′(b`) ⊆ Bε(b).
Because b` ∈ La(f) there exists a number T ′ > T such that
σa(T
′) ∈ Bε′(b`) ⊆ Bε(b).
Contradiction. Hence, b ∈ La(f) and therefore La(f) is closed.
(iii) Suppose there exists an f ∈ F such that La(f) is not connected for some a ∈ ∆. Then
La(f) = A∪A′, with A and A′ non-empty, closed and disjoint sets. Take b ∈ A and b′ ∈ A′.
Then there are sequences tm ↑ ∞ and t′m ↑ ∞ with t′m > tm for all m ∈ N such that
lim
m→∞
σa(tm) = b and lim
m→∞
σa(t
′
m) = b
′.
Let B andB′ be disjoint neighborhoods of A and A′, respectively (note that a neighborhoodB
of a set A is an open set properly containing A). We may assume that σa(tm) ∈ B and
σa(t
′
m) ∈ B
′ for all m ∈ N. Define for all m ∈ N the connected set
σa[tm, t
′
m] := {σa(t) | t ∈ [tm, t
′
m]}.
Then for all m ∈ N there exist a number tm < Tm < t′m such that σa(Tm) ∈ ∆ \ (B ∪ B′).
Because ∆ \ (B ∪ B′) is compact we may assume that σa(Tm) → b′′. And because Tm ↑ ∞
it follows that b′′ ∈ La(f). However, b′′ /∈ A ∪ A′. Contradiction.
(iv) Let f ∈ F and take a ∈ ∆. Let b ∈ La(f) and T > 0. There is a sequence tm ↑ ∞ such
that lim
m→∞
σa(tm) = b. Then T + tm ↑ ∞ and
||σa(T + tm)− σb(T )|| ≤ e
L·T ·||σa(tm)− b||.
Hence, lim
m→∞
σa(T + tm) = σb(T ). And thus σb(T ) ∈ La(f). 2
This chapter investigates when the limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria. In general
this is not the case. This is shown by Hart and Mas-Colell (2003). They provide a class of
three-person normal-form games in which each game has a unique Nash-equilibrium. They
prove that every uncoupled dynamic selection process does not converge to this unique Nash-
equilibrium. A dynamic selection process is said to be uncoupled if for each player i ∈ N
the changes in the weights on each of his pure strategies ski do not depend on the payoff
functions Uj for all j 6= i. This means that σ˙ki does depend on σ and on changes in the
payoff function Ui only, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N . So, a dynamic selection process
in which players act naively and ignore the payoffs of the others, cannot converge to Nash-
equilibria in a general normal-form game. Given an f ∈ F , the dynamic selection process
defined by (Df ) is an example of such an uncoupled process. Therefore, the result of Hart
and Mas-Colell tells us that for these three-person games, the limit sets does not contain a
Nash-equilibrium. To be complete, we repeat the example of Hart and Mas-Colell.
Example (Hart and Mas-Colell (2003)). Let (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+. We define Γ(α, β, γ) as the
class of three-person normal-form games with two pure strategies for each player and the
following payoff:
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0 α
0 1
0 0
1 0
0 1
γ γ
0 α
β 0
1 1
1 0
β 0
0 0
As usual, player 1 chooses the row, player 2 the column and player 3 the matrix. The normal-
form game Γ(1, 1, 1) has been introduced by Jordan (1993). Some calculations yield that
every normal-form game Γ(α, β, γ) has exactly one Nash-equilibrium, namely,
η(α, β, γ) := ( γ1+γ s
1
1 +
1
1+γ s
2
1 ,
α
1+αs
1
2 +
1
1+αs
2
2 ,
β
1+β s
1
3 +
1
1+β s
2
3).
Take (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+ and let f ∈ F . Consider the map H : [0, 1]3 −→ [0, 1]3 defined by
(x , y , z) 7−→ (H1(x, y, z) , H2(x, y, z) , H3(x, y, z))
where for all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]:
H1(x, y, z) := (1− x) · f
1
1
(
(1− x) ·[α− (α + 1)·y]+
)
− x · f21
(
(x ·[(α + 1)·y − α]+
)
H2(x, y, z) := (1− y) · f
1
2
(
(1− y) ·[β − (β + 1)·z]+
)
− y · f22
(
(y ·[(β + 1)·z − β]+
)
H3(x, y, z) := (1− z) · f
1
3
(
(1− z) ·[γ − (γ + 1)·x]+
)
− z · f23
(
(z ·[(γ + 1)·x− γ]+
)
.
Observe that H1(x, α1+α , z) = 0 for every (x, z) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Therefore,
d
dx
H1(x,
α
1+α ,
β
1+β )[x= γ1+γ ]
= d
dz
H1(
γ
1+γ ,
α
1+α , z)[z= β1+β ]
= 0.
Similarly, it follows that
d
dx
H2(x,
α
1+α ,
β
1+β )[x= γ1+γ ]
= d
dy
H2(
γ
1+γ , y,
β
1+β )[y= α1+α ]
= 0
and that
d
dy
H3(
γ
1+γ , y,
β
1+β )[y= α1+α ]
= d
dz
H3(
γ
1+γ ,
α
1+α , z)[z= β1+β ]
= 0.
Hence, the 3× 3−Jacobian matrix J in ( γ1+γ ,
α
1+α ,
β
1+β ) looks like,
J =

 0 c 00 0 d
e 0 0


for some numbers c, d, e ∈ R. Observe that det(J) = cde. After computing the characteristic
polynomial of J , it can be verified that J has at least one eigenvalue with positive real part.
According to the Poincare´-Lyapunov Theorem, this implies that the derivatives ‘lead away’
from ( γ1+γ ,
α
1+α ,
β
1+β ) and therefore it is unstable (see e.g., Hirsch and Smale (1974) for all
the details).
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Combining this observation with the fact that the set of differential equations (Df ) equals,
σ˙11 = H1(σ
1
1 , σ
1
2 , σ
1
3), σ˙
1
2 = H2(σ
1
1 , σ
1
2 , σ
1
3) and σ˙13 = H3(σ11 , σ12 , σ13),
yields for the Nash-equilibrium η(α, β, γ) to be unreachable. Differently, not every limit set
contains the unique Nash-equilibrium. ◦
So, in general a limit set does not contain a Nash-equilibrium. However, our main goal is to
find classes of normal-form games in which for every f ∈ F every limit set is a subset of the
set of Nash-equilibria. To achieve this goal, we search for normal-form games which have a
so-called Lyapunov function for (Df ) (see e.g., Hirsch and Smale (1974)). Let us first repeat
the definition of a Lyapunov function.
Definition. Let f ∈ F . A differentiable function L : ∆ −→ R is a Lyapunov function for
(Df ) if it has the following two properties:
(i) d
dt
L(σa(t)) ≤ 0 for every a ∈ ∆,
(ii) d
dt
L(σa(t))[t=0] = 0 ⇔ a is a rest-point of (Df ). ◦
A Lyapunov function is decreasing on the orbit Oa(f) for every a ∈ ∆. This implies that a
Lyapunov function has a constant value on a limit set.
Lemma 7.7. Let f ∈ F . If L : ∆ −→ R is a Lyapunov function for (Df ) then L is constant
on La(f) for every a ∈ ∆.
Proof. Let f ∈ F and let L : ∆ −→ R be a Lyapunov function for (Df ). Take a ∈ ∆.
Suppose L(b) < L(b′) for certain b, b′ ∈ La(f) with b 6= b′.
Define ε := L(b′)−L(b). There exists a number T ≥ 0 such that
L(σa(T )) < L(b) +
ε
2 .
And thus for all t > T we have that
L(σa(t)) ≤ L(σa(T )) < L(b) +
ε
2 .
Hence, for all t > T ,
L(σa(t)) < L(b
′)− ε2 .
But b′ ∈ La(f). Contradiction. 2
Now we can prove that for normal-form games which have a Lyapunov function for (Df ),
every limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria.
Proposition 7.8. Let f ∈ F . If Γ has a Lyapunov function for (Df ), then La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ)
for every a ∈ ∆.
Proof. Let f ∈ F and take b ∈ La(f) for some a ∈ ∆. Suppose b /∈ NE(Γ), then b is not a
rest-point (Proposition 7.4) and therefore,
d
dt
L(σb(t))[t=0] < 0.
But L is constant on La(f) (Lemma 7.7) and La(f) is (Df )-invariant (Proposition 7.6(iv)).
Contradiction. 2
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Hence, if a normal-form game has a Lyapunov function, then the dynamics defined by (Df )
converge for every f ∈ F only towards Nash-equilibria. Therefore, the main goal of the
remaining part of this section is to find structured classes of normal-form games for which
there exists a Lyapunov function. But before we do so, we end this part of the section by re-
peating the definitions of two well-known stability concepts for dynamic selection processes,
namely, Lyapunov and asymptotic stability. Let us start by giving the definition of Lyapunov
stability.
Definition. Let f ∈ F . A closed (Df )-invariant set A ⊆ ∆ is Lyapunov stable under (Df ),
if for every neighborhoodB of A there is a neighborhoodB′ of A such that
if a ∈ B′∩∆, then σa(t) ∈ B for all t ≥ 0. ◦
Lyapunov stability states that the orbit Oa(f) remains close to A whenever a is sufficiently
close to A. A more demanding definition of stability is asymptotic stability. Besides Lya-
punov stability it also requires the notion of local attractor. This means that σb(t) converges
to A for every b sufficiently close to A. Let us give a more formal definition of this stability
concept.
Definition. Let f ∈ F . A closed (Df )-invariant set A ⊆ ∆ is asymptotically stable under
(Df ), if it is Lyapunov stable and there exists a neighborhood B of A such that Lb(f) ⊆ A
for every b ∈ B ∩∆. ◦
Remark. If σ ∈ ∆ is a strategy profile such that {σ} is Lyapunov or asymptotically stable
under (Df ), then {σ} is in particular (Df )-invariant. Hence, by Proposition 7.4, σ is a Nash-
equilibrium. ◦
For a connected component of the set of Nash-equilibria (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) the
existence of a Lyapunov function for (Df ) closes the gap between Lyapunov and asymptotic
stability. Furthermore, a connected component of NE(Γ) which is asymptotically stable,
is minimal asymptotically stable (i.e., it does not properly contain an asymptotically stable
subset). Lemma 7.9 provides a more formal statement on these two points.
Lemma 7.9. Let f ∈ F and let K be a connected component of Nash-equilibria of Γ which
is Lyapunov stable under (Df ). If Γ has a Lyapunov function for (Df ), then K is minimal
asymptotically stable under (Df ).
Proof. Let f ∈ F and let K be a connected component of NE(Γ) which is Lyapunov stable
under (Df ). We first prove that K is asymptotically stable. There exists a neighborhood B
of K such that
NE(Γ) ∩ cl(B) = K.
We write cl(B) for the closure of B. Then, due to Lyapunov stability of K, there exists a
neighborhoodB′ of K such that
if a ∈ B′ ∩∆, then σa(t) ∈ B for all t ≥ 0.
So in particular, La(f) ⊆ cl(B) for all a ∈ B′ ∩ ∆. Because Γ has a Lyapunov function
for (Df ) it follows, by Proposition 7.8, that La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ) for every a ∈ B′ ∩∆. Hence,
La(f) ⊆ K for every a ∈ B′ ∩ ∆. Hence, K is a local attractor and thus asymptotically
stable.
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Now we prove that K is minimal asymptotically stable. Suppose A is a proper subset of K
which is asymptotically stable. Because K is a component, every neighborhood B of A
contains strategy profiles in K\A. So, in particular σ ∈ NE(Γ). By Proposition 7.4 this
means that σ is a rest-point of (Df ). Hence, A is not a local attractor. Contradiction. 2
Before closing this part of the section we prove a result which we use throughout the forth-
coming subsections. For this purpose, we first need the following definition.
Definition. Let f ∈ F and let L : ∆ −→ R be a Lyapunov function for (Df ). Then a set
A ⊆ ∆ is a local minimizer of L if:
(i) A is connected,
(ii) L is constant on A,
(iii) There exists a neighborhoodB of A such that L(σ) < L(σˆ) for every σ ∈ A and
every σˆ ∈ ∆ ∩ B\A. ◦
Proposition 7.10. Let f ∈ F and let L : ∆ −→ R be a Lyapunov function for (Df ).
Then a connected component of Nash-equilibria on which L has a constant value is minimal
asymptotically stable under (Df ) if and only if it is a local minimizer of L.
Proof. ⇒) Let L : ∆ −→ R be a Lyapunov function for (Df ) and let K be a connected
component of Nash-equilibria which is minimal asymptotically stable under (Df ) and on
which L has a constant value, say it has value L(K). Suppose K is not a local minimizer of
L. Then for every neighborhood B of K there exists a strategy profile σ ∈ B\K such that
L(σ) ≤ L(K). Because L is a Lyapunov function for (Df ) for every f ∈ F and thus strictly
decreasing on ∆\NE(Γ), this implies that K cannot be a local attractor. Contradiction.
⇐) Let L : ∆ −→ R be a Lyapunov function for (Df ) and let K be a connected component
of Nash-equilibria which is a local minimizer of L, say again it has the constant value L(K)
on K. Let B be a neighborhood of K. There exists a neighborhoodB ′ ofK such that L(K) <
L(σ) for every strategy profile σ ∈ B′\K. Define
L0 := min{L(σ) | σ ∈ ∂(B ∩ B
′)},
B′′ := {σ ∈ B ∩ B′ | L(σ) < L0+L(K)2 }.
We write ∂(A) for the boundary of A. Observe that B′′ is a neighborhood ofK and becauseL
is decreasing on B ∩ B′, it follows that
if a ∈ B′′ then σa(t) ∈ B for all t ≥ 0.
Hence, K is Lyapunov stable under (Df ) for every f ∈ F . By Lemma 7.9 this yields that K
is minimal asymptotically stable under (Df ) for every f ∈ F . 2
7.5.1 The limit set and stability in zero-sum games
The current subsection is devoted to investigate the limit set and stability of the dynamics
(Df ), on the class of two-person zero-sum games. This class of normal-form games has been
introduced in Von Neumann (1928). The defining feature is the symmetry in the payoffs,
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i.e., the payoff to player 2 is minus the payoff to player 1. An other way to look at it, is by
saying that both payoffs sum up to zero which explains the term ‘zero-sum’. Let us start by
repeating the formal definition of a zero-sum game.
Definition. A two-person normal-form game Γ := 〈{1, 2}, (∆i)i=1,2, (Ui)i=1,2〉 is a zero-
sum game if U1 + U2 = 0. ◦
Remark. A zero-sum game Γ has a so-called min-max value v(Γ) (Vilkas (1963)). This
value is the payoff player 1 can guarantee himself and −v(Γ) is the payoff player 2 can
guarantee himself. A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆ is a Nash-equilibrium of a zero-sum
game Γ if and only if σ1 and σ2 are optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2 , respectively
(i.e., σ1 guarantees the payoff v(Γ) and σ2 guarantees the payoff−v(Γ)). ◦
Every limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria on the class of zero-sum games. We
prove this statement by showing that for any f ∈ F a zero-sum game has a Lyapunov function
for (Df ).
Theorem 7.11. Let f ∈ F and let Γ be a zero-sum game. Then La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ) for every
a ∈ ∆.
Proof. Let f ∈ F and let F ki be a primitive function of fki (i.e., F˙ ki = fki ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki
and i ∈ {1, 2}. We prove that
σ 7−→
K1∑
k=1
F k1 ◦R
k
1(σ) +
K2∑
`=1
F `2 ◦R
`
2(σ)
is a Lyapunov function for (Df ).
Let σ : R+ −→ ∆ be a solution of (Df ) and take 1 ≤ k ≤ K1, then (time indices are
suppressed),
˙(F k1 ◦R
k
1)(σ) = f
k
1 ◦R
k
1(σ) · [U1
˙(sk1 , σ2)− U1
˙(σ1, σ2)]
= fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ)·
[ K2∑
`=1
σ˙`2 ·[U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)−U1(σ1, s
`
2)]−
K1∑
p=1
σ˙p1 · U1(s
p
1, σ2)
]
. (1)
We start by elaborating on the first part of equation (1). First note that
K2∑
`=1
σ˙`2 · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)] =
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
− f2 ◦R2(σ) ·
K2∑
`=1
σ`2 · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
=
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
− f2 ◦R2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , σ2)− U1(σ1, σ2)].
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Furthermore, note that
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
=
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, σ2) + U1(σ1, σ2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
=
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, σ2)] +
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) ·R
`
2(σ).
The last equality follows from the fact that U1 = −U2 and from the fact that,
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U2(σ1, s
`
2)− U2(σ1, σ2)] = f
`
2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · R
`
2(σ) for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ K2.
Hence, the first part of equation (1) equals,
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) ·
K2∑
`=1
σ˙`2 · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
= fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) ·
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, s
`
2)]
− (fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ)) · (f2 ◦R2(σ)) · [U1(s
k
1 , σ2)− U1(σ1, σ2)]
= fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ)·
( K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, σ2)] +
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) ·R
`
2(σ)
)
− fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , σ2)− U1(σ1, σ2)] · (f2 ◦R2(σ))
= fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) ·
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · [U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, σ2)]
+ fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) ·
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ)·R
`
2(σ) − (f
k
1 ◦R
k
1(σ)·R
k
1(σ))·(f2 ◦R2(σ)). (2)
The last equality follows from the fact that f k1 ◦Rk1(σ) · [U1(sk1 , σ2)− U1(σ1, σ2)] =
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) · R
k
1(σ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K1.
Next, we elaborate on the second part of equation (1). Note that
K1∑
p=1
σ˙p1 · U1(s
p
1, σ2) =
K1∑
p=1
fp1 ◦R
p
1(σ) · U1(s
p
1, σ2) − f1 ◦R1(σ) ·
K1∑
p=1
σp1 · U1(s
p
1, σ2)
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=
K1∑
p=1
fp1 ◦R
p
1(σ) · U1(s
p
1, σ2) − f1 ◦R1(σ) · U1(σ1, σ2)
=
K1∑
p=1
fp1 ◦R
p
1(σ) · [U1(s
p
1, σ2)− U1(σ1, σ2)]
=
K1∑
p=1
fp1 ◦R
p
1(σ) · R
p
1(σ).
Hence, the second part of equation (1) becomes,
−fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ)·
K1∑
p=1
σ˙p1 · U1(s
p
1, σ2) = −f
k
1 ◦R
k
1(σ)·
K1∑
p=1
fp1 ◦R
p
1(σ) · R
p
1(σ). (3)
Adding equations (2) and (3) and taking the sum over 1 ≤ k ≤ K1 yields,
K1∑
k=1
˙F k1 ◦R
k
1(σ) =
K1∑
k=1
K2∑
`=1
(
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ)
)
·
(
f `2◦R
`
2(σ)
)
·[U1(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U1(σ1, σ2)] (4a)
+ (f1 ◦R1(σ)) ·
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · R
`
2(σ) (4b)
− (f2 ◦R2(σ)) ·
K1∑
k=1
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) · R
k
1(σ) (4c)
− (f1 ◦R1(σ)) ·
K1∑
k=1
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) · R
k
1(σ). (4d)
Similarly, it can be derived that
K2∑
`=1
˙F `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) =
K1∑
k=1
K2∑
`=1
(
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ)
)
·
(
f `2◦R
`
2(σ)
)
·[U2(s
k
1 , s
`
2)− U2(σ1, σ2)] (5a)
+ (f2 ◦R2(σ)) ·
K1∑
k=1
fk1 ◦R
k
1(σ) · R
k
1(σ) (5b)
− (f1 ◦R1(σ)) ·
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · R
`
2(σ) (5c)
− (f2 ◦R2(σ)) ·
K2∑
`=1
f `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) · R
`
2(σ). (5d)
Observe that (4b) + (5c) = 0 and that (4c) + (5b) = 0. Furthermore, because U1 = −U2, it
follows that (4a) + (5a) = 0. Therefore,
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K1∑
k=1
˙F k1 ◦R
k
1(σ) +
K2∑
`=1
˙F `2 ◦R
`
2(σ) = −
2∑
i=1
(fi ◦Ri(σ)) ·
Ki∑
k=1
fki ◦R
k
i (σ) ·R
k
i (σ).
Hence, for every f ∈ F a zero-sum game has a Lyapunov function for (Df ). Therefore, by
Proposition 7.8, we can conclude that La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ) for every a ∈ ∆. 2
In Brown and Von Neumann (1950) (see also Hofbauer (2000)) it is shown that for symmetric
zero-sum games every limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria for the Brown-Von
Neumann-Nash dynamics. Since this dynamic selection process is a special case of the dy-
namics defined by (Df ), Theorem 7.11 generalizes this classic result to the asymmetric case.
Another consequence of Theorem 7.11 is the following.
Corollary 7.12. Let Γ be a zero-sum game then lim
t→∞
U1(σa(t)) = v(Γ) for every a ∈ ∆ .
2
So, on the class of zero-sum games every limit set of the dynamic selection process defined
by (Df ) is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria. This gives rise to the question: ‘Which
Nash-equilibria of a zero-sum game are stable?’. Before we study this problem we first have
a closer look at the structure of the set of Nash-equilibria of a two-person normal-form game.
Definition. A subsetN ⊆ ∆ is exchangeable if for each pair (σ1, σ2) and (σˆ1, σˆ2) ∈ N , the
pairs (σ1, σˆ2) and (σˆ1, σ2) are also inN , i.e., the set N is a Cartesian productN1 ×N2 with
Ni ⊆ ∆i for i = 1, 2. A subset N ⊆ NE(Γ) is a Nash-component if N is exchangeable
and convex, and no convex and exchangeable subset of NE(Γ) contains N properly, i.e., N
is maximal. ◦
It is a well-known result that the set of Nash-equilibria of a two-person normal-form game
is the irredundant union of finitely many Nash-components (Jansen (1981)) and that the set
of Nash-equilibria of a zero-sum game consists of exactly one Nash-component. It turns out
that this unique Nash-component is minimal asymptotically stable under (Df ).
Theorem 7.13. Let f ∈ F and let Γ be a zero-sum game. Then the unique Nash-component
of Γ is minimal asymptotically stable under (Df ).
Proof. Let Γ be a zero-sum game and N be the unique Nash-component of Γ. Take f ∈ F .
By Theorem 7.11 we know that
L : σ 7−→
K1∑
k=1
F k1 ◦R
k
1(σ) +
K2∑
`=1
F `2 ◦R
`
2(σ)
with F˙ k1 = fk1 and F˙ `2 = f `2 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K1 and for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ K2, respectively, is a
Lyapunov function for (Df ).
Define L0 :=
∑K1
k=1 F
k
1 (0) +
∑K2
`=1 F
`
2 (0). Note that L(σ) = L0 if and only if σ ∈ N .
Furthermore, since L : ∆ −→ R is a Lyapunov function for (Df ) and N is the unique
Nash-component of Γ, we have that L(σ) > L0 for every σ ∈ ∆ \ N . Hence, N is a
local minimizer. Because N is in particular a connected component of NE(Γ), it follows, by
Proposition 7.10, that N is minimal asymptotically stable under (Df ). 2
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A direct consequence of Theorem 7.13 is that only zero-sum games which have a unique
Nash-equilibrium, like for instance ‘Matching Pennies’ (see the example below), have an
asymptotically stable Nash-equilibrium.
Corollary 7.14. Let f ∈ F and let Γ be a zero-sum game. Then a Nash-equilibrium is
asymptotically stable under (Df ) if and only if it is the unique Nash-equilibrium of Γ. 2
We end this subsection by looking at a classic example of a zero-sum game and investigate
the orbit Oa(f) for a particular f ∈ F .
Example (Matching Pennies). Consider the (two-person) zero-sum game Γ with two pure
strategies for each player and the following payoff:
1 −1
−1 1
−1 1
1 −1
The unique Nash-equilibrium is b := ( 12s
1
1 +
1
2s
2
1 ,
1
2s
1
2 +
1
2s
2
2). Hence, by Theorem 7.11,
La(f) = {b} for every a ∈ ∆ and f ∈ F . According to Corollary 7.14 the Nash-equilibri-
um b is asymptotically stable under (Df ) for every f ∈ F .
Assume that fki (x) := x for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 and i = 1, 2. It is left to the reader to verify that
in this case the map
ρ : t 7−→ (2·σ11(t)− 1)
2 + (2·σ12(t)− 1)
2
is strictly decreasing on R+. So, for every a ∈ ∆ the orbit Oa(f) is a ‘spiral with center b’.
r
r b
a
s21
s12
s11
s22
1
2s
1
1 +
1
2s
2
1
1
2s
1
2 +
1
2s
2
2
Pl
ay
er
1
Player 2
Figure 16. Sketch of an orbit in ‘Matching Pennies’ for the Brown-Von Neumann-Nash dynamics. ◦
7.5.2 The limit set and stability in potential games
In this part of the chapter we restrict ourselves to the class of potential games. This class of
normal-form games has been introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996). They introduce
several concepts of potential games, namely, exact, weighted and ordinal potential games. A
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common feature of these concepts is the existence of a real-valued function defined on the set
of pure strategy profiles S, that incorporates information about the strategic possibilities of all
players simultaneously. Monderer and Shapley prove that for exact and weighted potential
games this real-valued function can be extended to a multilinear function defined on the
polyhedron of mixed strategy profiles ∆. For an ordinal potential game such an extension
may not be possible (see Sela (1992) for an example). This subsection investigates the mixed
extension of exact and weighted potential games which we call shortly potential games. Let
us give the formal definition.
Definition. A normal-form game Γ := 〈N, (∆i)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N 〉 is a potential game if there
exists a multilinear functionP : ∆ −→ R+ and a vector ω ∈ Rn+ of strictly positive numbers
such that for all i ∈ N , for every σ−i ∈ ∆−i and every σi, σˆi ∈ ∆i,
Ui(σ−i, σi) − Ui(σ−i, σˆi) = ωi · [P(σ−i, σi) − P(σ−i, σˆi)].
The function P is a potential for Γ. ◦
Remark. It is easy to verify that strategy profiles maximizing a potential are Nash-equilibria
of the potential game. Due to the multilinearity of the potential, there exists at least one
pure strategy profile maximizing the potential. Hence, every potential game has pure Nash-
equilibria. ◦
The limit set is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria on the class of potential games. We
prove this by showing that a potential game has a Lyapunov function for (Df ).
Theorem 7.15. Let f ∈ F and let Γ be a potential game. Then La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ) for every
a ∈ ∆.
Proof. Let f ∈ F and let P : ∆ −→ R be a potential for Γ. We prove that
σ 7−→ −P(σ)
is a Lyapunov function for (Df ).
Let σ : R+ −→ ∆ be a solution of (Df ), then (time indices are suppressed),
P˙(σ) =
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
P(σ−i, s
k
i ) · σ˙
k
i
=
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
P(σ−i, s
k
i ) ·
[
fki ◦R
k
i (σ)− σ
k
i · fi ◦Ri(σ)
]
Note that
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
P(σ−i, s
k
i ) · σ
k
i · fi ◦Ri(σ) =
∑
i∈N
fi ◦Ri(σ) ·
Ki∑
k=1
P(σ−i, s
k
i ) · σ
k
i
=
∑
i∈N
fi ◦Ri(σ) · P(σ).
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Therefore,∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
P(σ−i, s
k
i ) ·
[
fki ◦R
k
i (σ)− σ
k
i · fi ◦Ri(σ)
]
=
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
P(σ−i, s
k
i ) · f
k
i ◦R
k
i (σ) − P(σ) ·
Ki∑
`=1
f `i ◦R
`
i (σ)
=
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
fki ◦R
k
i (σ) · [P(σ−i, s
k
i ) − P(σ)].
Because fki ◦ Rki (σ) > 0 ⇔ Rki (σ) > 0 ⇔ P(σ−i, ski ) > P(σ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and
i ∈ N it follows that
−P˙(σ) = −
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
fki ◦R
k
i (σ) · [P(σ−i, s
k
i )−P(σ)]+.
Hence, for every f ∈ F a potential game has a Lyapunov function for (Df ) and therefore, by
Proposition 7.8, La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ) for every a ∈ ∆. 2
In Subsection 7.5.1 we prove that on the class of (two-person) zero-sum games the map
σ 7−→
K1∑
k=1
F k1 ◦R
k
1(σ) +
K2∑
`=1
F `2 ◦R
`
2(σ)
in which F˙ k1 = fk1 and F˙ `2 = f `2 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K1 and 1 ≤ ` ≤ K2, respectively, is a
Lyapunov function for (Df ). However, this is not true on the class of (two-person) potential
games. This statement is a straightforward consequence of the following theorem.
Theorem 7.16. Let f ∈ F . If Γ is a normal-form game for which the map
L : σ 7−→
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
F ki ◦R
k
i (σ) (6)
in which F˙ ki = fki for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N , is a Lyapunov function for (Df ), then Γ
has a single connected component of Nash-equilibria.
Proof. Take f ∈ F and let Γ be a normal-from game for which L : ∆ −→ R is a Lyapunov
function for (Df ). Define
L0 :=
∑
i∈N
Ki∑
k=1
F ki (0).
Observe that L(σ) = L0 if and only if σ is a Nash-equilibrium and therefore NE(Γ) =
{σ ∈ ∆ | L(σ) = L0}. Furthermore, since L : ∆ −→ R is a Lyapunov function for (Df ) we
have that L(σ) > L0 for every σ ∈ ∆\NE(Γ).
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Suppose there exists a number M ≥ 2 such that NE(Γ) =
⋃M
m=1Km with Km a connected
component for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M . Define, for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M,
Am := {a ∈ ∆ | La(f) ⊆ Km}.
It can be readily seen thatAm is (Df )-invariant and non-empty for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M . Further-
more, observe that Km is a local minimizer of L. Therefore, by Proposition 7.10, it follows
that for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M the component Km is minimal asymptotically stable and thus there
exists a neighborhood Bm of Km such that Km ⊆ Bm ⊆ Am. Finally, observe that since⋃
mKm = NE(Γ) and La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ) for every a ∈ ∆ we have that
⋃
mAm = ∆.
To obtain a contradiction, we first prove that Am is closed for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M . Take 1 ≤
m ≤ M and let a1, a2, . . . be a sequence in Am such that ap → a. Suppose a /∈ Am, then
a ∈ Am′ for some 1 ≤ m′ 6= m ≤ M . There exists a number T > 0 such that σa(T ) ∈ Bm′ .
Select ε > 0 such that Bε(σa(T )) ⊆ Bm′ and take p ∈ N such that ||ap − a|| < ε · e−L·T .
Then
||σap(T )− σa(T )|| ≤ e
L·T ·||ap − a|| < ε.
Hence, σap(T ) ∈ Bε(σa(T )) ⊆ Bm′ ⊆ Am′ . But Lap(f) ⊆ Am. This contradicts the
(Df )-invariance.
So, Am is a closed set for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M . However, since Am is non-empty for all
1 ≤ m ≤ M and
⋃
mAm = ∆ it follows that Am ∩ Am′ 6= ∅ for some 1 ≤ m 6= m′ ≤ M .
This means that for a strategy profile a ∈ Am ∩Am′ , it holds that La(f) ⊆ Km ∩ Km′ . But
Km ∩ Km′ = ∅. Contradiction. 2
Given the fact that in general the set of Nash-equilibria of a potential game is not connected,
Theorem 7.16 yields that for every f ∈ F the map stated in (6) in which F˙ ki = fki for all
1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N is not a Lyapunov function for the class of potential games. Hence,
for this class of normal-from games we indeed need a Lyapunov function different from the
one for the class of zero-sum games.
The property that for potential games the map σ 7−→ −P(σ) is a Lyapunov function for (Df )
in fact states that the dynamics defined by (Df ) satisfy the property which Sandholm (2001)
calls positive correlation. Since, for every f ∈ F the Nash-equilibria are exactly the rest-
points of (Df ) (Sandholm calls this property non-complacency) we can use the results by
Sandholm for stability of Nash-equilibria on the class of potential games. To do so, we first
repeat a result by Sandholm (2001). It states that a potential P : ∆ −→ R has a constant
value on a smoothly connected component K of Nash-equilibria. The set K is smoothly
connected if for all σ, σˆ ∈ K there exists a continuous and piecewise differentiable curve
α : [0, 1] −→ K such that α(0) = σ and α(1) = σˆ. For the sake of completeness we give
also a proof of this statement.
Proposition 7.17. Let Γ be a potential game with potential P : ∆ −→ R. If K is a smoothly
connected component of Nash-equilibria, then P is constant on K.
Proof. LetK be a smoothly connected component of NE(Γ) and take σ, σˆ ∈ K. There exists
a continuous and piecewise differentiable curve α : [0, 1] −→ K such that α(0) = σ and
α(1) = σˆ. Define
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γ : [0, 1] −→ R
τ 7−→ P ◦ α(τ).
Suppose P(σˆ) > P(σ). Then there exists a number τˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that d
dτ
γ(τ)[τ=τˆ ] > 0.
Therefore,
0 < d
dτ
γ(τ)[τ=τˆ ] =
d
dτ
P ◦ α(τ)[τ=τˆ ] =
〈
∇P(α(τˆ )) , d
dτ
α(τ)[τ=τˆ ]
〉
, (6)
in which∇P : ∆ −→ R|S| denotes the gradient of P and
〈
· , ·
〉
is the inner product on R|S|.
Define r := d
dτ
α(τ)[τ=τˆ ]. Then r 6= 0 (according to (6)). Furthermore, note that rki ≥ 0
whenever α(τˆ )ki = 0 and that rki ≤ 0 whenever α(τˆ )ki = 1 (otherwise the curve α would
leave ∆ and time τˆ ). Select h > 0 such that α(τˆ ) + h·r ∈ ∆ and let i ∈ N . Then
Ki∑
k=1
P(α(τˆ )−i , s
k
i )·[α(τˆ )
k
i + h·r
k
i ] = P(α(τˆ )) + h ·
Ki∑
k=1
P(α(τˆ )−i, s
k
i ) · r
k
i
= P(α(τˆ )) + h ·
Ki∑
k=1
∇P(α(τˆ ))ki · ∇α(τˆ )
k
i . (7)
Because α(τˆ ) ∈ K ⊆ NE(Γ) we have that α(τˆ )i ∈ βi(α(τˆ )−i). By definition, this means
that
P(α(τˆ )−i, α(τˆ )i + h·ri) ≤ P(α(τˆ )−i, α(τˆ )i) = P(α(τˆ )).
Combining this observation with equation (7) yields,
Ki∑
k=1
∇P(α(τˆ ))ki · (
d
dτ
α(τ)[τ=τˆ ])
k
i ≤ 0.
Hence, we can conclude that
〈
∇P(α(τˆ ) , d
dτ
α(τ)[τ=τˆ ]
〉
≤ 0. But this contradicts equa-
tion (6). As a result, the potential P is constant on K. 2
Combining the fact that σ 7−→ −P(σ) is a Lyapunov function for (Df ) with the results of
Proposition 7.17 and Proposition 7.10, the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 7.18 (Sandholm (2001)). Let f ∈ F and let Γ be a potential game with potential
P : ∆ −→ R. A smoothly connected component of Nash-equilibria of Γ is minimal asymp-
totically stable under (Df ) if and only if it is a local maximizer of P (i.e., a local minimizer
of −P). 2
Since, no connected set of completely mixed strategy profiles can be a local maximizer of a
potential, the following result can be derived from Theorem 7.18 and Lemma 7.9.
Corollary 7.19. Let f ∈ F . If Γ is a potential game, then no smoothly connected component
of NE(Γ) contained in the interior of ∆ is Lyapunov stable. 2
Because a strict Nash-equilibrium is in particular a local maximizer of a potential, Theo-
rem 7.18 yields also the following result.
Corollary 7.20. Let f ∈ F . If Γ is a potential game, then a Nash-equilibrium of Γ is
asymptotically stable under (Df ) if and only if it is strict. 2
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7.5.3 Strategic equivalence
In this subsection we extend some of the results of the previous two subsections to strategic
equivalent games. We start by giving the definition of the concept of strategic equivalence
for non-cooperative games. Given a set of players N and mixed strategy spaces (∆i)i∈N ,
we write G for the set of all non-cooperative games with player set N and (not necessarily
multilinear) payoff functions (Ui)i∈N defined on the polyhedron ∆.
Definition. The non-cooperative games Γ and Γ′ in G with payoff functions (Ui)i∈N and
(U ′i )i∈N respectively, are strategic equivalent if there exists a strictly positive vector λ ∈ Rn+
and (arbitrary) functions Vi : ∆−i −→ R for all i ∈ N such that for every σ ∈ ∆,
U ′i(σ) = λi ·Ui(σ) + Vi(σ−i) for all i ∈ N.
We write Γ ∼ Γ′ if and only if Γ and Γ′ are strategic equivalent. ◦
Indeed, ∼ defines an equivalence relation on G. Furthermore, it is straightforward and not
surprising that NE(Γ′) = NE(Γ) whenever Γ ∼ Γ′. A similar result holds for the dynamics
studied in this chapter, as we now demonstrate. Given Γ ∈ G and f ∈ F , we write (Df)Γ for
the set of differential equations (Df) with respect to the normal-form game Γ.
Proposition 7.21. Let Γ, Γ′ ∈ G such that Γ ∼ Γ′ and let f ∈ F , then there exists a g ∈ F
such that (Df)Γ = (Dg)Γ′ .
Proof. Let Γ, Γ′ ∈ G, with payoff functions (Ui)i∈N and (U ′i)i∈N respectively, such that
Γ ∼ Γ′. Then there exist a strictly positive vector λ ∈ Rn+ and functions Vi : ∆−i −→ R for
i ∈ N such that U ′i(σ) = λi ·Ui(σ) + Vi(σ−i) for all i ∈ N .
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N . Observe that
[U ′i(σ−i, s
k
i ) − U
′
i(σ−i, σi)]+
= [λi ·Ui(σ−i, s
k
i ) + Vi(σ−i) − (λi ·Ui(σ−i, σi) + Vi(σ−i))]+
= λi ·[Ui(σ−i, s
k
i )− Ui(σ−i, σi)]+.
Hence, Rki (σ|Γ′) = λi ·Rki (σ|Γ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N .
Let f ∈ F and define gki := fki ◦ Λi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N , where Λi : x 7−→ λi ·x
for all i ∈ N . Clearly, we have {gki }[1≤k≤Ki,i∈N ] ∈ F and furthermore,
gki ◦R
k
i (σ|Γ) = f
k
i ◦R
k
i (σ|Γ
′) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki and i ∈ N.
Hence, (Dg)Γ = (Df)Γ′ . 2
Combining Proposition 7.21 along with Theorem 7.11 and Theorem 7.15 one can directly
verify the following result.
Corollary 7.22. Let Γ, Γ′ ∈ G such that Γ ∼ Γ′ and let f ∈ F .
(i) If Γ is a zero-sum game, then La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ′) for every a ∈ ∆,
(ii) If Γ is a potential game, then La(f) ⊆ NE(Γ′) for every a ∈ ∆. 2
Observe that the second part of Corollary 7.22 can also be derived from the fact that if Γ ∼ Γ′
and Γ is a potential game, then Γ′ is also a potential game.
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7.6 Example
Recall from Subsection 7.5.2 that on the class of potential games only strict Nash-equilibria
are asymptotic stable under (Df ) for any f ∈ F . Since, also for the replicator dynamics
only strict Nash-equilibria are asymptotic stable (Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)), it may be
of interest to point out that the dynamics defined by (Df ) still ‘behave’ differently on the
class of potential games than the replicator dynamics. To do so, we need the concept of a
robust Nash-equilibrium (Okada (1983)) which is a best reply to a neighborhood of itself, but
not necessarily unique. For a more precise definition we refer to Section 7.3. Ritzberger and
Weibull (1995) prove that a robust Nash-equilibrium is Lyapunov stable under the replicator
dynamics. However the forthcoming example of a potential game, illustrates that in general
this is not true for the dynamics defined by (Df ).
Additionally, this example is used to illustrate three more phenomena. First of all, we use the
example to emphasize the problem between asymptotic stability and Nash-equilibria. By the
results of Corollary 7.14 and Corollary 7.20 it follows that many normal-from games do not
have an asymptotically stable Nash-equilibrium. Of course, this is due to the fact the small-
est possible asymptotic stable set is a connected component of Nash-equilibria (Lemma 7.9).
Nevertheless, although such a component may be asymptotically stable, a proper subset of
Nash-equilibria may be selected by the dynamics defined by (Df ), but the concept of asymp-
totic stability cannot distinguish it from the connected component. Secondly, recall from
Proposition 7.3 that the (relative) interior int(∆) of ∆ is (Df )-invariant for every f ∈ F .
Now, assume that b ∈ ∆ is reachable under (Df ) from a strategy profile a ∈ int(∆).
Then we have a sequence {σa(t)}t∈R+ of completely mixed strategy profiles converging
to b. This might suggest for b ∈ ∆ to be a perfect Nash equilibrium (see Subsection 7.3 for
the definition). We show in the example that this is not the case. Here, for several f ∈ F
this limit b may not be a perfect Nash-equilibrium. This means that although σa(t) → b,
the strategy profile b is for every t ∈ R+ not an element of the best reply correspondence
β(σa(t)) (i.e., for every t ∈ R+, there exists a player i ∈ N such that bi /∈ βi(σa(t)−i)).
Finally, we use this example to show that for a given strategy profile a ∈ ∆ the limit set
La(f), and therefore the orbit Oa(f), depends on the choice of the functions f ∈ F .
Example (Potential game). Consider the two-person potential game Γ with two pure strate-
gies for player 1 and three pure strategies for player 2 and the following payoff:
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 1 0
Every Nash-equilibrium of Γ is contained in the connected component
K = {s11 ×∆2} ∪ {∆1 × [σ
3
2 = 0]}.
The set of perfect and the set of robust Nash-equilibria of Γ coincide and are given by (see
Figure 17)
PR = {s11 ×∆2} ∩ {∆1 × [σ
3
2 = 0]} = {s
1
1 × [σ
3
2 = 0]}.
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The notation [σ32 = 0] is an abbreviation of {σ2 ∈ ∆2 | σ32 = 0}. In this example, we
distinguish between two different cases:
Case (1). First, take f ∈ F with the additional assumptions that
f11 (x) = x
κ, f12 (x) = α·x
κ and f22 (x) = β ·xκ
for some numbers α, β, κ > 0. Observe, that there are no extra assumptions on f 21 and on f32 .
Since R21(σ) = R32(σ) = 0 for every σ ∈ ∆, the set of differential equations (Df ) equals:
σ˙11 = (1− σ
1
1)·[(1− σ
1
1) · σ
3
2 ]
κ,
σ˙12 = (α − (α + β)·σ
1
2) · [(1− σ
1
1) · σ
3
2 ]
κ,
σ˙22 = (β − (α + β)·σ
2
2) · [(1− σ
1
1) · σ
3
2 ]
κ.
Note that σ˙21 = − σ˙11 and that σ˙32 = − [σ˙12 + σ˙22 ]. Take a ∈ ∆ \ K and let σ : R+ −→ ∆ be
the (unique) solution of (Df ) with σ(0) = a. Then, by some straightforward calculations, it
follows that for all t ≥ 0,
σ11(t) = 1−
1− a11
[(1 + α + β)·(1− a11)·(1− a
1
2 − a
2
2) · t + 1]
1
(1+α+β)
,
σ12(t) =
α
α+β − (
α
α+β − a
1
2)·
[1− σ11(t)
1− a11
]α+β
,
σ22(t) =
β
α+β − (
β
α+β − a
2
2)·
[1− σ11(t)
1− a11
]α+β
.
Hence, σ11(t) → 1 whenever t →∞. Therefore, it follows that
lim
t→∞
σ1(t) = (1, 0) and lim
t→∞
σ2(t) = (
α
α+β ,
β
α+β , 0).
So, given α, β > 0, only the robust Nash-equilibrium b(α, β) := (s11, αα+β s
1
2 +
β
α+β s
2
2) is
reachable from every a ∈ ∆ \ K, i.e., which is not a rest-point and therefore only {b(α, β)}
is Lyapunov stable. Observe that for all t ≥ 0,(
β − (α + β)·a22
)
· σ12(t) −
(
α− (α + β
)
·a12) · σ
2
2(t) = β · a
1
2 − α · a
2
2.
This means that for every a ∈ ∆ the orbit Oa(f) is a straight line (see Figure 17).
The connected component K is minimal asymptotically stable, and therefore b(α, β) is not
asymptotically stable for every α, β > 0. So, although, given α, β > 0, the limit set La(f)
is exactly the Nash-equilibrium b(α, β) for every a ∈ ∆ \ K, this Nash-equilibrium is not
selected by the concept of asymptotic stability. This illustrates that the notion of local attrac-
tor, and by that the concept of asymptotic stability, may be too demanding for evolutionary
selection dynamics, since it does not select b(α, β) from the other Nash-equilibria.
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Figure 17. The orbits Oa(f) in Case (1), given α, β > 0. The gray part corresponds with the connected component
of Nash-equilibria K and the dark line with all possible limit sets for every α, β > 0.
Case (2). Second, take f ∈ F with the additional assumptions that
f11 (x) = x
κ, f12 (x) = α·x
κ+1 and f22 (x) = β ·xκ+1
for some numbers α, β, κ > 0. Again there are no extra assumptions on f 21 and on f32 .
Since R21(σ) = R32(σ) = 0 for every σ ∈ ∆, the set of differential equations (Df ) becomes,
σ˙11 = (1− σ
1
1)·[(1− σ
1
1) · σ
3
2 ]
κ,
σ˙32 = −(α + β)·σ
3
2 · [(1− σ
1
1) · σ
3
2 ]
κ+1.
Note that σ˙21 = − σ˙11 and that [σ˙12 + σ˙22 ] = − σ˙32 . Take a ∈ ∆\K and let σ : R+ −→ ∆ be
the (unique) solution of (Df ) with σ(0) = a. Then, by some straightforward calculations, it
follows that for all t ≥ 0,
σ32(t) =
a32
a32 ·(α + β)·(σ
1
1(t)− a
1
1) + 1
.
Furthermore, we have again that for all t ≥ 0,(
β − (α + β)·a22
)
· σ12(t) −
(
α− (α + β
)
·a12) · σ
2
2(t) = β · a
1
2 − α · a
2
2
which means that the orbit Oa(f) is a straight line. Combining these two results yields
that σ(t) converges to some strategy profile b ∈ K. However, b32 = lim
t→∞
σ32(t) 6= 0 and
therefore b is not a perfect Nash-equilibrium.
Observe that in Case (1) and in Case (2) the limit set La(f) for a given strategy profile a ∈ ∆
depends on the choice of α and β and therefore on the choice of the functions f ∈ F . ◦
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal onderwerpen binnen de speltheorie. Deze tak vanwiskunde houdt zich bezig met het formeel modelleren van conflictsituaties en het
eventueel aandragen van oplossingen. Een conflictsituatie kan een klassiek spel zijn, maar
ook een economische situatie waarin vele individuen participeren, ieder met zijn eigen voor-
keuren, capaciteiten, kennis en gedrag. Van oudsher wordt er een onderscheid gemaakt tussen
non-coo¨perative en coo¨perative speltheorie. De laatst genoemde tak binnen de speltheorie
bestudeert situaties waarin de betrokken partijen (de spelers) tot bindende afspraken kunnen
komen, terwijl non-coo¨perative speltheorie conflictsituaties bestudeert met een meer com-
petitief karakter.
Een veel gebruikte manier om een coo¨peratieve situatie te modelleren is aan de hand van
een spel met overdraagbaar nut, een zogenaamd TU-spel. Dit eenvoudige model heeft als
belangrijkste eigenschap dat de betrokken spelers de vruchten van hun samenwerking gelijk
waarderen. Dit is alleszins een redelijke aanname wanneer de te verdelen opbrengst in termen
van geld kan worden uitgedrukt en alle betrokkenen dezelfde waardering voor geld hebben.
Naast het modelleren is het geven van oplossingsconcepten een belangrijk aspect van de
speltheorie. Bijvoorbeeld in de coo¨perative speltheorie is de vraag of en hoe de spelers
samenwerken onlosmakelijk verbonden met de vraag wat die samenwerking uiteindelijk voor
iedereen oplevert. Anders gezegd, het geven van een oplossingsregel die door alle spelers als
‘eerlijk’ wordt beschouwd kan als een motivatie dienen om samen te werken. In het begin
van het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift worden enkele oplossingsconcepten voor TU-
spelen herhaald. Een van deze concepten is de core. Kortweg is een voorgestelde verdeling
van de totale opbrengst een core element als er ge´e´n groep van spelers bestaat die zich kan
verbeteren. Hoewel de core een heel natuurlijk oplossingsconcept lijkt te zijn, is het vrij
eenvoudig om voorbeelden van TU-spelen te maken waarvoor er geen core element bestaat.
Een ander bekend oplossingsconcept, waarvoor bovenstaand probleem niet opgaat, is de bar-
gaining set. Deze verzameling van oplossingsregels is gebaseerd op het idee dat alvorens
de spelers tot een verdeling van de opbrengst komen, er voorstellen worden gedaan waarte-
gen gemotiveerde bezwaren gemaakt kunnen worden. Alleen allocaties waarvoor al deze
bezwaren verworpen worden, zijn elementen van de bargaining set. Twee andere oplos-
singsconcepten die in verband staan met bargaining set zijn de reactive bargaining set en de
semireactive bargaining set. Beide oplossingsconcepten zijn ook gebaseerd op het idee dat
ieder gemotiveerd bezwaar van een speler tegen een andere speler, door de laatste verworpen
moeten kunnen worden. De verschillen liggen in de informatie die een speler heeft over de
bezwaren van zijn opponent, alvorens hij zo’n bezwaar moet weerleggen. Omdat core ele-
menten in ieder van deze drie bargaining sets liggen en de bargaining sets voor TU-spelen
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niet leeg zijn, kan ieder van deze verzamelingen van oplossingsregels als een uitbreiding van
de core gezien worden. Dit leidt tot de vraag: ‘Wanneer vallen de core en een van deze
bargaining sets samen?’.
Deze vraag wordt in Hoofstuk 2 bestudeert voor symmetrische TU-spelen. Hoewel voor
deze eenvoudige klasse van TU-spelen een bargaining set element niet de meest voor de hand
liggende oplossingsregel is, geeft deze klasse van spelen een goed beeld van de verschillen
tussen deze drie bargaining sets. Daarnaast wordt een symmetrisch TU-spel gebruikt om een
verrassende en opmerkelijke relatie tussen de bargaining set en de core te laten zien. Een
dertien-persoons symmetrisch TU-spel laat zien dat de core en bargaining set samenvallen
voor alle mogelijke waarden van de totaal te verdelen opbrengst behalve voor precies e´e´n
waarde. Daar is de bargaining set gelijk aan de core verenigd met een eindig aantal allocaties
buiten de core.
In Hoofstuk 3 wordt coo¨peratieve speltheorie toegepast om ruil-economie¨n met ondeelbare
goederen en geld te bestuderen. In deze economie¨n hebben spelers, ook wel agenten ge-
noemd, een aantal ondeelbare goederen plus een hoeveelheid geld in hun bezit, die ze met
elkaar kunnen ruilen. In het grootste gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk worden de drie bargaining
sets uit Hoofdstuk 2 gebruikt om tot ‘goede’ verdelingen van de goederen en het geld te
komen. In deze context zijn ieder van de drie bargaining sets niet leeg zodra iedere agent
genoeg geld heeft, dat wil zeggen de ruil-economie voldoet aan de zogenaamde Total Abun-
dance (TA) conditie, e´n de preferenties van de agenten gerepresenteerd kunnen worden met
quasi-lineaire nutsfuncties. Voorbeelden tonen aan dat in dit resultaat ge´e´n van deze voor-
waarden zonder meer kunnen worden weggelaten.
Dit hoofdstuk stelt zich ook ten doel om een e´e´n-op-e´e´n correspondentie te maken tussen
oplossingsconcepten voor TU-spelen en oplossingsconcepten voor ruil-economie¨n. Hoewel,
op het eerste gezicht de ondeelbaarheid van de goederen moeilijk lijkt te rijmen met het
overdraagbaar nut van TU-spelen, kan er wel degelijk een link worden gelegd tussen beide
modellen. Zodra in een ruil-economie de nutsfuncties quasi-lineair zijn en er wordt boven-
dien aan de TA-conditie voldaan, dan kan ieder (semi)reactive bargaining set element in de
economie worden vertaald in een (semi)reactive bargaining set element van het bijbehorende
TU-spel, en omgekeerd. Een soort gelijke bewering geldt voor de core zodra het bijbehorende
spel gebalanceerd is. Voor de bargaining set gaat deze redenering niet op. De reden hiervoor
ligt in het feit dat een bargaining set element in de ruil-economie niet individueel rationeel is.
Kortweg betekent dit dat in zo’n allocatie een agent een bundel krijgt die hij minder waardeert
dan zijn oorspronkelijke bundel. Allocaties in de overige twee bargaining sets zijn echter wel
individueel rationeel.
In de laatste paragraaf van dit hoofdstuk wordt een relatie gelegd tussen TU-spelen en het
bestaan van prijs-evenwichten in een ruil-economie met ondeelbare goederen en geld. Hier
wordt bewezen dat elk niet-negatief en superadditief TU-spel een ruil-economie met een
prijs-evenwicht genereerd, zodra het spel een niet-lege core heeft.
Hoofstuk 4 houdt zich ook bezig met economie¨n met ondeelbare goederen en geld. Echter,
in tegenstelling tot Hoofdstuk 3 hebben agenten nu geen initieel bezit. De vraag is wederom
of er ‘eerlijke/goede’ allocaties van de objecten en het geld bestaan. Omdat de nutsfuncties
hier niet meer quasi-linear zijn, wordt er niet gekeken naar oplossingsconcepten uit de the-
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orie van TU-spelen. Het eerste normatieve concept voor een eerlijke verdeling waar naar
gekeken wordt, is een allocatie die ge´e´n afgunst opwekt. Een allocatie wekt geen afgunst op,
wanneer iedere agent zijn toegekende bundel het meest waardeert over alle andere bundels
in de allocatie. Het belangrijkste resultaat van dit hoofdstuk zegt dat zo’n verdeling bestaat,
zodra de preferentie relaties van de agenten continue en strikt monotoon in geld zijn en aan
de archimedische eigenschap voldoen. Deze laatste eis zegt zoveel dat alle goederen door
geld gecompenseerd kunnen worden. Voorbeelden laten zien dat de continuı¨teit alsmede de
archimedische eigenschap van de preferentie relaties niet zomaar kunnen worden weggelaten
voor de existentie van allocatie waarin niemand elkaar benijdt.
Een eenvoudig voorbeeld van een economie met twee agenten en twee ondeelbare goederen
laat zien dat alle Pareto optimale allocaties afgunst kunnen opwekken. Een allocatie is Pareto
optimaal wanneer ge´e´n agent zijn positie kan verbeteren zonder de positie van de overige
agenten te schaden. Het niet compatibel zijn van deze twee begrippen laat dus zien dat om
afgunst te vermijden een verdeling gekozen moet worden die niet optimaal is, in de zin dat
iedere agent er op vooruit kan gaan door de goederen en het geld anders te verdelen.
Hoofdstuk 5 bekijkt de situatie waarin bewoners van dorpen, die via een vast boom-netwerk
met elkaar verbonden zijn, inkomsten krijgen zodra ze verbonden zijn met de wortel van deze
boom. Hierbij kan bijvoorbeeld gedacht worden aan een irrigatie-systeem; de wortel is een
meer en de takken van de boom zijn de kanalen in het systeem. Zodra een speler (bewoner
van een dorp) over water beschikt (d.w.z. een (in)directe verbinding heeft met de wortel),
kan hij zijn brood verdienen. De kanalen in het irrigatie-systeem brengen bepaalde kosten
met zich mee (bijvoorbeeld reinigings-kosten). De vraag die er nu gesteld wordt is wat iedere
speler van zijn inkomsten moet afgeven om samen de totale kosten van het netwerk te kunnen
betalen.
Om dit probleem op te lossen wordt bij deze boom met inkomsten een coo¨peratief TU-spel
geconstrueerd en wordt de nucleolus van dit spel als een oplossingsregel voorgesteld. Het
grootste gedeelte van het hoofdstuk houdt zich bezig om aan de hand van een gegeven boom-
netwerk en de individuele inkomsten van de spelers, de nucleolus op een efficiente manier
uit te rekenen. Daarnaast word deze oplossingsregel gekarakteriseerd. Dat wil zeggen er
wordt een lijst van zeven ‘redelijke’ eigenschappen van oplossingsregels geı¨ntroduceerd en
bewezen dat de nucleolus de enige oplossingsregel is die aan alle eigenschappen voldoet.
Tenslotte wordt bewezen dat de nucleolus van een boom met opbrengsten op drie verschil-
lende manieren monotoon is. Ten eerste is de nucleolus kosten-monotoon, wat zoveel wil
zeggen dat alle spelers meer betalen zodra de kosten van een tak toenemen. Aan de andere
kant, wanneer de inkomsten van een speler toenemen, dan hoeft volgens de nucleolus iedere
speler minder te gaan betalen. Met andere woorden, de nucleolus van een boom met opbreng-
sten is inkomsten-monotoon. De nucleolus is ook populatie-monotoon. Dit wil in feite zeggen
dat iedere speler meer gaat betalen zodra een bewoner van een dorp het netwerk verlaat.
In Hoofdstuk 6 worden processing spelen geı¨ntroduceerd. Deze TU-spelen worden gebruikt
om de gezamenlijke kosten van een processing situatie eerlijk over de betrokkenen te verde-
len.
In een processing situatie heeft iedere speler een individuele capaciteit om taken te ver-
werken. Bij een taak kan bijvoorbeeld gedacht worden aan het oplossen van een complex
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stelsel vergelijkingen via de computer en de capaciteit als rekensnelheid van deze computer.
Iedere speler is verantwoordelijk voor e´e´n taak. Gedurende iedere tijdseenheid dat een taak
van een speler niet af is worden er kosten in rekening gebracht. Door eventueel samen te
werken kunnen taken eerder afgerond worden en op deze manier kunnen dus kosten wor-
den bespaard. Wanneer een groep spelers besluit om samen te werken, dan heeft deze een
capaciteit ter grootte van alle individuele capaciteiten ter beschikking, om de taken van alle
leden van de groep te voltooien. Hoewel er geen restricties zijn op welke manier de spelers dit
zouden moeten doen, kunnen de minimale kosten gerealiseerd worden door op ieder tijdstip
de volledige capaciteit voor precies e´e´n taak te gebruiken en de taken in een vaste volgorde
af te handelen. Deze optimale volgorde kan worden bepaald via zogenaamde urgenties van
de taken.
Gegeven hoe een groep spelers optimaal kan samenwerken in een processing situatie, is de
volgende vraag hoe deze spelers de totale minimale kosten moeten verdelen. In dit hoofdstuk
wordt een antwoord op deze vraag gegeven door voor iedere processing situatie een expliciete
kosten-verdeling te definie¨ren die aan de core-condities van het bijbehorende processing spel
voldoet. Deze allocatie van de totale kosten wordt verkregen door middel van een prijs-
evenwicht in een geschikt gekozen ruil-economie met land.
In Hoofdstuk 7 krijgen we te maken met non-coo¨peratieve speltheorie. Zoals eerder gezegd
is het in deze tak van speltheorie niet mogelijk om bindende afspraken te maken en staan de
spelers als ‘concurrenten’ tegenover elkaar. Een bekend model in non-coo¨peratieve spelthe-
orie is het zogenaamde spel in normale vorm. In dit model participeren een eindig aantal
spelers. Iedere speler beschikt over een eindig aantal acties. Als iedere speler, tegelijk en
onafhankelijk van elkaar, e´e´n van zijn acties kiest, leidt dit tot een uitkomst en is het spel
afgelopen. Iedere speler heeft zijn eigen waardering voor elk van de mogelijke uitkomsten.
Een belangrijk probleem in de non-coo¨peratieve speltheorie is welke actie een speler moet
kiezen om voor hem de ‘beste’ uitkomst te realiseren. Omdat deze uitkomst niet alleen
van zijn eigen acties af hangt, maar ook van de acties van zijn tegenstanders, is deze vraag
verre van triviaal. Het misschien wel meest beroemde oplossingsconcept in non-coo¨peratieve
speltheorie is de verzameling van Nash-evenwichten. Een Nash-evenwicht geeft aan iedere
speler een actie met de eigenschap dat dit de beste actie is, gegeven de acties van de overige
spelers. Anders gezegd, e´e´nzijdig afwijken levert aan een speler geen hogere uitbetaling.
Een belangrijke vraag die ten grondslag ligt aan dit evenwicht is hoe spelers er toe komen
om gezamenlijk zo’n Nash-evenwicht te spelen. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden is er in de
literatuur een link gelegd tussen speltheorie en evolutietheorie. In dit hoofdstuk wordt dit
idee geformaliseerd aan de hand van een dynamisch selectie proces, gebaseerd op een stelsel
differentiaal-vergelijkingen. De belangrijkste resultaten zeggen dat voor twee-persoons nul-
som spelen en voor n-persoons potentiaal spelen dit proces naar de verzameling van Nash-
evenwichten convergeert. Intuı¨tief zegt dit dat voor deze twee klasse van normale-vorm spe-
len een evolutioneer selectie proces bestaat dat naar Nash-evenwichten convergeert.
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